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This volume is the proceedings of the National Conference 
on “Consciousness, Experience and Ways of Knowing; Perspectives 
from Science, Philosophy and the Arts” held at the National Institute 
for Advanced Studies, Bangalore from 6-7 February 2006. Many 
distinguished scientists, philosophers and artists spoke at the 
conference. The invited speakers included M rinalini Sarabhai,
B. V. Sreekantan, K. Ramakrishna Rao, S. Mahadevan, Sumantra 
Chattarji, Shatavadhani R. Ganesh, C. S. Unnikrishnan, Nataraja 
Sarma, M. Srinivasan, R. L. Kapur, Narayanan Srinivasan and Sharada 
Srinivasan. A hundred people, including scholars, students, engineers, 
doctors, et al. attended the conference. Dr. K. Kasturirangan, Director 
of NIAS gave the welcome and opening remarks. The Conference 
ended with a panel discussion. We thank all the speakers who not 
only took the time to come to the conference and speak but also to 
send in their papers for this volume in time. Our sincere thanks to 
the Global Perspectives on Science and Spirituality Award Program 
(jointly managed by the Interdisciplinary University of Paris, France, 
and Blon University USA, with funding from the John Templeton 
Foundation) for facilitating this conference. The Conference was 
made a lively and engaging event with the participation of several 
registered participants who came not only from Bangalore but also 
other cities of India. Thanks to Ms. V. B. Mariyammal for assisting 





Director, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
I  welcome all distinguished speakers and participants to this 
two-day National Conference on “Consciousness, Experience and 
Ways of Knowing: Perspectives from Science, Philosophy and the 
Arts”.
Along with nanotechnology, biotechnology and information 
technology, brain studies is considered to revolutionize human 
experience in the coming decades. The last few decades have seen 
tremendous achievements in not only creating new technologies and 
theories to understand life, nature and the universe, but also have 
brought back the human factor into discussions like never before.
Consciousness studies is one area that has emerged as a 
significant one in bringing disciplines together and redefining the 
basic questions we ask with an emphasis on the role of experience. 
Today the significant role of interdisciplinarity in understanding the 
various facets of the human mind and brain encourages scholars to 
sit together and chum the foundational structures of their questions 
and methods.
The limits of ways of knowing seem to extend with new 
insights into the complex nature of the human mind. The divide 
between the two cultures is no more a definite and rigid one. The 
erstwhile strict quantitative neural approaches today give significant 
place for more qualitative ideas on agency, memory, aesthetic 
experience and so on. Some time back in his famous Reith lectures 
to the BBC, the noted neuroscientist Dr. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran,
Vll
Director of the Centre for Brain and Cognition at the University of 
California in San Diego, said that the solution to the problem of 
aesthetics lies in a more thorough understanding of the connections 
between the thirty visual centers in your brain and the emotional 
limbic structures. According to him, once we have achieved a clear 
understanding of these two connections, we will be closer to bridging 
the huge gulf that separates C. P. Snow’s two cultures - science on 
the one hand, arts, philosophy and the humanities on the other. With 
more of these connections getting a clear place in the way we present 
knowledge systems, we could be at the dawn of a new age where 
specialization becomes old-fashioned and a new twenty-first century 
version of the Renaissance man is bom.
This two-day conference will present varied approaches to 
understand, appreciate and learn from basic human experiences with 
focus on specific theories of knowledge and method. The questions 
and issues that will be raised will include the nature of reality 
according to science in the light of understanding consciousness, the 
neurobiology of memory, the theory and experience of rasa and beauty 
in Indian aesthetics, consciousness and cognitive anomalies, brain 
and meditative experiences, the importance of experience in the world 
of science, etc.
I w elcom e all o f you to this exciting  conference on 
Consciousness, Experience and Ways of Knowing. I thank the eminent 
scholars who have come from Bangalore and outside and agreed to 
speak to all of us. I am sure that this conference would be a very 
fruitful one and an interesting one and in Sangeetha’s words, “Let a 
million ideas bloom”. But I would like to cut down the million to a 




Fellow, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
Today often the issue that gathers focus inspite of its evasive 
nature, in d iscussions on consciousness, cognition, or even 
advancem ents in nanotechnology and biotechnology, is about 
Experience with a capital ‘E ’. The last few decades have seen 
tremendous achievements in not only creating new technologies and 
theories to understand life, nature and universe, but also have brought 
back the human factor into discussions.
C onsciousness studies is one area that has em erged a 
significant one in bringing disciplines together as well as posing the 
challenge of the ‘binding problem’ of subjective experience. The 
puzzle how neural, discrete and quantitative processes give rise to 
consciousness that is subjective, unitary and qualitative has expanded 
the domain of consciousness studies to include as many different 
forms of human experience and ways of knowing.
Do experience and the way we understand have significant 
roles in altering our ideas about consciousness? This is one question, 
which we would explore in this two-day conference.
According to Thomas Kuhn, the late historian and philosopher 
of science, much of what we learn, including science, is by example. 
When we learn by example, we learn how to do something, not 
necessarily knowing everything that is involved in doing it. This kind 
of knowing was termed tacit knowledge by Michael Polanyi, where 
we do not fully know what it is that we know.
IX
So, is knowledge tentative and related to how far we extend 
our paradigms? Is the concept of ‘what is knowledge’ quite different 
in the sciences, humanities and arts? What is the role of experience 
in influencing knowledge systems? These questions will be recurring 
today and tomorrow.
Another interesting phenomenon is about the theory of 
emergence. Considering the inherent non-reducibility in theory of 
emergence how do we understand a complex phenomenon? The 
theory of emergence emphasizes that the phenomenon of emergent 
order deals with organization, with the higher levels showing new 
properties that are not evident at the lower levels. The unique 
properties and behavior of complex systems arise from how the parts 
are arranged and interact. These properties and behavior cannot be 
fully explained by breaking that order down into its component parts. 
Considering this inherent non-reducibility, how do we understand a 
complex phenomenon like consciousness and subjective experience? 
What is complexity?
This conference will address the persistent puzzles and 
attempted solutions in consciousness studies, developments in 
cognitive sciences, and the distinct ways of knowing and experiencing 
in science, philosophy and the arts in the context of the Indian 
discourse. It is hoped that such a discussion will help to examine the 
emerging trends in these areas and also explore the place of 
‘experience’ in knowledge systems.
The Concept of Beauty in Indian Aesthetics
MRINALINISARABHAI
Darpana, Ahmedabad.
In every aspect of Indian classical tradition, the beauty of the 
human being has been compared to the elements of nature. An 
exquisite love scene from the Tamil epic Shilappadikaram speaks of 
the hero Kovalan’s first night with his beloved Kannaki.
The scene was “as if the sun and moon had together bathed 
the entire world clasped by the sea in their light. He wore a wreath of 
jasmines in b loom ....her’s was a garland of shimmering red and 
purple water lilies....” Kovalan addresses his beloved :
“Dear Kannaki, wasn’t the moon bom with you when it became 
your forehead, and Kama the shadowy god of love pledged 
his lofty sugarcane bow to you when it became your two dark 
eyebrows. Eclipsed by your beauty the bejeweled peacock 
which hides itself in the fresh woods, helpless before your 
elegant step, the swan vanishes into a field of limpid water.”
The association of the birds, the animals, the universal features 
of the forest glades to human beauty and energy, is symbolic of India’s 
close affiliation with nature. The moon gave the radiance to the face 
of the beloved, the eyes resembled the deer or like the Goddess 
Meenakshi, the shape of the fish. When the bee hovers around 
Shakuntala in Kalidasa’s immortal classic Shakuntala the King 
Dushyanta remarks ;
“Again and again you touch her quivering eyes with their 
tremulous comers having beside her ear you hum sweetly as 
though whispering a secret, though she moves her hand, you 
drink the nectar of her lower lip the essence of joy -  O bee 
you are indeed blessed!”
The bee has always held a special place in people’s heart -  
perhaps not only for the precious honey, but also revered as a 
protector. Vishnu in the Rig Veda is often symbolized as a blue 
coloured bee resting on a lotus, and Kamadeva’s bow has the string 
fashioned from a cluster of bees.
In the philosophical text Saundaryalahari by Sankaracharya, 
which extols the beauty of Devi in ecstatic terms, the poet writes:
“With naturally curly locks as beautiful as young bees 
encircling it your face shames the beauty of the lotus.
When your eyebrows are slightly arched, 0  you who are 
devoted to banishing the fear of the worlds... the beauty of 
your limbs is like paths of splendor from the fresh sun strung 
with your two eyes, which are like bees....”
While bees represented signs of love hovering around the 
beloved, the swan or hamsa was a messenger. In the story of Nala 
and Damayanti, it is a swan that carries the message of love and acts 
as go-between.
The story is very beautiful. King Nala of Nishada, wanted to 
seek the hand of the Vidarbha Princess Draupadi who was courted 
even by the Gods. From his palace he sends a swan to woo her and 
Damayanti is captivated. The great artist Ravi Varma, whose paintings 
are some of the most exquisite in the world of art has pictured the 
heroine Damayanti with the swan, in one of his beautiful portrayals 
of women.
Mrinalini Sarabliai
A  moving scene tells us of Damayanti capturing the golden 
swan. The swan led her to a secluded part of the garden, and she 
almost fainted when it placed its white head almost caressing her 
and spoke:
“O princess Damayanti, there is a king named Nala who has
no peer among men. In my wanderings I have seen no one
equal to Nala and his energy is like the ceaseless flow of the
Ganga river.”
Through the swan’s words, Damayanti falls in love with the 
Nishada king.
When the marriage was celebrated, the beautiful palace was 
decorated with images of nature. In a multitude of colour the queen 
of the Nagas rising from Patala was depicted. At the top of the pillar 
was a picture exquisitely drawn of Garuda. The brocade hangings 
were patterned with images of birds set with emeralds, rubies and 
pearls. The garments of the women looked like white moonlight, the 
colour of jasmine flowers, and emeralds like the green of young 
bamboos.
Damayanti, gorgeously dressed, looked exquisite. As Nala 
entered the room, her dark eyes like deep pools shone in the moonlight 
and as she smiled, her teeth were white as cammrinle petals.
Nature in Sanskrit poetry encourages lovers and helps them 
to meet together. A leaf is a letter Sakuntala writes to the king. Many 
manuscripts were written on palm leaves and exist even today. The 
Natyasastra of Bharata was a valuable treatise on palm leaves. In 
Orissa this tradition still continues for manuscripts and paintings.
In the play Vikram and Urvashi, the Vidusaka tells the king 
Vikram a:
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“The bower of Atimukta creepers has a seat to receive you 
having dropped flowers because of the black bees clashing 
against them. Sitting here you may forget your longing for the 
beautiful Urvashi.”
In all our ancient stories poetry, music and dance forms, nature 
plays an important part. After a dance performance, apart from the 
golden coins, the dancers received a crown of green leaves as related 
in the Tamil classic Shilappadikaram.
An ancient story of the origin of music tells us of the great 
sage Svati. The great sage Svati once went to collect water at a pond. 
Large raindrops driven by the wind struck the lotus leaves. He saw 
and heard the nada went back to his hermitage and contemplated the 
creation of sounds on an earthen pot.
Great kings had as their emblems tigers and lions adored on 
their flags. Tamil poetry pays homage to the elements in songs of 
praise. An ancient song describes ;
“Let us bless the Moon, let us bless the Moon 
like an umbrella of pollen laden flowers 
it covers and cools the earth with light
Let us bless the Sun, we bless the Sun
eternal traveler around the goldem mount Meru
a symbol of the loved king of the lord of the Cauveri river
We bless the Rain, we bless the Rain 
pouring from on high, generous as the Ruler 
of the Earth surrounded by the Sea, ever benign.”
Throughout Indian literature, nature has been an important 
aspect of all artistic heritage of the deep spiritual insight. Rishis 
meditated under trees and great sages like the Buddha received 
enlightenment while searching for Truth under the Bodhi tree.
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An interesting episode about how trees are cut and made into 
images with deep reverence is related in the Bhavishya Parana when 
Narada muni speaks;
“O thou tree, salutations!
Thou art selected to be 
carved into this second image 
Please accept this offering.
May all the spirits residing in 
this tree, transfer their habitation 
elsewhere after accepting the 
offering made according to our ruler.
May they pardon me today 
For disturbing them.”
Love poems to Krishna dominate Indian literature and dance. 
Jayadeva’s Geeta Govindam is known throughout India and one 
instance of Krishna’s words to Radha, depicts the great affiliation of 
art to nature’s beauty.
Krishna, the Beloved Blue God appeals to his beloved in 
eloquent terms:
“Your moist lips glow
Like crimson bandhuka blossoms
Your tender cheeks, like pale madhuka petals.
Angry Radha! Your eyes defeat 
The dark blue lotuses in beauty 
Your nose is a sesame flower 
Your teeth are white jasmine.
Availing of the beauty of your face 
Love’s flower arrows conquer worlds.”
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Science, Reality and Consciousness
B.V.SREEKANTAN
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
The original puqjose of science was essentially to understand 
what is happening around us and how to interpret them in terms of as 
few hypotheses as possible. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge 
was the original aim of science and all the applications came in spite 
of pursuing science with this objective.
Charies Townes, the Nobel laureate gives this definition for 
‘science’: “Science is the attempt to understand the structure of the 
universe and how it works, including ourselves. Religion is the attempt 
to understand the purpose and meaning of the universe including 
ourselves”.
Of course, George Bernard Shaw always had his own way of 
saying: “Science is always wrong. It never solves a problem without 
raising more problems”.
And Popper says: “Science is a process of problem solving 
and explanation seeking”.
Of the many definitions of science some are purely for the 
sake of knowledge, and the other go into technology, applications 
etc. I will concentrate essentially on what science has done about 
explanation of the universe.
Purpose of Knowledge
The origin of the universe is fixed at 13.6 billion years. If you go 
back in time and ask the question what the universe was at various 
times, the picture is very different from what it is today. Today, there 
are so many billions of people on the earth. There was a time when 
there was no human being on the earth. There was a time when there 
was no life on the earth. Even the earth was not there some five 
billion years ago. If you ask the question ‘what is really reality’, then 
you have to immediately ask another question to what point of time 
you are referring to. Because reality itself, in a sense, has changed, 
unless you define reality in such a way that it is something which 
doesn’t change. What is it that we look for when we ask the question, 
‘what is reality’?
Reality is different at different levels, particularly in the 
reductionist approach. For a chemist it is enough to know up to about 
molecules or so. Nothing beyond molecules is relevant for him. He 
can do all his chemistry. A biologist also can go up to the molecule, 
stop there and then essentially do 90 to 95% of his biology. He does 
not have to bother anything beyond. But, on the other hand, if you go 
to a physicist, he has to go further down and worry about atoms and 
structure of the atoms, the nuclei, structure of nuclei, the structure 
of fundamental particles and so on. The question of reality is a 
question of ‘for whom’ and ‘who is addressing that question’. It is 
not something which is the same for everybody. Philosophically you 
may say, that there is only one kind of reality, that is absolute reality. 
The question is what is absolute reality? Is there one? And if it is so, 
what is the use of it, as far as we are concerned? Supposing there is 
something which is there, and which you can’t access, which you 
can’t describe and which we don’t know when it was created. The 
question that follows is what is the use of it, from any point of view, 
except from the point of view, of one who just wants to know the
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ultimate truth for the sake of knowing it. It has absolutely no use as 
far as many of us are concerned, neither in normal life nor in the 
academic life. When the question of reality arises what matters is its 
purpose.
Symbols and Correlations
There are various ways of approaching this question. Let us take a 
simple example of looking at, say, a rose flower. When I look at it, 
two things happen. One is what happens in the mind. There is a 
distinct perception and recognition of the flower. Then, of course, 
immediately you recognize its smell, colour, softness, symmetry, 
beauty of the flower. You may also recall some associations with the 
rose. That means, memory is immediately triggered. How does all 
this happen? What is the scientist’s explanation of it?
The scientist wants to relate mind and consciousness to the 
activity of the brain. What is it that is registered in the brain? What 
happens in the brain is: first the retinal image is activated - the rods 
and cones in the eye - and then generation of action potentials. These 
are electrical potentials that are triggered. They are all of practically 
the same duration and the same amplitude. But depending on what 
the scenario is, what the details are, the relative frequencies of 
triggering of action potentials changes and these potentials are 
transmitted through the millions of neurons to particular areas of the 
cortices of the brain. Vision is connected with the visual cortex. 
Millions of neurons are connected from the eye to the visual vortex. 
In passing through each single neuron the pulse has to encounter 
enormous amount of obstructions. It has to go through what are called 
sy n ap ses. In the synapses, the e lec trica l signals stop , a 
neurotransmitter chemical is released. Again this neurotransmitter 
chemical passes through some distance in the synapse. Whether the 
pulse should be sent forward or stopped is decided by other neurons 
that are there by the side. What should happen in each synapse is
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determined not only by one particular neuron but also by the 
associated neurons in the neighbourhood and sometimes the synapse 
is quite far off also. Finally, the bundle of electrical signals go to the 
cortex and more neurotransmitter chemicals are released. That is all 
that we know from all the developments in neurosciences. We have 
to relate the release of these neurotransmitter chemicals and electrical 
pulses to what we call consciousness, namely the softness of the 
petal, the color of the flower or the smell of the flower. All that we 
find is some kind of correlations. Various kinds of tomographs, 
scanning instrum ents and the laser instrum ents give us these 
correlations.
In the whole of science we establish nothing but correlations. 
For example, we use mathematical symbols in equations and relate 
them to what is happening elsewhere. If you want to study the 
planetary motions, you reduce them to the equations of Newton, work 
out the consequences and then predict. In all these we work through 
the symbols. In fact, for the sake of mathematics, we can even 
represent the entire sun by one point and the entire earth by another 
point. Mathematics takes over the functioning of prediction and we 
completely lose sight of what is happening physically there. It 
becomes much more complicated when we go into more subtle 
phenomena that we encounter in the field of quantum mechanics. 
For example, in the case of radioactivity, the alpha particle is inside 
the nucleus and later on it is outside. Though we record registration 
of an alpha particle outside, there is no way we can construct its 
trajectory . As science advances, we find that it becom es a 
representation of one set of quantities by another set of quantities. 
This is where consciousness plays an extremely important role. We 
can see that ultimately it is consciousness that is transforming signals 
into something that is qualitative. Without consciousness, you 
appreciate none of these. There is no smell; there is no color, there is 
nothing.
Science. Reality and Consciousness
The Imperceptible Substratum and Nothingness
Einstein says, “Matter, when we perceive, is merely nothing but a 
great concentration of energy in very small regions. We may therefore 
regard matter as being constituted of space in which the field is 
extremely intense. Field is the only reality” . We start with very 
concrete matter. We think we understand what matter is and how 
matter is converted into various forms. But, ultimately, reality 
according to Einstein, is just field. What is the field? We just can’t 
imagine it because we can only give a mathematical definition. 
Because there is no longer a physical entity which we can identity as 
field. The whole role reverses. And finally we start thinking of matter 
in terms of field and its manifestations.
Dirac says all matter is created out of some imperceptible 
substratum, which is nothingness according to him. Nothingness is 
ultimately what we call quantum mechanical vacuum. Reality is only 
quantum  m echanical vacuum  and fluctuations of it - either 
spontaneous fluctuations or something you bring about by deposition 
of energy, and that is responsible for creation. Nothingness according 
to Dirac is unimaginable, and undetectable. But it is a peculiar form 
of nothingness out of which all matter is created. Ultimately, we come 
to a situation where what we thought we would be able to concretize, 
ends in being reduced to symbols.
Weinberg says that the present level of understanding seems 
to be all about elementary quantum fields. They are very simple 
because they are governed by symmetries. They are not objects with 
which we are familiar. In fact, our ordinary intuitive notions of space, 
time, causation, substance and so on lose meaning in that scale. We 
want to know something much more substantial. But we end up in 
things that we have to only postulate.
To his amazement Bohm found that, once they were in a 
plasma, electrons stopped behaving like individuals and started
B. V. Sreekantan
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behaving as if they were part of a larger and interconnected whole. 
Although their individual movements appeared random, vast numbers 
of electrons were able to produce effects that were surprisingly well 
organized. Like some amoebic creature the plasma constantly 
regenerated itself and enclosed all impurities in a wall in the same 
way that biological organisms might encase a foreign substance in a 
cyst. This brings up another important aspect of the way things 
happen, i.e. individual behavior and collective behavior are very 
different. We cannot on the basis of individual behavior predict what 
is going to happen collectively. As a matter of fact, the whole field of 
emergence, which is today becoming one of the important areas of 
investigation, is just that you cannot predict what happens. In as much 
as in social sciences you cannot predict crowd behavior by studying 
individuals. Many phenomena are happening because of the collective 
action of many individual entities resulting in coherence effects and 
emergence. What Bohm says is that even electrons lose their identity 
once they are in the company of other electrons and you cannot predict 
their behaviour.
When a physicist looks at quantum reality or relativistic reality, 
he is not looking at things in themselves -  noumenon -  a direct and 
non-mediated reality. Rather, the physicist is looking at nothing but 
a set of abstract differential equations, not a reality itself but a 
mathematical symbol of reality. Heisenberg says, “It is important to 
realize that the behavior of smallest particles cannot be described 
unambiguously in ordinary language. The language of mathematics 
is still adequate for a clear cut account of what is going on”. But the 
question really is: Is that the kind of reality we are looking for?
The Subjective and the Objective
Schrodinger, the author of the famous book, which inspired many 
scientists to become biologists, said, “The scientific picture of the 
world around me is very deficient. It gives a lot of information, puts 
all our experience in a magnificently consistent order but it is grossly
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silent about all and sundry, that is really near to our heart, that really 
matter to us. It cannot tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and 
sweet, physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing about 
beautiful and ugly, good or bad, god and eternity. Science sometimes 
pretends to answer questions in that domain, but answers are very 
often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously. In brief, 
we do not belong to the material world that science constructs for us. 
We are not in it. We are outside it. Because it is the criterion of 
objectivity that we use in science. We take out subjectivity and then 
try to explain everything in terms of what we call objective reality.”
Schrodinger continues: “We are only spectators. The reason 
why we believe that we are in it, that we belong to that picture is 
because our bodies are in that picture, our bodies belong to it. Not 
only my own body, those of my friends, also of my dog and cat and 
house and all other people and animals. And this is the only means 
of communicating with them. Moreover, my body is implied in quite 
a few of more interesting changes, movements that go on in this 
material world and is implied in such a way that I feel myself partly 
the author of these goings-on. But then comes the impasse, this very 
embarrassing discovery of science that I am not needed as an author. 
Within the scientific world picture all these happenings take care of 
themselves. They are amply accounted for by direct energy interplay. 
Even the human body movements are its own, as Sherrington puts it. 
“The scientific world picture vouches a very complete understanding 
of all that happens. It makes it a little too understandable. It allows 
you to imagine the total display as that of a mechanical clockwork, 
which, for all that science knows, could go on just the same, as if it 
does without there being consciousness, will, endeavor, pain, delight 
and the responsibility connected with it, though they actually are. 
This is the kind of situation in which we are. We want answers to 
these questions but science is not able to answer them and the reason 
for this disconcerting situation is just this - that for the purpose of 
constructing the picture of the external world, we have used the great
B. V. Sreekantan
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simplifying device of cutting our own personality out, removing it, 
hence it is gone, it has evaporated. It is ostensibly not needed. In 
particular, and most importantly, this is the reason why the worldview 
contains of itself no ethical values, no aesthetic values, not a word 
about our own ultimate scope or destination, no God, if you please, 
whence I came, whither I go. Science cannot tell us a word about 
why music delights us or why and how an old song moves us to 
tears. Science, in principle, describes in full detail all that happens in 
the latter case, i.e. why tears come to our eyes, in our sensorium and 
motorium from the moment the waves of compression and dilatation 
reach our ear to the moment when certain glands secrete a salty fluid 
that emerges from our eyes, but of the feelings of delight and sorrow 
that accompany the process science is ignorant and therefore reticent”.
Schrodinger wrote this nearly fifty years ago. More recendy 
Francis Crick came up with his famous hypothesis that all our joys, 
all our sorrow, etc is nothing but the neurons being activated. There 
is nothing else other than the play of neurons that are responsible for 
all the emotions. He wrote this in The Astonishing Hypothesis. The 
hypothesis was that there is nothing else other than the activity of 
the neurons to explain everything. After two hundred and sixty-five 
pages of this beautifully written book, he comes to the very strange 
conclusion that this hypothesis may be right or it may be totally 
wrong; there may be some other religious or other explanation.
Nature controls everything. That is what Einstein calls -  
‘cosmic religion’. Einstein comes to the conclusion that just by 
randomness and chaos operating all this can not happen. What he 
says is that there is a cosmic intelligence. But we should make a 
difference between a personal god and the cosmic intelligence.
What is the methodology of science? The methodology of 
science is to understand all phenomena in terms of, constituents and 
the forces. There may be alternative methods, for example, somebody 
might say I will understand it by just contemplation or meditation.
Science, Reality and Consciousness
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Those are different from science. The methodology that we have 
adopted so far in the field of science is by the method of trying to 
correlate one thing to the other and trying to find out what is the 
cause, what is the effect up to the level we can proced. For example, 
in the last fifty years the advent of all different kinds of tomographic 
instruments has given us much more insight into what is happening 
inside the brain, and neurons. This is the power of technology. But 
ultimately it has not given the answer we are looking for. When you 
consider the question of ultimate realities, the ultimate truths, we 
find that science is in an impasse.
In Popper and Eccles’ book The Self and Its Brain two positions 
are taken. One is a deterministic evolution: It was predetermined 
that human beings will come into this earth and have consciousness 
and so on. But there is another aspect, probability, chance and 
uncertainty, which make the evolution of a system somewhat 
contingent on different parameters.
Whatever approach you take finally you are not getting a right 
answer.
It is all right to talk in terms of generalities. When we go into 
details of mechanism we find that there is no adequate answer. That 
has been the problem with science also. We all use Newton’s laws 
for nearly three hundred years. We all assumed Newton’s laws and 
then did so many calculations, without understanding the fundamental 
question how the force acted at a distance. When somebody asked 
Newton, how the force acted at a distance, he said, “God only knows”. 
At the same time you can’t question the validity of Newton’s laws, 
or the usefulness of Newton’s laws. In our way to analyze these 
fundamental problems we end up with the feeling that science is 
prepared for changes. That is the strength of science.
There is no doubt that a lot of effort is going on in the field of 
science, particularly in the field of biological sciences to understand
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many of the intricacies of life, consciousness etc. and to find out 
what the ultimate realities are. But, ultimately, we end up in a situation 
where science is not giving the answers that you would like to have 
for the most fundamental questions. In fact, Schrodinger says that 
when I do something, say I lift my finger, there is a will on my part 
that is responsible for it. We cannot say just the atoms in my brain 
are responsible for it.
We ask the question, what is the ‘I’ that is there? When I say, 
“I do it”, “I will”, etc. The question is, “What is this I?” Schrodinger 
says: The only possible inference is that ‘I’, in the widest meaning 
of the word, is to say every conscious mind that ever said or felt “I” 
am the person, if any, who controls the “motion of atoms” according 
to the Laws of Nature. This insight is not new. The earliest records 
date back to some two thousand five hundred years or more, from 
the early Upanishads. The recognition Atman equals Brahman - the 
personal self equals the omnipresent, all-comprehending eternal self 
-  is an Indian thought considered far from being blasphemous to 
represent the quintessence of deepest insights into the happenings of 
the world. Schrodinger came to this conclusion nearly fifty to sixty 
years ago, long before the developments that have taken place in 
many sciences. In fact, in the last fifty or sixty years, the developments 
in science are fantastic. There is absolutely no question about it. But 
none of the developments, as far as I can make out, have made any 
dent in changing the final outcome of the conclusions to which some 
of these scholars of the pre-1950 days had come. Eddington, Max 
Planck, most of them who are Nobel laureates who have written on 
this subject, became a kind of ‘mystics’. They are all, after all, 
scientists who really developed science. They were driven to some 
kind of mysticism because in their serious attempts at understanding 
what is happening they ended up being mystics, throwing up their 
hands and saying that as far as the ultimate reality is concerned, we 
have to say that there is something beyond science. While science is 
certainly contributing quite a lot to our stream of knowledge, we
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should not forget that science is one of the many streams that are 
there. Science is just one of the streams that contributes to the 
knowledge and has been, of course, of great value in improving life 
in so many respects.
For example, the average life of an Indian has gone up from 
thirty years to seventy years or so and you can straightaway attribute 
it to the benefits of science. There is no question about it. But at the 
same time, when we ask the question -  about ultimate realities and 
insights, we have no option but to keep our minds very open.
B. V. Sreekantan
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Denying Experience in tlie Physical World: 
Consciousness Misled
C.S.I
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai.
Human consciousness is perhaps the only subject of study 
that has attracted serious attention, as a topic of thought and 
discussion, of people in all walks of life. This is perhaps because 
everybody has something to say about ‘It’, rightly, from experience. 
The vastness of the possibilities of speculations has also brought in 
considerable amount of mysticism, glorification, trivialization etc. 
into the literature on consciousness studies, along with some insights. 
Indeed, we usually see samples of all these in conferences on topics 
related to consciousness studies. The individual or the collective 
human consciousness itself has no innate way of determining whether 
statements on its properties and abilities are true, false, or irrelevant. 
Indeed, even at a more primary level, it has no innate ability to decide 
which of a set of linguistic statements about the plausible truths in 
the physical universe is a true statement. The topic of this paper is 
this serious and crucial inability of the complex entity called 
consciousness and some of its consequences in seeking knowledge. 
I will use some examples from history and from the present situation 
in physical sciences to illustrate the central point.
Experience plays a very important role in seeking and gaining 
knowledge. When situations are designed specifically to gain 
experience, we are talking about experiments. Recognizing the 
conceptual implications of empirical experiences require a high level 
of awareness and feel for the physical universe and its behaviour. I
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will explore how collective objective scientific knowledge of our 
times could be grossly off the mark because of the denial of experience 
and of the results of experiments in particular. Such situations arise 
in the physical sciences due to efficient biasing of scientists’ collective 
consciousness, generally thought to be immune to such bias, by 
specificities of theoretical descriptions, as well as due to factors of 
sociology, politics and even religion.
We usually assume that the ability to do logical reasoning and 
analysis is innate to human beings. As a starting point one may accept 
that for some reason human beings are able to use logic in a simple 
and natural way according to certain rules of reasoning that seems 
acceptable to most people. In occasions when logic is used, it also 
seems that gross misunderstanding about natural phenomena is 
avoided and the scientific rationality based on logic and experience 
forms the basis of communication and consensus in scientific activity. 
Its methods as well as practice depend a lot on the assumption of 
universal classical logic, and there is no reason yet to doubt the validity 
of this approach. But it seems that this operates at a layer that could 
be veiled by more subjective considerations, as we will soon see.
The progress of science or of any pursuit of seeking knowledge 
is actually hampered by the inability of the conscious mind to judge, 
in a pure and a priori manner, without depending on previous 
experience of the material world, whether something that is presented 
to it as a fact or law of nature is truth or not. At least to some people 
this might come as a surprise, especially if they believe that there is 
something supernatural and super-material about consciousness. Here 
I am using the word ‘truth’ in a material physical sense, as represented 
in  a fact that can be experim en tally  checked, under som e 
approximations and within the limitations and the resolutions of the 
senses or instruments. Schools of natural philosophy that advocate 
that truths can be reached by pure thinking, without relation to 
observations of the behaviour of the external world, also will object
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to statements to the contrary. However, there is strong evidence 
throughout the history of physical sciences that such claims of the 
self-sufficiency of consciousness and thought cannot be defended.
We represent what we perceive and make theories of them, 
and usually it is these theories that are presented as the truths of the 
physical nature. Even if new physical facts are in front of us, as 
something that can be logically examined, the individual and the 
community can continue to refuse the new truth, and go on believing 
in an existing, possibly false, theoretical picture of the physical world. 
Of course, what I am saying here is obvious, and there are many 
examples in the history of sciences, especially the physical science. 
To see the importance of the situation discussed here, imagine that 
the human consciousness had an innate universal ability, among other 
divine virtues, to recognize true statements about the physical nature, 
when they stated in an explicit form. All one has to do to make fast 
progress in science of nature is to generate all possible linguistic 
statements, using an algorithm, and the conscious mind will pick the 
truths and reject the false statements. But, this does not work and 
one has to resort to seeking experience from  a m ultitude of 
experiments to arrive at even partial truths. What is really appalling 
is that even after it is argued, using experiments, that the truth is 
different from what one believes till then, the conscious mind, either 
at the individual or at the collective level, may not recognize it and it 
can take a long time before a natural truth gets recognized and 
accepted.
At this point I should clarify that I do not undermine revelations 
occurring to individuals about truths of nature, based on their 
experiences, imagination and thinking, some of it operative only in 
the inner layers of the mind. Many of these revelations may turn out 
to be verified later by empirical methods, but this by itself does not 
point to any ability of the conscious mind to reach statements of 
truths by pure thinking devoid of empirical experiences because 
revelations are related in a subtle way to experience. I should also
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clarify that I use the terms consciousness and conscious mind in a 
collective sense, without demarcating layers like the subconscious.
The case study I would like to present is one aspect in the 
physical problem of motion, namely the relation of the speed of light 
to the state of motion of an observer. There are several reasons to 
take this example. One is that almost everybody is familiar with 
various aspects of motion, from direct experience, and even those 
aspects that are not so familiar can be described in a simple way. At 
least the gross aspects of motion are first person experiences. Another 
reason is that my research in physics is deeply related to the problem 
of motion, inertia, and experience of the physical world in moving 
laboratories, and this familiarity allows me to make certain strong 
statements supported with logic and with experimental results. Third, 
we just completed celebrating a theory of motion all of us believe in 
and even worship in a way, the special theory of relativity, with great 
enthusiasm, and this theory and its foundations happen to be grossly 
incorrect when contrasted with results from real experiments! Finally, 
it seems very easy to explain why this theory, believed to be true for 
last hundred years, is not compatible with either experience or 
experiments, and why it is incompatible and inconsistent with our 
cosmology, the knowledge of our large scale environment. (Even 
quantitative statements of this argument can be presented using very 
simple and familiar algebra.) Therefore, the hope is that everybody 
can see the point even if there is no expertise or even familiarity.
To keep the discussion simple and short we take up just one 
belief that is held about the physical world -  that the velocity of light 
is independent of the velocity of the observer or of the source of 
light. This assumption is the basis for Einstein’s special theory of 
relativity. Even school children know, as a universal truth of physical 
nature, that the speed of light is asserted to be an absolute constant, 
independent of the velocity of the source or that of the observer who 
is measuring the speed. I want to examine the empirical basis for this 
assertion, and its compatibility with some facts and experiments that
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haven’t been considered before. (I use the terms ‘speed’ and ‘velocity’ 
interchangeably, since we will be treating one dimensional problems.) 
The theory of relativity before Einstein’s theory became popular, 
Lorentz’s theory of relativity (generally called the Lorentz-Poincare 
relativity), or even Galilean relativity (applied to waves), had about 
half of this assumption as its truth -  that the velocity of light is 
independent of the velocity of the source, but the velocity of light 
was different for different observers moving relative to each other. 
Let us look at these two different postulates about the physical world 
in some detail.
The velocity of sound waves in a room, through the air, is 
independent of whether I am standing still or whether I am running 
while speaking. That is considered natural, since the velocity is 
determined by the properties of the medium and not by the velocity 
of the source of sound. (This is not the case for particles of the classical 
physics; their speed does depend on the speed of the source that 
emits them.) Similarly, waves on the water surface move at some 
velocity, relative to reference marks that are stationary relative to the 
water surface, determined by the properties of water and the reservoir. 
The velocity of water waves does not depend on the speed of the 
boat that created the waves. However, once the wave is generated, 
their observed speed depends on whether the observer is moving or 
not. The speed determines the time it takes to cover a fixed distance 
in the reference frame used for the measurement. It is easier to discuss 
this with the help of a diagram.
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Figure 1: Observers equipped with clocks in two boats in a canal 
trying to measure the one-way speed o f waves in water.
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The one-way velocity can be said to be measured only if the 
waves do not retrace their path during the measurement. For example, 
this can be done if there are two observers with their clocks initially 
synchronized, and running at the same rate, placed at two different 
points. If the two boats (observers) are stationary with respect to the 
medium (water in the canal) then the waves generated near one boat 
will take some time T  to reach the other boat, and if the separation 
between the reference points in the boats is L, the speed is c=L/T. On 
the other hand if the two boats are moving forward in unison (with a 
fixed tie of length L  in between), by the time the waves reach the 
second boat that is ahead, that reference point would have moved 
forward with the boat; the waves will have to catch up an additional 
distance I to reach the observer. Obviously the time taken is longer, 
though the distance between the reference points (the two boats) is 
still L. Therefore, the effective speed of the waves will be lower, and 
a calculation shows that it is simply c-v where v is the speed of the 
boats. Similarly, if we are trying to measure the speed of the waves 
emitted by the boat 2, received by the boat 1 moving towards the 
waves, the effective speed will be c+v. This is what is natural for 
waves in any medium and this is what our experience is.
But suppose that we do not have two boats and two clocks. 
Then the two-way speed of the waves can be measured by sending 
the wave, and getting it back after a reflection on a reference reflector 
at a fixed known distance L from the boat. If the boat is not moving, 
then the measured speed is taken as the true speed which is of course 
c=2L/T where T  is the time taken (which is different from the time 
taken in the one way experiment.)
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Figure 2: Observer in a boat measuring the two-way speed o f waves 
with the help o f a single clock and a reflector fixed at a known 
distance from the boat.
If the boat (and the reflector along with it) is moving through 
the canal, then the measured speed will not be the true speed in the 
medium. One might think that the extra time the waves take for 
reaching the reflector that is moving away, as the waves progress 
towards it, will get compensated when the waves reflect back and go 
towards the boat that is moving towards the waves. This compensation 
is not perfect. The time taken for the trip ‘up’ is T (u) = L/(c-v) and 
the time taken for the trip ‘down’ is T (d) = L/(c+v) since we know 
from the previous experiment with the two boats that the effective 
speeds are (c-v) and (c+v) respectively. So, the total time taken is
T =  T(u) + T(d) = ^ + ^ =  ,, (1)' ^ /  c-v c+v c (1-v /c )
This is slightly longer than the time 2L/c expected if there was perfect 
cancellation of the up and down time differences. Since the correction 
term contains only the square of the ratio of the speed of the reference 
frame and the speed of the waves, the excess duration is very small 
in most situations. For the earth moving around the sun, with speed 
of about 30 km/s, the correction vVc  ̂for the two-way propagation of 
light is only a few parts in a billion (5 nanoseconds in 1 second, for 
example).
23
It is precisely this small expected difference, when the moving 
observer is attempting to measure the two-way speed of light, that 
was proposed to be measured in a precision experiment by Michelson 
and Morley to test whether the observers on the earth is moving 
through the aether, which was supposed to be the medium that 
supported the propagation of light. It is not important to describe 
how exactly this was tested, but the results of the test turned out to 
be very surprising since the small correction was not seen ', even 
though the experiment had the sensitivity to see changes that were 
much smaller! It was as if the two-way time was just 2L/c, exactly as 
would happen if the effective speed of the waves both ways were 
exactly c. Another equivalent statement would be to say that the results 
are identical to the situation when the boat and the reflector (observer) 
are not moving at all. Thus the results of the experiment had no 
signature of motion through the medium, excluding a method of 
determining the speed of the observer through the medium. But neither 
of these statements was made when the results of the Michelson- 
Morley (M-M hereafter) experiment became known since that would 
have gone against experience derived from experiments with other 
waves familiar to physics. Instead Lorentz, and earlier Fitzgerald, 
proposed that all lengths will suffer a physical contraction along their 
direction of motion by an amount given by (7 -  vVc^). This was a 
radical proposal, but it solved the problem since if the distance that 
is used to measure the speed of the waves contract by this amount, 
then there is this factor in the numerator of equation (1), canceling 
the same factor in the denominator. Thus Lorentz contraction explains 
well the null result of the M-M experiment and this explanation stood 
for about 10 years as the reason for the null result of the experiment.
It is very important to note that the Lorentz-Fitzgerald proposal 
acknowledges that the speed of light is dependent on the velocity of 
the observer. This need to be stressed because many people do not 
realize the difference between this explanation of the null result by a 
real and absolute Lorentz contraction, and the explanation based on
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Einstein’s special relativity in which there is no real length contraction 
for the observer who is moving along with the experimental apparatus 
and the earth. In special relativity it is proposed, as a fundamental 
hypothesis, that the speed o f light is a universal constant, c, 
independent of the velocity of the observer. This then means that the 
time it takes to cover a distance L  is L/c irrespective of whether the 
reference length used for the measurement is moving in space or not. 
Obviously, then the time it takes to make a two-way trip after reflecting 
is twice the time taken for the one-way trip, in contrast to the two 
different durations, one longer and the other shorter than the duration 
L/c, it takes in the standard wave theory. Therefore, in special 
relativity, the null result of the M-M experiment is natural for the 
observer moving along with the interferometer, without any length 
contraction. In fact, a real physical length contraction of the apparatus 
will spoil the agreement with the experimental result.
The up and down times for the propagation of the waves are 
identical in special relativity even when the laboratory is moving in 
space. Of course, it is not natural for the conscious mind that has 
other experiences to the contrary, yet it is faced with the necessity of 
accepting this strange hypothesis because that can explain the failure 
to detect that small difference in time durations in the M-M 
experiment. But once this is accepted, one also has to reject that the 
propagation of light is supported by a medium because we reach a 
conflict with the ideas of the properties of the medium determining 
the speed of the waves. Thus, in special relativity, a reference frame 
and an observer in it moving uniformly in a straight line are completely 
equivalent to a reference frame and an observer at rest. As Max Planck 
put it^, “the gist of the principle of relativity is the following. It is in 
no wise possible to detect the motion of a body relative to empty 
space; in fact, there is absolutely no physical sense in speaking about 
such motion. If, therefore, two observers move with uniform but 
different velocities, then each of the two with the same right may 
assert that with respect to empty space he is at rest, and there are no
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physical methods of measurement enabling us to decide in favour of 
one or the other”.
At this stage, I would like to stress the point that both the 
Lorentz-Fitzgerald hypothesis of length contraction and Einstein’s 
hypothesis of the constancy of the speed of light relative to all 
reference frames are consistent with the null result of the M-M 
experiment, as well as with the results of all other electromagnetic 
experiments. As Einstein wrote in a letter^ to F. Adler, Sept. 1918: 
“A decision between Lorentz and Einstein is impossible, anyway, 
since factually Lorentz’s theory agrees entirely with the special theory 
of relativity.” (Here, ‘factually’ means ‘in terms of the empirical tests 
conducted at that time. The theories are actually completely different). 
Therefore, Lorentz’s theory was discarded, slowly, only because 
people did not like the concept of the invisible aether and the idea of 
real length contraction, as a physical deformation. Special theory of 
relativity looked simpler, and it was based on principles that were 
clearly stated. Yet, one should keep in mind that empirical evidence 
in its favour is not superior to the evidence for the validity of Lorentz’s 
theory.
Before we go on to discuss the empirical evidence regarding 
the proposal that the speed of light is a universal constant independent 
of the velocity of the observer, we examine briefly some theoretical 
consequences of the hypothesis. Even though there is no real length 
contraction in special relativity, in the sense imagined by Lorentz, an 
apparent, observer-dependent length contraction becomes necessary 
for consistency. Consider an observer who is stationary relative to 
the water in the canal, observing the experiment of the measurement 
of the speed of waves by the observer in the boat (figure 2). For him, 
the boat is moving and the waves have to catch up with the reflector 
one way, and the boat will catch up with the reflected waves the 
other way. Since he is stationary relative to the medium (water) the 
speed of the waves is c both ways, but the effective distances have
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changed. Therefore, the duration taken by the waves one way is longer 
than L/c and it is shorter than L/c for the reflected waves. This will 
imply that the total duration, as far as the observer on the banks is 
concerned, is slightly more than the expected 2L/c as given by the 
equation (1). This applies to the propagation of light as well. But the 
result of the M-M experiment is an invariant -  the same (zero) for all 
observers, and this can be accommodated in special relativity only if 
there is an apparent length contraction for the observer on the banks, 
relative to whom the boats are moving. This is the ‘Lorentz 
contraction’ in special relativity, and it is observer-dependent and 
has no objective and absolute meaning.
There is a conceptual problem associated with the non-absolute 
nature of the Lorentz contraction in special relativity that has not 
been adequately addressed. While it is consistent to say that the length 
contraction is a co-ordinate effect that is dependent on the observer, 
and that there is no real physical contraction of the moving object, 
such a detached view becomes inconsistent and ambiguous when 
one comes to the issue of time dilation. In theories of relativity, moving 
clocks run slower than stationary ones. Time is an accumulated 
quantity, and it is the rate of progress of time that is affected by 
motion. In Lorentz’s theory, the time dilation is absolute -  clocks 
that travel relative to the aether run slower than the clocks that are 
stationary relative to the aether. But in special relativity, there is no 
absolute and objective time dilation. The effect is purely relative, 
and for any observer in inertial motion (motion without accelerations) 
it is always the ‘other’ clock that runs slower. But, when there is a 
possibility to compare two clocks, it becomes relevant to ask which 
of the clocks ‘really’ advanced slower. The theory has to answer this 
question, and special relativity does not, as Einstein himself clarified 
in a paper in 1918. Instead of dwelling more on this issue, since I 
have discussed this in detail elsewhere'*, we now go further to explore 
the issue of the one-way speed of light.
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It turns out that there is not even a single experiment that 
provides direct evidence for the hypothesis that the one-way speed 
of Hght is independent of the speed of the observer. However, there 
are several experiments that support the hypothesis that the two-way 
speed of light is independent of the speed of the observer. Therefore, 
the foundational hypothesis of special relativity has no direct 
empirical support. The hypothesis is a leap from the results on two- 
way speed to a conclusion regarding the one-way speed.
Why is it possible to sustain the hypothesis of the constancy 
of light without any conflict with experiments? The reason, in the 
context of a conventional one-way speed measurement, has to do 
with the synchronization of clocks. Two clocks that are at a distance 
need to be synchronized before they can be used for a measurement 
of the speed; either they have to be synchronized at the same spatial 
region and then transported, or some synchronization signal needs 
to be transmitted across the clocks such that the relative rates and the 
readings of the two clocks are precisely known. In the first case there 
are corrections to the clock readings and rates due to the motion, and 
in the second case, the signal that is sent for synchronization is 
essentially the same as the signal whose speed one is trying to 
measure. Therefore, in both methods, the consequences of the theory 
play a role in the set up designed to test the theory, and there is 
significant amount of circularity. A careful analysis of the details 
show that synchronization of spatially separated clocks using light 
allows us to consistendy maintain that the one-way speed of light 
measured using such clocks is independent of the speed of the 
reference frame in which the measurement is executed. Due to the 
circularity, however, this is not an em pirical support for the 
hypothesis, as we will see soon.
Given the two statements -  one stating that the one-way speed 
of light is independent of the velocity of the observer, and the other 
stating that it is dependent on the velocity of the observer, how does
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one decide which of the statements is correct? As I was claiming 
earUer, the conscious mind has no innate way of determining the 
relative truth of these statements. It has to depend on experience and 
empirical evidence. In 1905, there were two paths available to make 
progress in the general theory of motion, both with apparently equal 
success in explaining empirical results known at that time. For various 
reasons including historical and sociological ones, and certainly not 
by demarcation based on rigorous empirical evidence, Einstein’s 
special relativity was chosen and built on later, instead of the Lorentz- 
Poincare theory of relativity. One of the reasons for the bias towards 
special relativity was the general setting in which it was proposed, 
applicable to all of inertial kinematics, whereas the Lorentz-Poincare 
re la tiv ity  had the in itia l flav o u r of being  sp ec ia lized  to 
electrodynamics.
Before we consider the possibility of measuring the one-way 
speed of light without having to synchronize clocks that are spatially 
separated, there is an important aspect to be discussed briefly 
regarding the general empirical support for the special theory of 
relativity. When the theory was proposed, it was supposed to 
applicable only to observers and measurements in inertial frames -  
reference frames that move linearly, without accelerations. However, 
such a theory is untestable because the earth and every measuring 
equipment used in experiments are noninertial. Since results from 
many noninertial experiments designed to test the theory of relativity 
match with the predictions based on the theory, it is clear that for 
some reason the restriction proposed by the special theory of relativity 
that the theory be applicable only to inertial frames is not valid. In 
any case, if such a restriction is insisted on then there is no empirical 
evidence whatsoever in support of the theory. I stress this point here 
because very few people who use the formulae of the theory (Lorentz 
transformations) seem to understand the theory of relativity itself, 
and one can often see statements by professional physicists that the 
theory is not to be invoked when there are accelerations. However,
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the same physicists use the theory, as prescribed in textbooks, for 
analyzing the kinematics of particles in particle accelerators of 
different kinds and particles decaying in cosmic rays and so on, all 
done in the non-inertial accelerating frame of the earth! Thus, both 
the particles and the frame of the observer are accelerating in every 
such instance. I have analyzed this example in the context of a study 
on the beliefs and superstitions prevalent in the physical sciences, 
and it has always been a surprising fact to me that many physicists 
do not insist on rigorous logical consistency, let alone plausible 
ontology and strict adherence to empirical support, while building 
theoretical representations of the physical world.
It turns out that there is one way of measuring the one-way 
speed of light or other signals without using two spatially separated 
clocks. The main requirement is not to allow the signal to retrace its 
path, and yet bring the signal back to the starting point so that the 
same clock can be used to measure the duration between the emission 
and reception of the signal. This is possible in a very simple 
experimental configuration as I realized a few years ago^. Before we 
discuss this, it might be useful to discuss another example, to fix the 
ideas.
If one wants to conduct a race over some distance L, say 100 
meters, then usually the race track is linear, and what is compared is 
the time of arrival of the racers at the final tape, assuming that they 
all started at the same time. For each person in the race, considered 
as the observer, the relative speed of others is the distance covered 
by others per second, relative to him, as per his clock. If the race is 
over a larger distance, 400 meters, then usually the race track need to 
be closing on itself, with curves, to accommodate the track within 
reasonable area. But the basic principles of comparing the winners, 
or estimating the relative speeds do not change. These are done as if 
the track is one dimensional, and any one person estimates the relative 
speeds of all others with respect to him by estimating the distance
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covered by them along the track per second, relative to him. For 
example, when somebody much ahead of him, and running faster, 
seems to run opposite to him on the other side of the oval, he cannot 
consider that the relative velocity has become negative and that they 
are running towards each other! They are not, and distances are 
actually increasing. In such a track, if there are two people racing in 
opposite directions (see figure 3) such that their speeds relative to a 
third person, designated as the ‘moving observer’, are identical, then 
according to the moving observer, the forward and backward distances 
along the track to the other two are identical in magnitude at all times.
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Figure 3: Round trip race on an oval race-track. ‘O ’ denotes the 
moving observer relative to whom the speeds o f ‘A ’and ‘B ’are 
measured. Equal relative speeds imply equal relative distances.
This means that the two will meet the moving observer at the 
same time after a round trip. On the other hand, if the race is arranged 
such that the two are running in opposite directions at equal speeds 
relative a stationary observer, standing by the track, then the two 
will meet the moving observer at different times after the round trip. 
Relative to the stationary observer, the ‘observer’ on the track (O) is 
also moving. So, in this example, there is no way one can have the 
relative speeds identical for the two runners relative to both the 
moving observer and the stationary observer. If the speeds in the two 
directions are identical relative to the moving observer, then 
necessarily the two runners will meet the moving observer at the 
same time, simultaneously, after the round trip.
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Figure 4: Measurement o f one-way speed o f waves relative to the 
moving boat.
Now consider the experiment with waves suggested in figure
4. The ‘canal’ in the earlier discussion for measuring the speed of 
water waves is designed to be closing on itself, like a race-track. To 
satisfy various belief systems, we will keep the entire motion of the 
observer (the boat with a clock) to be linear and acceleration free. 
Since a good clock is synchronous with itself, by definition, the time 
interval between the emission and reception of the wave pulse can 
be determined with a single clock as the waves go around and reach 
back the observer. If the average perimeter of the canal is L, the 
speed of the waves is L/(t2-tl). The only quantity that is measured in 
the experiment is the time interval {t2-tl). But if this experiment is 
done, the measured speed of the waves will be seen to depend on 
whether the boat is moving or not. That is, the time interval (t2-tl) 
depends on the speed of the observer, and by simply measuring this 
time interval the observer can determine whether he is moving or 
not, and at what speed, linearly and inertially. This experiment can 
also be done using two pulses of waves, one emitted in the forward 
direction and another in the opposite direction. Then one tests whether 
the pulses come back at the same time or at different times. Everybody 
will agree, based on their experience with waves in water etc., that 
the pulse that is emitted forward will take more time to get back after 
the round trip if the boat and the observer are moving. Therefore, the 
two pulses will reach the moving observer at different times, indicating 
that the relative speeds in the two directions are indeed different.
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What is the expected result if the experiment is done with 
light? Some mirrors can be used to make the light go around, or a 
hollow optical fiber can be used (we do not want the medium in 
which the propagation takes place move, because that can bring in 
additional corrections). If the two pulses arrive at different times to a 
detector moving linearly and uniformly, then we have to conclude 
that the behaviour of light is not different from that of the water 
waves. If on the other hand the pulses reach the detector at equal 
times irrespective of the linear speed of the detector, then we conclude 
that the one-way speed of light is a universal invariant relative to an 
observer in inertial motion. To fix the ideas further and to avoid 
ambiguities let us examine part of the experimental set up for light in 
detail.
The experiment consists of an emitter for light fixed to the 
reference frame of the observer, and an optical guide of length L. 
According to special relativity, since the effective speed of light is 
independent of whether the observer is moving or not, the observer 
would estimate that a pulse of light will reach the end of the guide 
after a time U c  irrespective of the velocity at which he is moving, 
exactly as in the case where he is at rest. Another way of getting the 
same result is to note Planck’s statement on the ‘gist of special 
relativity’ that I quoted earlier -  that an observer in inertial motion 
can claim that he is at rest. Then light pulses propagate exactly as if 
the observer was not moving, and obviously the time taken to reach 
the end is always L/c.
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Figure 5: A portion o f the experimental setup for measuring the speed 
o f light guided through a hollow fiber o f length L.
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This conclusion remains the same in the configuration shown 
below, since the length of the guide to be traveled by the pulse of 
light remains the same, and the observer is still moving linearly and 
inertially. As the observer is moving forward, the end of the guide is 
pulled around a wheel so that there is no overall motion of the curved 
parts of the guide in space, and this avoids any possibility of ‘carrying’ 
the pulse by the guide in space. The length of the guide the pulse has 
to traverse is still L, and since the speed relative to the observer is 
supposed to be c, the expected time in the special theory of relativity 
is L/c. In both cases the distance between the observer and the end of 
the guide, as measured by the observer, remains a constant, 
independent of the speed of the observer.
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Figure 6: An extended configuration for the measurement o f the one­
way speed o f light. The distance between the tip o f the light guide and 
the moving observer (emitter-detector) remains a constant during the 
experiment, as in the previous figure.
Since the observer is moving linearly, without accelerations, 
there is full agreement regarding the applicability of special relativity, 
and since the speed of light is the same constant irrespective of the 
speed of the observer, the pulse should take the same duration to 
complete the round trip over the fixed length between the point of 
emission and the point of reception, as measured in the frame of the 
observer. Now the experiment proposed with the water waves can be 
implemented with light pulses as shown in the following figure. If 
the relative speeds of light in the two directions are identical, then 
the two pulses should reach the observer simultaneously after a round 
trip. This is an unambiguous prediction from the special relativity 
because in this theory the observer in linear inertial motion is 
equivalent in all respects to an observer at rest.
3 4
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Figure 7: Comparison o f the one-way speed o f light in two directions 
relative to a moving observer 'O ’ (emitter-detector combination). The 
light pulses moving in opposite directions are shown in exaggerated 
size for clarity.
To make sure that this important point is clarified well, let me 
say it in another way. The speed determines the distance covered in a 
fixed duration of time. If the speed of the light pulses is the same in 
two directions, then at every instant, as per the clock of the observer, 
the distances to the pulses from the observer are identical. Since the 
distances from the reference mark of the observer to the same 
reference mark along the two possible paths, the forward and 
backward directed paths in the race-track, are identical at every 
instant, the pulses have to reach back along these paths at the same 
instant, simultaneously. (This is as in the case with the racers on the 
track we discussed earlier). This conclusion is inescapable in special 
relativity.
But the result of the experiment is a direct blow to the 
fundamental hypothesis of special relativity. Since one is dealing 
with waves, one can test whether the crests or troughs of the two 
waves arrive together or out of step, directly indicating the degree of 
simultaneity; this is the interferometry technique. Thus the race-track 
interferometer (which is a variant of the ‘Sagnac interferometer’*) 
compares the one-way speed o f  light in two different directions 
relative to a moving observer, whereas the Michelson interferometer 
used in the M-M experiment compared the two-way speed o f  light in 
two different directions relative to the moving observer.
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I have conducted this experiment in an interferom etric 
configuration. Indeed, numerous such experiments have been done 
in the Sagnac interferometer configuration, from 1913 to the present 
times, without realizing that it is in fact a comparison of the one-way 
relative speeds of light in directions parallel and anti-parallel to the 
direction of motion of the observer. The results are exactly the same 
as one would obtain for waves in water or waves of sound in air. The 
two pulses reach with time difference proportional to the velocity of 
the observer. Therefore, the effective speed that is measured by the 
moving observer depends on the speed of the observer, as in the case 
of water waves, clearly indicating that the observer in motion is not 
equivalent to an observer at rest, in total variance with the quote by 
Planck we mentioned earlier. In fact, the results of the experiment 
are in complete agreement with the prediction from Lorentz-Poincare 
relativity, as if there is a preferred absolute frame. In other words, 
the result of the experiment can be reconciled by the observer who 
measures the time intervals with his clocks only by accepting that he 
is ‘actually’ moving through a preferred absolute frame, and he cannot 
claim a state of rest even though he is in linear inertial motion. 
Empirically there is no difference between our experience with water 
waves (and sound waves), and our experience with light. Their 
measured one-way speed does depend on the velocity of the observer.
I am sure that despite this demonstration people will remain 
unconvinced, as I have seen during the talk in the conference, because 
their beliefs and prejudices are stronger than their ability to grasp 
empirical evidence. That is a severe limitation of the conscious mind. 
This was the point I was trying to make in the beginning. Not only 
that the conscious mind do not possess the innate ability to decide 
and pick the true statement from a set of plausible truths about nature, 
it often refuses to consider empirical evidence that can upset beliefs 
held about the physical nature. However, people who are reluctant 
to believe remain unable to justify or support their reluctance with
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any plausible rational argument, in spite of the physical, mathematical 
and the logical simplicity of the problem that we just discussed.
There is more evidence I can present to show that the 
predictions of special relativity have been invalidated by experiments, 
especially experiments of clock comparisons’ . But, I do not think 
this is essential at this point since its foundational hypothesis of the 
constancy (observer independence) of the one-way speed of light 
itself is invalidated by experiments. However, it is necessary to explain 
why moving clocks run slower and why energy is equivalent to mass 
if the special theory of relativity is empirically invalidated. As I 
mentioned earlier, the Lorentz formulae for time dilation and length 
contraction are not a unique feature of special relativity -  indeed 
they existed much before special relativity was proposed. So was the 
Lorentz relation connecting the electromagnetic energy and an 
equivalent mass. It tums out that the correct theory of relativity, 
consistent and in full agreement with all known empirical facts, is 
based on the gravitational interaction of every object with all other 
matter in the universe. This new theory of relativity, which I call 
Cosmic Relativity*, has the matter filled universe as the preferred 
frame, and one gets the correct theory by replacing Lorentz’s aether 
with the matter filled universe. Since there was no reliable cosmology 
and knowledge about the matter content of the universe in 1905, or 
even as late as 1970 or so, it is clear why it was not possible, logically 
or empirically, to arrive at a correct theory of motion and relativity 
till our knowledge about the universe matured. All relativistic effects, 
and in fact all physical effects that we include in kinematics of motion 
today, are all due to the gravitational interaction with the matter in 
the universe. It is the gravity of the universe that fixes the speed of 
light (similar to the way properties of water fix the speed of water 
waves), and it is the gravitational potentials of all matter in the 
universe that are responsible for the change of rates of moving clocks 
and the change of length of moving scales. All of these are ‘absolute 
effects’, depending directly on the speed through the average matter
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frame of the universe, and not ‘relative effects’ depending on relative 
velocity between observers as special relativity was claiming. The 
special theory of relativity necessarily has to be replaced by Cosmic 
Relativity that acknowledges the gravitational presence of the matter 
filled universe that we see. The inertia of beliefs will resist this 
paradigm  change, but the change is inevitable in the light of 
overwhelming empirical evidence. I refer to other sources for a 
detailed discussions of these results’ .
The importance of the empirical anchor in our ways of knowing 
has to be recognized. The methods of science encompass first person 
experiences like revelations and human preferences on beauty and 
harmony, seemingly detached from the empirical examination of the 
external world as it is. However, subconscious revelations and flashes 
of realizations are subdy related to the collective empirical knowledge 
accumulated over ages. Every fundamental assertion on the nature 
of the physical world has to be tested empirically, as directiy as 
possible, and that is the only way of ensuring the passage through 
the right path from among several plausible paths. Also, it is important 
to recognize that all of kinematics and dynamics, and indeed all 
motion including the actions of the conscious mind, are in the 
gravitational presence of the ‘once given universe’ . Therefore, any 
fundamental theory of the physical world, be it relativity theory or 
quantum mechanics, should necessarily include this presence and its 
physical effects consistently into the theory and its interpretation. 
Physical reality cannot be approached if the obvious, overwhelming 
and the sensible reality of the matter filled universe is ignored. 
Cosmology should be a necessary basis of all natural sciences.
In summary, I have discussed and illustrated a deficiency of 
the consciousness, namely its lack of innate ability to recognize truths 
of nature from among a set of plausible statements about the behaviour 
of physical nature. I discussed the example of the measurement of 
the one-way speed of light to bring out the contrast between the belief
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held today without direct empirical evidence, of the universality of 
the speed of light, and the empirical truth of the dependence of the 
one-way relative speed of light on the velocity of the observer.
How long will you continue with your old belief?
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W h a t  is C onsciousness?
The term “consciousness” has multiple meanings. In a sense it is 
many concepts rolled into one. English language dictionaries list over 
twelve different connotations. There are equally numerous meanings 
of consciousness in psychological literature. Though psychology 
began as “the description and explanation of states of consciousness 
as such" (Ladd, 1909), psychologists at no time were able to give an 
agreed on and unambiguous definition of consciousness. Edward 
T itchner (1915) referred  to its th irteen  d ifferen t m eanings 
distinguished by Alexander Bain, and James Ward’s description of 
consciousness as “the most treacherous of psychological terms”. More 
recently , a d ictionary  o f psychology has this to say about 
consciousness: “The term is impossible to define except in terms 
that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means” 
(Sutherland, 1989, p. 90). The difficulty of defining consciousness 
in psychological discourse has other reasons as well. There is a general 
lack of agreement on what the criteria of consciousness are. The 
phenom ena o f consciousness have an intrinsically subjective 
character. They are accessible only to introspection and are not directly 
observable from outside. The first-person-only direct access in one 
sense makes consciousness the most intimately known aspect of our 
being. For this reason some writers (Stout, 1899; James, 1890/1952) 
considered consciousness to be too familiar to require any definition. 
In another sense, it is possibly the least amenable of all psychological
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phenomena for scientific study. Therefore, some psychologists are 
convinced of the utter futility of the concept, because it is too 
subjective to be observed and studied from a scientific standpoint, 
which is the perspective of the third-person.
Consciousness as Awareness
Though its multiple connotations suggest that consciousness may 
not refer to one but several things, it is possible that all of them may 
be seen as constituting a cluster and related in a conceptually coherent 
way. In whichever way we look at consciousness and whatever 
meaning we may attribute to it, consciousness appears to refer always 
to some form of awareness. In all the senses in which consciousness 
is understood, awareness is implied. Consequently it is reasonable 
to assume that awareness may be an important and useful key for 
opening the doors to a meaningful understanding of consciousness.
Thomas Natsoulas (1978, 1983a, 1983b), who has noted in 
the Oxford English D ictionary  seven distinct defin itions of 
consciousness, suggests that consciousness in all these meanings 
im plies awareness phenomena. First, consciousness as mutual 
knowledge is reflected in Skinnerian behaviorism, which regards 
consciousness as a social product, as well as in the psychoanalytical 
notion of consciousness as expression. Second, consciousness as 
conviction may be seen in GH. Mead’s theory of social origins of 
individual consciousness. The third usage of consciousness as 
awareness is the most obvious one. The fourth usage is direct 
awareness as implied in statements that speak of something being 
accessible to consciousness. In the fifth sense, consciousness means 
internal unity and continuity of awareness. The sixth and perhaps 
the most general usage is that consciousness is a general state of 
being aware. The seventh usage may be seen in descriptions of double 
consciousness or split awareness when one discusses dissociated 
states and multiple personality. “If the awareness phenomena”, writes 
Natsoulas (1983a, 1983b), “is as ubiquitous psychologically as our
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ordinary concepts of consciousness consistently imply, then modem 
objective psychology inherits a major responsibility, namely the 
development of a scientific understanding of the common element 
that makes awareness a distinct kind of occurrence” (p. 122).
Basically awareness appears to be of two sorts. On the one 
hand, it denotes a state of being aware and, on the other hand, it 
refers to certain phenomena of experience. We say we are conscious 
while we are awake and alert, and unconscious when in coma. Also, 
we distinguish between states of awareness that are qualitatively 
different. For example, awareness in dreams is different from ordinary 
waking consciousness. Therefore, we speak of altered states of 
consciousness. Sometimes we distinguish between degrees of 
consciousness. We say we are “half conscious,” meaning that we are 
not fully  alert. D egrees o f aw areness, grades or levels of 
consciousness refer to differences in sensitivity, intensity of reflection, 
levels of creativity, originality, and so on. In all the ways just 
mentioned, consciousness denotes a state of awareness. It does not 
refer to awareness of something, but to itself. Awareness in this sense 
is a subjective condition. C onsciousness in our phenom enal 
experience obviously refers to something more than alertness and 
wakefulness. It is an experience of being aware, and aware of 
something. It is an information state that gives us knowledge of an 
object outside or image inside. When we think, doubt, remember, or 
perceive, there is usually something to which our thoughts, memories, 
etc. refer. When we remember or perceive something, we believe 
that the world is represented to us in our consciousness.
Consciousness thus has its subjective and objective aspects. 
In its objective aspect, consciousness is about something and refers 
to information, one’s knowledge or perception of events. In its 
subjective aspect, it is an experience of sensing something. Therefore, 
we may legitimately ask of consciousness what it is about (its 
information aspect) and what it is like (its subjective aspect).
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The Four Ps of Consciousness
Viewing consciousness in all its forms is more like looking at a 
mountain or a pyramid rather than at a nonhierarchical flat terrain. 
C onsequently , consciousness may appear to have different 
characteristics as we view it from different angles, examine it at 
different levels, and explore it with different perspectives. What may 
indeed seem to be appropriate criteria/description from one angle or 
perspective may turn out to be inappropriate when looked at from 
another. The conceptual maps and the methodological tools that are 
needed to explore the terrain of consciousness may have to be different 
as we move from one level to another.
Awareness in the abstract is a state of knowing. It relates the 
knower to that which is known. On the basis of the nature of the 
relationship between the knowing agent and the object of knowledge, 
awareness may be seen as falling into four broad categories: they are 
(1) primary awareness, (2) paradoxical awareness, (3) pathological 
awareness, and (4) paranormal awareness. I call them the four Ps, 
the four perspectives, of consciousness. These are not mutually 
exclusive categories. Rather, they are plainly identifiable aspects with 
their own distinctive characteristics. The apparent differences in their 
manifest characteristics at different levels often mistakenly lead to 
conflicting accounts of what consciousness precisely is.
Primary awareness is what we have in the acts of perception, 
thinking, feeling, and volition. Included in this category are 
perceptions, images, inner speech, feelings such as pain and the like, 
which have sensory qualities, as well as abstract concepts, beliefs, 
intentions, and expectations. The basic characteristics of primary 
awareness are its subjective quality, accessibility to introspection, 
and immediate transparency. Primary awareness is what William 
James called the “first concrete fact” and discussed extensively in 
The Principles o f  Psychology. In fact, many writers since Descartes 




Primary awareness is consciousness at the ground level. It is 
comprised of the multitude of percepts provided by various sensory 
modalities such as vision, touch, and smell, feelings like pain, joy, 
and anger, internal imagery, thoughts, and beliefs. Consciousness 
here refers not only to the awareness of the contents contained in 
them but also to the subjective quality inherent in them, the first- 
person aspect. In this form consciousness has the characteristics of 
being changing and yet continuous, like a flowing stream. It is noetic 
and has the cognitive function of knowing in the sense that it is about 
something. In being selective it attends to some inputs while ignoring 
others (James, 1890/1952; Searle, 1992). The phenomena of primary 
awareness are generally available for introspection in human subjects.
Consciousness at the primary level thus appears to have two 
components or aspects, the subjective and the objective. These two 
are also described as the phenomenal and functional aspects of 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1996) or as phenomenal consciousness 
and access consciousness (Block, 1995). From a methodological 
perspective, primary awareness is both a first-person and a third- 
person phenomenon. The uniqueness of conscious experience is that 
it purports to reveal objective reality, but at the same time it is 
observer-relative.
Several cortical processes are associated with the subjective 
conscious experience. Two stages of processing may be distinguished 
at this level. They are the pre-attentive processing of the inputs and 
focal attention. A central processor appears to rapidly integrate the 
events occurring during a short span of time. The impressions of 
immediate experience so generated are held in short-term memory 
and further integrations give one the unity and continuity of 
experience (Bluementhal, 1977). Volition seems to play a significant 
role in the process of attention, influencing conscious experience in 
important ways.
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Paradoxical awareness is awareness that is not recognized 
as such by the person having it. Unliice primary awareness, it is neither 
accessible to introspection nor does it have a subjective feel. It is 
paradoxical in that it is a kind of “knowing” without knowing. If 
primary awareness is the most familiar form of awareness, paradoxical 
awareness is the least felt and, possibly, the more primitive of the 
two. Paradoxical awareness is implied in a variety of mental 
phenomena such as subliminal perception, implicit memory, and 
blindsight.
Subliminal perception refers to the possibility that people may 
be influenced by objects and events of which they have no subjective 
awareness. Research in this area has produced some interesting 
results. There is impressive evidence that stimuli present at low energy 
levels, or in masked forms so that they cannot be recalled, recognized, 
or discrim inated from  other sim ilarly presented stim uli, can 
nevertheless produce detectable cognitive, affective, and other 
behavioral effects (Bomstein & Pittman, 1992). Even though several 
of the claims made and popularized in the media such as subliminal 
audio tapes continue to be controversial, there is compelling evidence 
to suggest that people do indeed respond to stimuli that they are not 
subjectively aware of.
Considering the extensive evidence gathered by numerous 
researchers utilizing a variety of experimental strategies, the existence 
of subliminal perception may no longer be in doubt. In fact, not only 
do we know that subliminal perception is real, but we also know a 
great deal about it. For example, we know that subliminal perceptions 
have emotional as well as cognitive effects. Subjects in subliminal 
studies successfully respond in lexical decision-making tasks (Marcel, 
1983) as well as in tasks that elicit affective reactions (McGinnies, 
1949). Subliminal stimuli can bring about attitude and mood changes 
(Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Weinberger, Kelner & McClelland, 
1990). Subliminal stimulus effects may manifest not only in terms of
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subjects’ responses and changes in attitudes and moods, they may 
also be revealed in free associations and dream images of the subjects, 
even when the subjects themselves are unable to recognize them as 
such (Haber & Erdelyi, 1967; Poetzl, 1917).
Analogous to subliminal perception is the phenomenon of 
implicit memory. Unlike in subliminal perception, the subject in an 
implicit memory task has subjective awareness of the stimulus when 
it occurs. The subject is unable, however, to deliberately recognize 
or recollect it later. Yet, the effect of the stimulus is seen in the 
subsequent performance of the subject in a manner similar to the 
performance of the subject in a subliminal perception study. For 
example, subjects tend to show appreciable saving in relearning items 
that they could neither recall nor recognize as seen before (Nelson, 
1978). Such residual subliminal memory is known as implicit memory 
or indirect memory.
A number of studies (Weiskrantz, 1988; Schacter, 1985) have 
shown subliminal memory among amnesic patients. It is known that 
damage to certain midline structures in the brain can lead to serious 
amnesia in humans with the result that they are unable to remember 
their experiences beyond a few seconds. For example, a person 
suffering from such amnesia, who just solved a jigsaw puzzle, is 
typically unable to remember how she did it; but if asked to solve the 
same puzzle the next day, she would solve it faster than before. It 
appears that there is indeed enough residual memory to facilitate 
faster relearning of the same task.
As in the case of amnesic syndrome, brain-damaged patients 
show a variety of deficiencies of awareness, depending on the location 
and severity of the damage. The deficiencies include inability to see 
objects falling in the damaged visual field, failure to recognize familiar 
faces, and disruption in reading ability. There is evidence to show, 
however, that, when such a perceptual loss occurs at the explicit 
level impeding subjective awareness, some patients continue to retain
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the ability to have implicit or subliminal awareness similar to what 
we have noted with amnesics.
It has been observed that some people who are cortically blind 
because of damage to primary visual areas (striate cortex) can respond 
discriminatingly to different stimuli, even though they report no 
subjective awareness of them. Lawrence Weiskrantz (1986) among 
others carried out extensive investigations of such people and called 
the phenomenon blindsight. D.B., one of his patients, had left 
hemianopia consequent to the removal of a tumor from the right 
visual cortex. D.B. was neither able to name nor describe any object 
that was presented to his left visual field. However, when he was 
asked to guess whether the stimulus that was presented to him in the 
left visual field was “x” or “o” D.B. guessed correctly in 27 of 30 
trials, suggesting that his ability to discriminate between the two 
stimuli was indeed preserved to a significant degree, despite a lack 
of subjective awareness that he could do so.
P athologica l aw areness  is aberrant and dysfunctional 
awareness. As mentioned before, awareness primarily serves the 
function of relating us to the world by faithfully representing it either 
in concrete or abstract forms in actual or imaginary situations. 
However, awareness may sometimes misrepresent the world and lead 
us to indulge in behavior inappropriate to the occasion. Hallucinatory 
experiences and other forms of cognitive abnormalities are examples 
of pathological awareness.
Blindsight may be a consequence of brain pathology; but it is 
not dysfunctional. Also, subliminal perception and implicit memory 
do not constitute abnormality of awareness, whereas delusional 
thoughts and hallucinatory visions are abnormal. The dream  
experience, though in a sense hallucinatory, is considered normal 
because we assume certain relationships between types of processing 
and wakefulness. We infer abnormalities of consciousness when a 
type of processing appears incompatible with the associated level of
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wakefulness. Such incompatibilities play a role in the psychiatric 
description and evaluation of patients. Pathologies of consciousness 
resulting from inappropriate processing may be seen as more than 
useful descriptors of psychiatric disorders. They may also be helpful 
in understanding and explaining certain mental disorders as resulting 
from disconnections, disassociations and conflations between 
different levels of processing awareness.
In cases of clouding of consciousness, for example amentia, a 
sub-acute delirious state in which the patient engages in haphazard 
associations and random performance of old habits and shows a lack 
of thought, it is reasonable to suppose a dysfunctional higher-order 
conscious system. Again, we find among schizophrenic patients 
hallucinations (usually in the form of hearing voices), delusions (often 
involving claims by patients that their thoughts are controlled from 
the outside), and thought disorders (seen in fluent but abnormal 
speech, which makes little sense). These symptoms are usually 
attributed to abnormal processes. They may also be seen as abnormal 
perceptions. It is often suggested that the schizophrenic suffers from 
a defective filter and that the patient is overwhelmed by excessive 
stimulation and is no longer able to separate the relevant from 
irrelevant stimuli. It is equally plausible to argue that the schizophrenic 
symptoms constitute abnormal perceptions rather than indicate a 
defective filter.
Studies of paradoxical and pathological awareness strongly 
suggest that awareness can be explicit or implicit, the subjectively 
experienced and the covert. Further, awareness is unmistakably linked 
to brain systems. Different modalities of awareness are linked to 
different systems and localized in different parts of the brain. Damage 
to or dysfunction of a particular system may result in a concomitant 
change in awareness. Loss of subjective awareness of stimuli falling 
in the damaged visual field of the patients with blindsight, the covert 
awareness of faces by the prosopagnosic patients with bilateral lesions
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to the occipital-temporal regions of the cortex (Bauer, 1984), and the 
implicit perceptions of neglect patients with posterior parietal damage 
(Volpe, Le Doux & Gazzaniga, 1979) provide persuasive arguments 
in favor of cortical necessity and sufficiency to modulate and constrain 
awareness. We must, however, keep in mind the fact that similar 
changes and aberrations of awareness may also be observed without 
relevant cortical defects, for example in hysterical blindness and 
hypnotic amnesia and analgesia. It has been shown that some subjects 
in a deep hypnotic state fail to experience pain from a stimulus that 
normally causes pain (Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983). The “hidden 
observer” technique of making the subject give reports of pain 
experience which she denied earlier suggests that the analgesic 
subjects who report no experience of pain may have processed the 
pain stimulus thoroughly but the resultant experience is, however, 
dissociated from the stream of consciousness.
Whereas primary awareness refers to cognitive conscious 
states, paradoxical awareness belongs to the cognitive unconscious. 
Both primary and paradoxical awareness are cognitive in nature in 
that they contain information encoded and represented in certain ways 
and is accessible at conscious or unconscious levels. The latter 
constitute the cognitive unconscious, which in turn involves at least 
three different levels of processing described as unconscious, 
preconscious and subconscious (Kihlstrom, 2003). In the case of the 
truly unconscious states the information is in principle inaccessible 
to the person for exam ple, autom atic m ental processes and 
unconscious procedural knowledge. In preconscious states, the 
representations of information received are not sufficiently activated 
to reach threshold levels to enable the person to have subjective 
awareness of them. The examples of preconscious processing are 
sub lim inal perception , im plicit m em ory and b lindsight. In 
subconscious states, though the representations are activated enough 
to reach threshold levels, they are not consciously experienced 
because they lack self-reference due to presumed dissociation 
between perceptual representations and the self.
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P a ra n o rm a l aw a ren ess  is non-sensory  and non- 
representational awareness. If ESP phenomena are real and the mystic 
states genuine, they are instances of paranormal awareness. At the 
outset, two kinds of paranormal awareness may be distinguished -  
(1) anomalous awareness and (2) awareness-as-such. Anomalous 
awareness is awareness implied in such paranormal phenomena as 
telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition.
Paranormal awareness is considered anomalous in the Western 
scientific tradition because its occurrence is precluded on a priori 
grounds and seen as violating what C.D. Broad (1953) called the 
basic limiting principles ordained by the current dominant scientific 
paradigm. Awareness-as-such is conceived as nonrepresentational 
awareness, which has no content and is non-intentional. As the Hindu 
sage Ramana Maharshi, who was reputed to have experienced states 
of pure consciousness, says “when all thoughts are stilled, pure 
consciousness remains over.” Robert Forman (1990) defines what 
he calls the pure conscious event (PCE) as “a wakeful though 
contentless (nonintentional) consciousness” (p. 8). Some forms of 
PCEs are believed to be rather common occurrences in the lives of 
ordinary people.
Unlike instances of awareness-as-such, ESP experiences have 
content. They convey information. They manifest in familiar forms 
similar in certain respects to primary awareness as well as paradoxical 
and pathological awareness. Veridical intuitions are very much like 
ordinary thoughts except that they convey information that is in 
principle inaccessible to normal cognitive activity. Often anomalous 
awareness is implicit; but it is unlike paradoxical awareness in that 
there is no physical contact or causal link between the stimulus and 
the subject in an ESP experience. Again anomalous awareness may 
occur in the form of a hallucination and may convey invalid 
information (psi-missing) and even be dysfunctional as in pathological 
awareness.
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The defining characteristic of anomalous awareness is that it 
shows no causal connection with the presumed source, the object of 
awareness, and is therefore considered acausal by C. G  Jung (Jung 
& Pauli, 1955). Further, it is claimed that parapsychological 
phenomena are not influenced by space-time constraints. Also, 
sensory processes are believed to have no significant role in 
anomalous awareness. At the most, their role appears to be limited to 
making explicit the implicit ESP awareness.
In the light of the claimed experiences of the mystics and 
yogins, one may conjecture that it is possible to experience awareness- 
as-such. The defining characteristic of such an experience is that it 
has no representational content. It is simply a state that is essentially 
indescribable. The difficulty of conceptualizing such an ineffable 
state, if it exists, is quite obvious. However, the accounts we have of 
them from those who claim to have experienced awareness-as-such, 
inadequate though they are, provide some glimpses into it. In such a 
state the dichotomy between the subject and the object appears to 
disappear. The individual having such an experience is believed to 
realize the oneness and unity of all being. More importantly, 
experiencing aw areness-as-such is seen to influence people 
profoundly and to bring about remarkable transformations in them.
There are good reasons for bringing anomalous awareness and 
awareness-as-such into a single category. They seem to be related at 
a fundam ental level. The yogic tradition , which deals with 
supernormal abilities as well as pure conscious states, regards the 
former as preliminary manifestations that occur as one progresses 
on the path leading to the latter. It would seem that mystic states are 
states of consciousness-as-such, whereas ESP and such are its 
phenomenal manifestations. It is likely that paranormal awareness 
may involve two stages. In the first stage, there may be unmediated 
access to or identity with reality. It is a state of accessing pure 
consciousness. The second stage is a phenomenal expression of the
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pure conscious access, which may occur among those whose 
motivations are still anchored, in worldly activities and whose control 
over and suppression of cortical and sensory participation is not 
complete. Possibly for this reason yoga practitioners are warned 
against paying attention to supernormal phenomena, which are 
believed to impede the progress to reach the all important goal of 
achieving a stable and enduring state of pure consciousness.
From the preceding discussion of the four Ps of consciousness 
we can see how consciousness appears differently as we look at if 
from its different locations. At the level of primary awareness, the 
stream metaphor appears to be most appropriate as it captures the 
sense of subjectivity reflected in the unity and continuity of 
phenomenal awareness. The metaphor of stream, however, is of little 
help in the discussions of paradoxical awareness, which lacks 
subjective awareness. We find therefore philosophers like Daniel 
Dennett (1991), who are uncomfortable with the subjective aspects 
of consciousness and go as far as dismissing all the qualitative aspects 
o f aw areness (qualia) as im aginary and unreal, question the 
appropriateness of the stream metaphor. Even William James, as his 
interests moved away from primary awareness in The Principles o f  
Psychology, to paranormal awareness in The Varieties o f  Religious 
Experience replaced the stream metaphor with the metaphor of the 
“mother sea” to describe consciousness. Again, psychologist Jung, 
who was more concerned with transpersonal aspects of consciousness, 
likened consciousness to the luminosity and brightness of light (Jung, 
1919/1954).
So we see why we need different conceptual maps in order to 
understand different areas of consciousness. It is equally obvious 
that we require diverse methodological tools to explore the different 
regions of consciousness. Clearly, the subjective aspects of conscious 
experience require a first-person approach. Paradoxical awareness, 
however, may be fruitfully investigated with objective methods and
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from the third-person perspective. It is entirely possible that 
neurobiologicai studies may provide a complete description and 
explanation of implicit perception. When we move on to the area of 
paranormal awareness, however, we possibly need an altogether new 
approach, very different strategies to capture its essence.
I am persuaded to believe that exclusive concern with some 
Ps and the neglect of others or their conflation is at the root of much 
fallacious reasoning in consciousness studies. This is not the occasion 
to go into further details to substantiate this statement except to note 
that we must keep in mind the four Ps without conflating them for a 
meaningful understanding of consciousness, what it is about and what 
it is like.
Consciousness, it would seem, is much like a multi-tiered 
structure, a building with several floors. Primary awareness is like 
the ground floor, whereas the paradoxical awareness is the basement. 
Higher forms of consciousness look like the upper floors; and the 
terrace at the top, open and unenclosed, is analogous to pure 
consciousness or awareness-as-such. Pathological awareness may be 
seen as cracks in the wall or other defects we may find in the structure 
at any floor level.
Physical Explanations of Consciousness
Philosophical behaviorism, physical reductionism and cognitive 
functionalism have all in their own way helped to sharpen the 
d iscussion of consciousness. N eurobiologicai and cognitive 
psycho log ica l stud ies m ade notab le con tribu tions tow ards 
understanding many aspects of awareness. We know a great deal 
about the intimate association between cortical states and mental 
states. We know for instance that damage to the reticular activating 
system or suppression of its functions by drugs causes coma and that 
signals from the reticular activating system are necessary for 
sustaining consciousness It has been shown that in humans the
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integration of mental activity and attentional focus is achieved by 
the activity in the frontal lobes. Again, temporal and parietal lobes 
appear to play significant roles in higher-order cognitive functions 
such as thinking. These and other interesting discoveries in 
neuroscience, pointing to localization of numerous mental functions 
in the brain, and the developments in cognitive science, involving 
the computer modeling of the cognitive processes, made a strong 
prima facie case for assuming that the mind can be fully accounted 
for in physical and computational terms.
Now, let us consider the four Ps of consciousness and examine 
whether they are fully realizable by an entirely physical system. First, 
let us look at paradoxical awareness, which is the least complicated 
of the four. As mentioned earlier, paradoxical awareness refers to a 
variety of phenomena including subliminal perception, implicit 
memory, blindsight, and, covert awareness in prosopagnosia and 
neglect patients. There may be significant differences in the way 
different forms of paradoxical awareness, for example subliminal 
perception and blindsight, are processed. However, there is a 
commonality that binds them all. They are not experienced; they lack 
subjectivity. They are processed “in the dark,” as it were. Awareness 
is inferred here from third-person observations and not experienced 
at the level of the first-person. Lacking in subjective quality, awareness 
here is seen in its functional manifestations. Consequently, in order 
to understand them we need only to specify the computational or 
neural mechanisms that perform those functions. This, asvChalmers 
would say, is the “easy” problem, one that could be solved ih principle 
within the physical scheme of things, by the structural and functional 
studies of the brain and the nervous system.
As we move from the paradoxical to primary awareness, i.e., 
from awareness without subjective quality to felt awareness, we are 
faced with the “hard” problem of finding a proper explanation for 
subjectivity and the qualitative “feel” of cognitive components of
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perceptual experience. As pointed out earlier, primary awareness has 
subjective and objective components, the “what it is like” and the 
“what it is about” aspects. The physical explanations of primary 
awareness focus mainly on the latter. Either they ignore and eliminate 
the former aspect or attempt to show how it may be realized by a 
physical system.
Philosophical behaviorism  sees in consciousness no more 
than certain behavioral states and dispositions. For example, pain in 
this view is a complex description of one’s behavioral condition when 
one is in pain. States of mind are what those in those states do or 
would do. In other words, according to behaviorism, all statements 
about consciousness and the mental may be shown to be statements 
about behavior and dispositions to behave. The main problem with 
such a view is that some statements about conscious states may not 
be translatable into statements about behavior and dispositions. The 
experience of pain is hurtful and that feeling of “hurt” is not 
represented by the so-called dispositions to pain-behavior. A good 
actor may display pain behavior without experiencing pain. Again, 
one may experience pain without showing it. Also, we may note that 
the very notion of dispositions is open-ended and there is no limit to 
what one may or may not be disposed to do, when in anger, for 
instance. What we do, or are disposed to do, crucially depends on 
what we believe to be the case and on our desires and expectations. 
Consequently, any attempt to explain mental states in terms of 
dispositions introduces again mental states into the explanation.
Central-state materialism  locates conscious states in the brain 
and nervous system and regards all conscious states as states of the 
brain. As D.M. Armstrong (1968) puts it, “mental states are not simply 
determined by corresponding states of the brain, but they are actually 
identical with these brain-states, brain-states that involve nothing 
but physical properties” (p. 182, original emphasis). In an incisive 
and critical analysis of contemporary materialism, John Searle (1992)
K. Rcunakrishiia Rao
56
has pointed out that materialism in all its incarnations, ranging from 
logical positivism and Watsonian behaviorism to identity theories 
and strong artificial intelligence, is essentially guilty of leaving out 
the mind; “it has left out some essential feature of the mind, such as 
consciousness or ‘qualia’ or semantic content” (p. 30). Searle has 
further argued that an identity theory, which identifies the properties 
o f sub jective  experience such as pain, w ith the attendan t 
neurophysiological properties in the brain either, “leaves out the mind 
or it does not; if it does, it is false; if it does not, it is not materialism” 
(1992, p. 37). The properties of pain are either mental or they are 
not. If an identity theory asserts that the experience of pain is mental, 
it is no longer a materialistic theory. However, if the theory leaves 
out the subjective feature of the pain experienced, it essentially leaves 
out the mind.
Functionalism holds that all mental states are functional states 
and that they can be defined in terms of sensory inputs and behavioral 
outputs (Shoemaker & Swinburne, 1984). In the functionalist view, 
mental states are not mere states of behavior disposition, as 
behaviorists hold. Nor are they identical with the brain states, as the 
identity theorists believe. Rather, a mental state is a functional state. 
As Hilary Putnam (1991) argues, “pain is not a brain state, in the 
sense of a physical-chemical state of the brain (or even the whole 
nervous system), but another kind of state entirely. I propose the 
hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional 
state of the whole organism” (p. 199). The input-output model of 
functionalism is clearly a favorite of cognitive psychologists engaged 
in abstract modeling of cognitive processes independent of their 
neurophysiological basis, and the researchers in artificial intelligence, 
who are occupied with writing computer programs that perform the 
functions analogous to those performed by the human mind. The 
relationship between the brain and the mind is considered similar to 
the one between hardware and software in the functioning of a 
computer. Consciousness is the software program running on the
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hardw are b ra in . From  the functionalist view point it is not 
inconceivable that non-organic entities like computers may have 
mental states. What is considered relevant here are the functions that 
a system performs and not the substance or the material that 
constitutes it. Some functionalist philosophers hold, however, that a 
structure like the brain with com plex, m ultiple and parallel 
connections is necessary  to produce m ental states and that 
computational models of the mind are simply inadequate to this task 
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991).
There are several well-known objections to functionalist 
theories of consciousness. Like materialist theories, functionalism 
provides no viable explanation of the subjective and qualitative 
aspects of awareness. The qualia, the phenomenal properties of 
conscious experience, appear to be too elusive to be captured in a 
functionalist theoretical framework. They have so far defied all 
attempts to be successfully defined in terms of functional roles. “The 
subjective character of experience,” writes Thomas Nagel (1974), 
“is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive 
analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with 
its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system 
of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed 
to robots or automata that behave like people though they experience 
nothing”(pp. 166-167).
Some philosophers of functionalist persuasion have gone so 
far as to deny that qualia exist. For example, Daniel Dennett (1997) 
categorically asserts, “there simply are no qualia at all” (p. 620). If 
the essential features of qualia are that they are “ineffable, intrinsic, 
private, and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness,” 
Dennett argues that there are no properties in conscious experience 
that match such a description. He concludes, “qualia is a philosophers’ 
term that fosters nothing but confusion, and refers in the end to no 
properties or features at all” (p. 623). Even the Churchlands (1982),
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whose physicalist bias can hardly be doubted, disagree with such a 
blanket rejection of qualia. “The functionalist need not, and perhaps 
should not,” they counsel, “attempt to deny the existence of qualia. 
Rather, he should be a realist about ‘qualia’ and hope that their nature 
would eventually be revealed by “neurophysiology, neurochemistry, 
and neurophysics” (p. 31). Patricia Churchland likens consciousness 
to heat. When we keep something in the microwave to heat, the 
molecules of the food in the microwave start to move faster and 
faster. The motion of the molecules does not generate the heat; it is 
the heat. Likewise, consciousness is not produced by the functions 
of the brain. Rather the functions themselves are consciousness. We 
are back again in the court o f identity  theory and reductive 
materialism!
Even regarding the “aboutness” aspect of consciousness, there 
are those who argue that materialism is inconsistent with the notion 
of iijtentionality. Most philosophers in the Western tradition have 
assum ed that in ten tionality  is the defin ing characteristic of 
consciousness. By intentionality it is meant that consciousness is o f  
or about something (Brentano, 1925/1973). Some philosophers 
consider that intentionality is an irreducible and intrinsic and non- 
dispositional property of the act of consciousness. If that is the case, 
there can be no convincing m aterialistic explanation o f self- 
knowledge, knowledge of one’s thinking and the contents of thought 
(Madell, 1988). We all have intentional frameworks of beliefs, which 
we use to evaluate and make normative decisions. Such intentional 
frameworks that enable us to deliberate, reflect and evaluate are in 
principle not analyzable into any descriptive frameworks, whether 
neurological or physical (Kim, 1985).
Moving away from general philosophical discussions to a 
consideration of the more specific attempts to relate subjective 
experience to brain states, we find three broad types of approaches 
in neuropsychology. One approach is to conceive of particular brain
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systems as mediating subjective awareness; anottier is to suggest that 
subjective experience is not an outcome of the activity of any 
particular brain systems, but involves integration among different 
neural systems. The third approach associates subjective awareness 
with the “higher-quality end of the continuum  of degrees of 
representations” involved in information processing (Farah, 1997).
An example of the first approach is the DICE (dissociated 
interactions and conscious experience) model of Daniel Schacter 
(1989). Schacter postulates a cognitive module, labeled as conscious 
awareness system (CAS), which mediates subjective awareness. The 
CAS is separate from the brain systems associated with different 
cognitive activities, which are called knowledge modules. It is also 
different from the executive system, which makes decisions and 
initiates actions. The CAS is conceived as a monitoring system, which 
on the one had integrates and relates information from different 
knowledge modules and provides inputs to the executive system 
whose outputs it receives in turn. When the CAS is disconnected 
from other brain systems mediating perception and memory, those 
perceptions and memories remain implicit. Thus the difference 
between paradoxical awareness, such as subliminal perception and 
implicit memory and primary awareness is that in the former there is 
a disconnection between the CAS and memory and perceptual 
modules.
The second approach is represented by the integrated field 
theory of Marcel Kinsboume (1988). In this approach subjective 
awareness is not the property of any particular neural system, but 
rather a state of integration among different systems in the brain. 
Various modality-specific perceptions, memories, action plans, and 
so on arising from disparate brain systems interact to bring about a 
mutually consistent and integrated state. This state is continually 
revised and upgraded to reflect all the information available in 
different parts of the brain. It is possible, however, because of damage
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to one or more brain systems as in prosopagnosia or neglect, normal 
integration of the output of the different systems involved may be 
weakened or disrupted, thus preventing the updating of the contents 
of awareness. Consequently, the person lacks subjective awareness 
of the information that fails to be incorporated into the integrated 
state. Subjective awareness in this view is thus the result of the 
integrating activities of several systems in the brain.
The third approach draws its support from the fact that 
information in neural networks is not represented in all or none 
fashion. It is possible for the information to be represented partially 
or in a degraded manner. If the quality of representation does not 
reach certain levels of clarity or intensity then that representation 
lacks subjective awareness. It is also suggested (Armstrong & 
Malcolm, 1984) that subjective awareness arises from the scanning 
of neural representations in the brain. When these representations 
are too weak to be scanned, we have no subjective awareness of 
them.
This is all very interesting and may indeed lead to some 
important research. However, one may legitimately wonder whether 
any of these hypotheses throw useful light on the main question of 
why we experience the way we do. We have no difficulty in agreeing 
that a person in coma is unconscious and that injury to the brain may 
alter one’s conscious experience. No one denies that conscious 
experience in the human condition depends decisively on the cortical 
processes. The real question is, are they sufficient to account for all 
aspects of conscious experience?
From  the p reced ing  d iscussion  we see that physical 
explanations of consciousness appear to leave out something, which 
may be quite basic to consciousness, viz, the subjective quality of 
experience. Thomas Nagel (1974) argued persuasively that no 
naturalistic explanation of consciousness can capture the “what it is 
like” quality of subjective experience. Colin McGinn (1991) echoed
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a similar view and suggested that we are “cognitively closed” to 
understand subjectivity. However, scientists in general do not seem 
to be bothered by this. Instead they have focused almost entirely 
with the cortical connections awareness has and are content with 
know ing the structural and functional aspects of awareness. 
Therefore, there is little disenchantment in scientific circles with the 
materialist theories. Even Nagel and McGinn continue to subscribe 
to naturalism of one sort or another. Moreover, science favors 
simplicity and unity; and materialist accounts of consciousness fit 
well with the general physical paradigm to which most scientists 
subscribe. Also the private nature of subjectivity and its inaccessibility 
to third-person observations makes many scientists disinterested in 
that aspect of consciousness. Further, to many scientists dualism is 
a “m etaphysically repellant doctrine” , as McGinn put it. The 
mysteriousness of posited causal connection between the material 
and the nonmaterial is an enigma that frustrates many. In the absence 
of more compelling rejection of the basic materialistic assumptions, 
it is unlikely that science would give up its materialistic bias even 
though it is becoming increasingly clear that we may never find a 
satisfactory physical explanation of subjectivity inherent in one’s 
conscious experience.
As we climb up from the “main-floor” of primary awareness 
to the higher-levels of paranormal awareness, the inadequacy of all 
physical explanations of consciousness becomes more glaring. 
C red ib le  sc ien tific  claim s are m ade for the ex istence of 
parapsychological phenomena (Rao & Palmer, 1987). If we take these 
claims seriously, we are inexorably driven to raise fundamental 
questions about the role of consciousness in our being. For this reason 
John Bel off (1962), for example, considers parapsychology as “the 
ultimate battleground on which the mind-body controversy must be 
fought out. For, if no plausible physical explanation can be offered 
for what are ostensibly paranormal phenomena, the radical dualist 
approach would appear to win by default” (p. 229).
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The Reality of Psi
What are parapsychological phenomena? Are they real? Can they be 
explained within a physical framework? Answers to these questions 
have important implications to our understanding of consciousness. 
The Parapsychological Association (1989) defines parapsychology 
as the discipline with studies “apparent anomalies of behavior and 
experience that exist apart from currently known explanatory 
mechanisms that account for organism-environment and organism- 
organism information and influence flow” (pp. 394-395). In order 
that they may not be confused with concepts that have occult and 
nonscientific connotations, parapsychologists chose the Greek letter 
“psi” to refer collectively to parapsychological phenomena. Psi is 
conceived to have two aspects— the cognitive or the receptive aspect 
and the kinetic or the expressive aspect. The cognitive aspect of psi 
is commonly designated as ESP or extrasensory perception. ESP is 
awareness of something outside oneself obtained without the use of 
known senses. It includes precognition (the ability to foretell future 
events), telepathy (thought-transference between two people), and 
clairvoyance (ESP of objective events). The expressive aspect of psi 
is called PK or psychokinesis, and is commonly described as the 
direct action of the mind over matter. Even though parapsychologists 
have developed specific methods to test for each of these types of 
psi, it is now increasingly recognized that all of them stem from the 
same source.
Surveys show that a significant majority of people, even in 
the Westem societies, believes in ESP and related phenomena. Further, 
many people who responded attest to their occurrence in their own 
lives. For example, a Newsweek poll (November 3-4,1994) revealed 
that about 60% of Americans felt the need to experience spiritual 
growth and that one third of them had mystical/religious experiences. 
In another survey, 51% of Charlottesville, VA, residents and 55% of 
University of Virginia students reported to have experienced some 
form of ESP (Palmer, 1979). Whereas many scientists outside of
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parapsychology remain skeptical of paranormal claims, the consensus 
among the scientists who are actually involved in psi research is that 
there is compelling evidence in support of ESP and PK.
The Evidence
The evidence of ESP is of two kinds. First, there is the body of reported 
cases of paranormal ESP experiences. Consider for example, the case 
noted by the renowned German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Emanuel 
Swedenborg, a versatile scholar, visiting a friend in Stockholm, had 
a sudden “vision” of a raging fire at that very moment in the city of 
Gothenburg about 300 miles away. Swedenborg described the fire 
and how it was extinguished “third door” from his house in great 
detail to about fifteen people gathered at his friend’s house. A 
messenger arrived much later from Gothenburg and, as Kant notes, 
in the letters he brought with him “the conflagration was described 
as Swedenborg had stated it” (quoted in Inglis, 1977, p. 132). There 
was apparently no way Swedenborg could have known about the 
fire normally. Edmund Gurney and colleagues published many cases 
in their 1886 book Phantasms o f  the Living. Since then there have 
been several other surveys of spontaneous ESP experiences, the 
prominent among them being a collection of several thousand cases 
by L.E. Rhine, which is now deposited in the Duke University 
archives.
The second line o f  ev idence com es from  laborato ry  
experiments. The credit for conducting the first major systematic 
experimental investigation of ESP goes to John Coover (1917/1975) 
at Stanford University. It was, however, J.B. Rhine (1934) of Duke 
University who made a sustained scientific claim for the existence 
of ESP and turned psychical research, an amateur endeavor, into 
parapsychology, a professional and scientific study of anomalous 
psychological phenomena. As Mauskopf and McVaugh (1980) note, 
Rhine gave the field “a shared language, methods, and problems.” 
Rhine’s experimental procedures were simple and easy to repeat. He
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asked his subjects to guess the random order of the cards in a deck of 
twenty-five consisting of five each of five symbols: circle, cross, 
wavy lines, square, and star. The Pearce-Pratt experiment by Rhine 
was the methodological culmination of the early attempts to test for 
ESP. It had special precautions taken to exclude all types of error, 
such as two-experimenter controls, independent record keeping, and 
several hundred yards of distance between the subjects and the target 
cards, to preclude any sensory cues. With such controls in place, the 
Pearce-Pratt series gave highly significant results in support of the 
ESP hypothesis (Rhine & Pratt, 1954).
The Conclusive Experiment
Since the publication o f R hine’s m onograph, Extra-Sensory  
Perception, in 1934, there have been numerous experimental reports 
that provided evidence for ESP and PK. There were also reports of 
experiments that failed to replicate Rhine’s results and various kinds 
of criticism against the evidential value of Rhine’s results. Rhine, 
however, held his ground. He stoutly defended that none of the 
criticisms invalidate the evidential value of the results without a 
presumption of fraud on the part of the investigators, an unlikely 
possibility (see Rao, 1982). In light of the fact that Rhine’s results 
were not universally replicated, there were calls for a conclusive 
experiment, a completely “fool-proof’ study that would control for 
all conceivable error, including experimenter fraud. I find the demand 
for an error-proof experiment an impossible goal, at best a tempting 
mirage, because in retrospect one can always speculate on a possible 
source of error. If, however, by “conclusive” we make a more modest 
claim, viz., that it is highly improbable that the results of a successful 
experiment are due to some possible artifact, then a good case can 
be made for more than one such experiment in parapsychology.
The REG experiments of Helmut Schmidt (1969), a physicist 
at Boeing Scientific Laboratories at the time of conducting them, 
may be cited as an example of well-controlled research that can be
Consciousness and Cognitive Anomalies
65
accorded  the status of a conclusive experim ent. S chm id t’s 
experiments were carried out with specially built machines that 
controlled against artifacts such as recording errors, sensory leakage, 
subject cheating, and improper analysis of the data. The Schmidt 
machine, as it has come to be known, randomly selected the targets 
and automatically recorded both the target selections and subject’s 
responses. The subject’s task was to select which of the four lamps 
in the panel would light up, and then press the corresponding button 
to indicate the selection. Random lighting of the lamps was achieved 
by a sophisticated random event generator (REG) with a tiny 
radioactive source, strontium 90. After extensive testing in control 
trials, it was determined that the output of the REG did not deviate 
s ign ifican tly  from  chance. The results of each of the three 
experimental series were highly significant suggesting ESP on the 
part of the subjects tested.
Replication of ESP Experiments
Whereas a call for a conclusive and completely error-proof experiment 
seems to be somewhat misconstrued, the emphasis on the need for 
replication, especially when controversial empirical claims are made, 
is well placed. If parapsychological phenomena are not replicable, 
they would hardly excite any scientific interest. Isolated findings 
and unique events ordinarily hold little interest to scientists unless 
they lead to or are capable of leading to some kind of general law. 
ESP as a laboratory effect must be repeatedly observed with 
reasonable ease in order that it can be studied and understood as a 
natural phenomenon. Also, the necessity of a foolproof experiment 
recedes into the background as the phenomenon becomes increasingly 
replicable.
There is sufficient evidence that several parapsychological 
phenomena are replicated to a significant degree (see Radin, 1999), 
although the goal of reproducing the phenomena on demand is yet to 
be achieved. For example, the REG experiments of the kind carried 
out by Schmidt have been replicated by several other investigators.
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Radin, May, and Thomas (1985) made a survey of all the binary 
REG experiments published between 1969, when Schmidt first 
published his results, and 1984. Their review, which included 332 
individual experiments, carried out by 30 principal investigators, 
showed that 71 of them gave statistically significant results in favor 
of the PK hypothesis. The combined binominal probability of all the 
studies they reviewed is too small to suggest that these results could 
be due to chance. The most prominent of the REG replications is a 
wide range of important experiments carried out by Robert Jahn 
(1982) and associates (Jahn et. al., 1997; Nelson et al., 1984) at 
Princeton University. Replication of parapsychological experiments 
has been observed in the study of the differential effect (Rao, in press), 
the sheep-goat effect (Palmer, 1971). The differential effect is an 
often-observed response pattern indicating positive and negative 
scores in the same experiment by the subject when she is asked to 
make ESP responses in two different conditions. Sheep-goat effect 
is the observed tendency of the subjects who believe in the possibility 
of paranormal phenomena such as ESP to obtain scores in the positive 
direction while the disbelieving subjects (goats) tend to miss. Other 
areas in which there is significant evidence for psi include 
extroversion and ESP (Sargent, 1981; Honorton, Ferrari & Bern, 1998; 
Palmer & Carpenter, 1998), hypnosis and ESP (Schechter, 1984), 
ESP in dreams (Child, 1985), and ESP in the ganzfeld (Honorton, 
1985; Hyman, 1985; Milton & Wiseman, 1999; Bem, Palmer & 
Broughton, 2001).
ESP and Sensory Noise Reduction
The results of a number of ESP studies from different areas converge 
to suggest that the occurrence of ESP may be facilitated by the 
procedures that result in the reduction of meaningful sensory stimuli 
and proprioceptive input to the subject. W hatever may be the 
mechanism by which ESP is mediated, it is reasonable to assume 
that ESP behaves like a weak signal that must compete for the 
information processing resources of the organism. In this context.
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any reduction of ongoing sensory activity may help to improve the 
chances of detecting the ESP signal. In fact, many of the traditional 
psychic development techniques, such as the practice of yoga, appear 
to involve sensory noise reduction procedures.
Experimental results also suggest that meditation may enhance 
one’s ESP ability (Rao et al., 1978). Similarly, relaxation (Braud & 
Braud, 1974) induced by a variety of techniques, including hypnosis 
(Fahler and Cadoret, 1958), has been shown to improve ESP scores. 
There is also substantial evidence to suggest that the absence of 
meaningful external stimulation in a wakeful state facilitates ESP. 
The ganzfeld-ESP experiments fall into this category. The ganzfeld 
is a homogeneous visual field produced by such manipulation as 
taping two halves of a ping-pong ball over the eyes of the subject 
and focusing uniform white or red light on the face from about two 
feet away.
In a typical ganzfeld-ESP experiment, the subject after being 
in the ganzfeld for about 30 minutes, is asked to report whatever is 
going on in the mind at that time. The subject’s reports are monitored 
and recorded by an experimenter in another room via a microphone 
link. A second experimenter, located in a different room isolated from 
the subject and the monitoring experimenter acts as a sender and 
looks at a picture for about 15 minutes attempting to “transmit” it to 
the subject. At the end of the ganzfeld period, the monitoring 
experimenter gives the subject a set of four pictures with a request to 
rank each one of them 1 through 4 on the basis of their correspondence 
to the subject’s mental images and impressions during the ganzfeld 
period. The m onitoring experim enter like the subject has no 
information as to which one of the four pictures is the target picture. 
Honorton and Harper (1974) published the first ganzfeld-ESP 
experiment, which provided evidence that the subject’s mentation 
during the ganzfeld matched significantly with the target pictures. 
By 1985 there were 42 published ganzfeld-ESP experiments of which
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19 gave significant evidence of ESP, suggesting that ESP in the 
ganzfeld is a fairly robust effect. A more recent successful study by 
Daryl Bern and Honorton (1994) appeared in Psychological Bulletin.
This study consisting of 11 experiments involves a setup called 
autoganzfeld, which utilized complete computer control of the 
experimental protocol. It is claimed that this procedure meets the 
“stringent” methodological standards recommended jointly by the 
critique o f parapsychological experim ents Ray Hym an and 
parapsychologist Charles Honorton in their joint communique (1986). 
The results of these experiments provide unambiguous evidence for 
ESP in the ganzfeld. The latest review of ganzfeld-ESP research is 
given by Palmer (2003), which again supports the psi hypothesis.
With this much evidence, robust and widespread, we may ask 
why is it that the scientific community in general is still skeptical 
about the existence of ESP? First, many of the scientists who express 
skepticism about ESP have little firsthand knowledge of the evidential 
experiments in the field. They are guided mostly by the biased 
criticisms of people like C.E.M. Hansel (1969, 1989). It is doubtful, 
however, that everyone would accept ESP even if they did read the 
original reports. Like Hansel, if one accords zero probability for the 
possibility of ESP, no amount of evidence would be sufficient to 
establish it. This is the antecedent improbability argument, which 
leaves no room for ESP in the universe.
While none of the major critics of psi research, including 
Hansel (1989), Hyman (1985) and Alcock (2003) explicitly endorse 
the zero probability argument as such their criticisms are generally 
inspired by the a priori assumption that psi cannot be real and that 
the proponents of psi subscribe to a nonscientific worldview (Alcock, 
1987).
It would appear that only a significant shift in the prevailing 
scientific paradigm could make ESP congruent with our conception
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of the universe and make it less dissonant to accept ESP and other 
paranormal phenomena. Here is where consciousness studies, which 
suggest the inadequacy of physical explanations to account for all of 
conscious phenomena, and parapsychological research, concerned 
with anomalous phenomena, may help to reinforce each other. 
Meanwhile, ESP researchers continue to struggle to convince the 
largely skeptical science community with more and hopefully better 
evidence. Their efforts will at least keep the case for ESP alive. No 
matter what scientists think, those people who have experienced ESP 
in their lives, as many have, will continue to believe in ESP. Also, I 
expect, many others who have not closed their minds to the possibility 
of ESP on a priori grounds would be convinced of the reality of ESP 
if they took the time to acquaint themselves with the scientific 
literature in the field of parapsychology.
Natural Explanations of Psi
Now we may ask, how can we explain the weird phenomena called 
ESP? The attempted explanations fall into two basic categories, 
natural and paranormal. Natural explanations of psi fit into two broad 
ca tegories. F irst are those that a ttem pt to exp la in  away 
parapsychological phenomena as no more than artifacts resulting from 
malobservation and misinterpretation. In the second category are 
the attempts to explain psi within a physical framework, without 
invoking any paranormal process. The latter include those that seek 
to find a place for psi in the physical world as we know it now and 
those that find it necessary to extend or modify current physical theory, 
and introduce new physical principles to account for psi.
Skeptical Explanations
The first category is essentially the skeptical stance. The paranormal 
experiences people report, it is suggested, are due to memory lapses, 
misconceptions, or simple chance coincidence of events. Some have 
argued (Spencer-Brown, 1953; Gilmore, 1989) that the statistically 
significant ESP results are due to inappropriate assumptions about
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chance expectations. Some skeptics have dismissed all evidence on 
ad hoc expectations of possible fraud on the part of those involved 
in the experiment, including the experimenter (Hansel, 1966). A 
few responsible and constructive critics (Diaconis, 1978; Hyman, 
1985) have suggested possible procedural errors. I have not found 
any of those attempts to explain away parapsychological claims to 
be any more compelling than the claimed evidence in favor of the 
phenomena. It has been generally agreed that the statistical 
procedures employed to evaluate psi experimental data since Rhine’s 
early experiments are basically valid (Camp, 1937). The fraud 
hypothesis is essentially nonfalsifiable. Critics have generally failed 
to show that procedural errors account for all of the significant psi 
results.
Physical Explanations of Psi
In the second category of natural explanations of psi are the physical 
theories. There are a variety of them, and the more prominent among 
them are electromagnetic theories and observational theories. The 
latter are derived from quantum mechanics.
Electromagnetic Theories'. On the analogy of the radio, it is 
suggested that in telepathy some kind of electromagnetic wave 
transmission may take place between the subject and the agent. 
According to the Russian scientist B. Kajinsky, the neuron system is 
vibratory in nature, and there are closed electrical circuits in the 
nervous system. Every thought, in this view, is accompanied by 
electromagnetic waves generated in the nervous system; and the 
waves thus generated in one brain can be afferently received by 
another brain, resulting in a telepathic kind of experience (see Vasiliev, 
1963/1976).
There are several problems with an electromagnetic theory 
such as the above. Electromagnetic transmission between brains, if 
it is possible, must be subject to the inverse square law. It is known,
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however, that telepathic communication decreases with distance. 
Russian physiologist L.L. Vasiliev (1963/1976) reported that he was 
not only able to induce hypnotic trance over long distance (1700 
km) by telepathic suggestion, but also found no diminishing of the 
effect when double metal screens were used to shield electromagnetic 
wave transmission. Moreover, ESP sometimes manifests in the form 
of clairvoyance, where the information is not generated in the brain 
but comes from objects that do not have brain-like structures to 
transmit electromagnetic waves.
Newer versions of electromagnetic theory appear in I.M. 
Kogan (1966), and Robert Becker (1992). Kogan postulated the 
existence of “the electromagnetic field of extra-long waves excited 
by biocurrents” (p. 81). In a similar vein, Becker proposed that 
extremely low frequency (ELF) waves are assumed to be of such 
great length that they are not impeded by physical obstructions. In 
Becker’s view, psi signals are not processed by the neurons in the 
brain, but by a more primitive system involving possibly the glial 
cells. It is hypothesized that such a primitive communication system 
consisting of electromagnetic field effects may function more 
effectively during periods of less turbulent geomagnetic activity. 
Significant correlations are observed between the occurrence of 
spontaneous ESP experiences and quiet geomagnetic activity 
(Persinger, 1985, 1989) and between successful psi tests in the 
laboratory and low levels of geomagnetic activity at the time the 
tests were conducted (Berger & Persinger, 1991; Persinger & 
Krippner, 1989). These findings are cited as evidence in support of 
the ELF hypothesis.
These correlations are no doubt interesting, but they do not 
establish that electrom agnetic transm ission is involved in psi 
communication. A quiet geomagnetic period may be conducive for 
the occurrence of psi for other reasons. The ELF hypothesis assumes 
(1) that human beings are capable of generating ELF waves of 
sufficient length to penetrate physical barriers and to travel over very
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long distances, (2) that human subjects can detect such waves, and 
(3) that ELF waves carry information of the kind required to account 
for an ESP experience. There is little evidence in support of these 
assumptions. Moreover, no electromagnetic theory of psi can provide 
a plausible explanation for precognition (see Stokes, 1997).
Observational Theories: In recent years several physicists 
have attempted to explain psi with the help of quantum mechanics. 
These are referred to as observational theories of psi; and the one 
advanced by Evan Harris Walker (1975) is the best known of them. 
It may be mentioned that classical mechanics assumes that the future 
state of a physical system can be determined if we have a complete 
description of the preceding state of the system. In quantum 
mechanics, however, a given system develops into one of several 
possible subsequent states and, according to the widely accepted 
Copenhagen interpretation, the ultimate description or the state vector 
of the system incorporates all the potential states. However, when a 
measurement or “observation” of the system is made, the state vector 
loses this undefined probabilistic quality and gets “reduced” to one 
real outcome. Unfortunately, the mathematical formalism of quantum 
mechanics does not specify what exactly constitutes an “observation”, 
and the resulting difficulties lead to the well known “measurement 
problem” in quantum mechanics.
One attempt to overcome this problem is to introduce the 
concept of “hidden variables,” the hypothetical factors that reconcile 
the demands of the deterministic and stochastic conceptions of the 
development of the state vector. Walker takes off from here and locates 
the hidden variables in consciousness and equates them with the 
“will.” By “will” Walker means, “that part of man’s conscious 
experience postulated to allow him to assert some control over 
physical events” (1975, p. 9). In Walker’s view, the will is responsible 
for the collapse of the state vector for a physical system at the quantum 
level with macroscopically diverse potential states. PK is an instance
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of such collapse brought about by human volition. Since the hidden 
variables are “nonlocal” and unconstrained by space-time factors, 
they are capable of coupling two observers or an observer and an 
object separated by distance or time. In telepathy, for instance, “the 
will of the subject and the experimenter act together to select a 
particular state into which the system is collapsed” (Walker 1975, p. 
10). In psi, whether ESP or PK, there is no transfer of energy, but 
only information is transferred. The magnitude of a psi effect, in 
Walker’s view, depends on the amount of information transferred 
through the will channel and the amount needed to collapse the state 
vector of a given system. Walker suggests that quantitative predictions 
of psi effects can be made based on a detailed analysis of the psi task 
and the estimate of the observer’s abilities to will.
T he o b serv a tio n a l theories o f psi are stated  to be 
experimentally testable as they are formulated in mathematical terms. 
Indeed Walker’s theory and other versions of it (Schmidt, 1975,1984) 
did stimulate a significant amount of research, especially in the area 
of PK. H owever, the validity o f any o f the versions of the 
observational theory is yet to be established (Irwin, 1999). Even in 
the liberal versions of quantum mechanics, it is highly controversial 
whether the collapse of the state vector involves consciousness in 
the sense the observational theories require to explain psi. Further, 
the question of what constitutes an “observation” necessary to bring 
about the collapse is not answered with any degree of clarity by the 
theorists in this area. Even granting some validity to observational 
theories of psi, it is difficult to see them as mere extensions of current 
physical theory. Walker’s theory, for example, sounds clearly dualistic. 
The “will” and the “hidden variables” seem to have the same 
ontological primacy as energy, which accounts for the events in the 
physical world. That the “will” influences only the micro-level 
quantum systems is beside the point. What is important is that the 
physical theories seem to assume principles and processes that are 
not just a mere extension of what is ordinarily understood as physical.
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but things that are commonly regarded as mental on the Cartesian 
model. In an important sense, Walker’s theory is a significant reversal 
of the physical model. One could even characterize it as vitalist 
because the central principle that accounts for psi is located in the 
“will” of the subject. This shift from the stimulus-centered physical 
model to a response-oriented approach gives Walker’s theory a vitalist 
look. Note that Walker’s theory does not postulate a process by which 
the energy emanating from the stimulus objects reaches the subject, 
but rather it looks at the subject and his “will” variables. The 
development of dualistic physics— this is what this theory attempts 
to develop— would indeed constitute a paradigmatic shift, and its 
acceptance would have revolutionary consequences for physics.
Psychological Models'. Some attempts have been made by 
parapsychologists to explain psi within the framework of information 
processing models (Schmeidler, 1991; Irwin 1979, 1999). In fact, 
the concept “extrasensory perception” presupposes a perceptual 
model, that psi operates in a sensory-like fashion, even if it is not 
mediated by any known senses. This model has shown little promise 
and attracted only negligible support within the parapsychological 
community. In a sense it is paradoxical to consider psi as a species 
of perception and at the same time regard it nonsensory. In fact, lack 
of any sensory orientation, and absence of any systematic effects of 
color, shape, size and location of the target on ESP performance 
clearly suggest that no sensory processing of the kind that goes on in 
perception is involved in psi. For this reason I argued elsewhere 
(Rao, 1966) that psi in its cognitive aspect is more like imagination 
than perception.
H.J. Irwin (1979, 1999) suggested that psi fits better with the 
information processing model in its ideational mode than in its sensory 
mode. Irwin recommends a memory model of psi such as the one 
proposed by W.G. Roll (1966, 1987). Roll suggested that ESP is 
more like remembering than perceiving. Therefore, the mediation
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of psi into awareness may involve essentially similar cognitive 
processing as in memory and be subject to similar laws, e.g., laws of 
association and frequency. In support of this theory it is claimed that 
exceptionally successful subjects appear to have excellent memories. 
At least one experimental study (Feather, 1967) reported a positive 
correlation between subjects’ memory scores and ESP scores. All 
this is well taken, and there may be some genuine similarities in the 
way memories and ESP information are mediated into awareness. 
The memory model, however, does not really explain ESP without 
invoking something more fundamental and something that is entirely 
beyond what memory can do. As Irwin himself recognizes, the 
memory model at best attempts to account for the mediation phase 
of psi, but not how the subject has access to extrasensory information 
in the first place. The latter does seem to require a paranormal process.
Paranormal Explanations of Psi
If psi phenomena are anomalous, as they appear to be, and do not fit 
into physical and psychological models, we will be tempted naturally 
to conclude that consciousness is not completely contained in our 
cortical structures or the rest of the nervous system. Indeed, several 
psychical researchers from F.W.H. Myers (1903/1915) and William 
James (Murphy & Ballou, 1960) to R.H. Thouless and Weisner( 1948) 
and Larry LeShan (1976) felt it necessary to postulate a hitherto 
unknown “entity” or a yet unrecognized principle operating when 
one has a psi experience. Though philosopher Michael Seriven (1962) 
complained that parapsychology is the reverse of psychoanalysis, 
with facts only and no theory, there is no lack of speculative theorizing 
in parapsychology (see Rao, 1977). The primary thrust of the theories 
in this area has been directed toward explaining how psi may function 
relatively unaffected by space-time constraints. As mentioned, many 
theorists felt it necessary to postulate new entities that can transcend 
space and time or new media that enable an individual to interact 
with the environment without being limited by space-time constraints. 
Since there are too many theories to review here, we may consider
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two of them to illustrate the kind of theorizing that goes on in 
parapsychology to provide paranormal explanations of psi.
Sublim inal Self'. F.W.H. Myers in his monumental work 
Human Personality and Its Survival o f  Bodily Death (1903/1915) 
has attempted to lay the foundation for a comprehensive science of 
consciousness. Myers believed that consciousness is more than what 
we are ordinarily aware. Our normal consciousness, which Myers 
called supraliminal consciousness, “does not comprise the whole of 
consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more 
comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty” (Myers, 1903/ 
1915, p. 12), which he refers to as subliminal or ultramarginal 
consciousness. In this view, it is like radiation beyond the visible 
spectrum. The states of consciousness that we are normally aware of 
are like those that fall within the visible spectrum, i.e., between violet 
and red. According to Myers, consciousness can be represented “as 
a linear spectrum whose red rays begin where voluntary muscular 
control and organic sensation begin, and whose violet rays fade away 
at the point at which man’s highest strain of thought of imagination 
merges in reverie and ecstasy” (p. 18). Thus, at either end of the 
consciousness spectrum Myers senses a wide variety of states that 
go beyond sensation and intellect.
The ultramarginal consciousness, which for the most part 
remains only as potential, is what Myers calls the subliminal self. “I 
mean by the subliminal self,” writes Myers, “that part of the self 
which is commonly subliminal. And I conceive also that no self of 
which we can have cognizance is in reality more than a fragment of 
a larger Self, —  revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited 
through an organism not so framed as to afford its full manifestation” 
(Myers, 1903/1915, p. 15).
In his conception of the subliminal self, Myers postulates an 
“inward extension of our being”, as James put it, “cut off from 
common consciousness by a stream or diaphragm not absolutely
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impervious but liable to leakage and to occasional rupture” (Murphy 
& Ballou, 1960, p. 230). However, Myers was vague as to how the 
subliminal self makes contact with the “cosmic” environment to bring 
about paranormal awareness. Various alternatives suggest themselves: 
(1) The subliminal selves are but waves in the sea of consciousness, 
pervasive and all compassing; (2) the subliminal self is discrete and 
discontinuous from others but it can interact with them because all 
of them are submerged in a common medium of consciousness; or 
(3) the subliminal self is a discrete center of consciousness inherently 
nonlocal and hence capable of interacting with others without being 
limited by space or time. The vagueness of Myers’ formulation had 
the merit of inspiring a number of subsequent thinkers ranging from 
William James to Jan Ehrenwald (1947).
The Shin Theory: The British psychologist R.H. Thouless 
and his associate B.P. Weisner advocate a radical dualistic postulation 
of the mind-brain relationship. Thouless and Weisner (1948) suggest 
that an entity, which they call “shin”, is involved in all our cognitive 
processes, normal as well as paranormal. They argue that in all normal 
processes of volition and perception the shin functions through the 
medium of the brain and the nervous system. Anomalous cognitive 
experiences occur when the shin bypasses the brain and the nervous 
system and directly interacts with the environment. In this view, the 
shin becomes aware of brain states by a clairvoyant type of monitoring 
of neural activity. Similarly, a psychokinetic type of influence of 
neural events by the shin results in volitional activity. In normal 
perception, stimuli from the object act on the sensory part of the 
nervous system. Shin is informed by the processes in the nervous 
system and the brain. In clairvoyance, however, direct connections 
are established between the shin and external objects without the 
mediation of the brain and the nervous system. Thus psi cognitions 
are no more supernormal than ordinary perceptions, but they are, as 
Thouless and Weisner put it, “exosomatic forms of processes which 
are normally endosomatic” (1948, p. 199).
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It would appear that the shin is more Hke the mind in a state of 
pure consciousness or awareness-as-such. The question remains, 
however, whether the shin is a discrete center of consciousness or a 
common medium that envelops the multitude of beings with cognitive 
abilities. Shin as a discrete entity is consistent with the notion of 
plurality of selves. Plurality of nonlocal selves, whose normal 
cognitive processes manifest only in association with particular brain 
structures may be merely functional rather than intrinsic. The question 
whether the shin is one or many is relevant only at the level at which 
the shin functions in association with the brain.
Charles Honorton and Lawrence Tremmel (1979) claimed 
support for the shin theory when they found a significant positive 
correlation between the subjects’ PK scores and their ability to control 
their own brain waves. An attempted replication of this finding did 
not succeed (Varvoglis & McCarthy, 1986). In fact, significant PK 
results were obtained in this study only in the trials in which the 
subjects’ performance on the brain-wave control task was poor. This 
finding is clearly contrary to what Honorton and Tremmel reported. 
We can still argue, however, that these findings do not contradict the 
shin theory, if we assume that the shin has a limited capacity for 
attention, and that when it is diverted to a normal task there may be 
less or no success in a paranormal task (Stokes, 1997).
M any o f the physical theories o f psi have testab le  
implications, but they are not supported by the relevant data. The 
paranormal theories may have intuitive appeal; however it is difficult 
to generate testab le hypotheses from  them . The thing that 
distinguishes psi research from folklore and occult claims is the 
commitment to scientific method. Consequently, a theory that permits 
little deductive development and makes no verifiable predictions can 
hardly be of any legitimate interest to parapsychologists. This is the 
problem that haunts most paranormal theories.
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Consciousness and Psi
From the preceding discussion of consciousness and psi, it is 
clear that they share similar conceptual and methodological problems. 
How can we conceive of and study phenomena and processes that 
may not be reduced to physical and biological states? What kinds of 
observations and measurements can we make of them? More 
importantly, while addressing questions about the role of the physical 
brain in cognition and action, the subjectivity aspect of consciousness 
in general and the evidence for psi in particular raises serious doubts 
about the adequacy of the materialist conception of the universe and 
our place and role in it. Parapsychology has attempted to naturalize 
the supernatural by successfully employing scientific method. In so 
doing it has raised questions about the very assumptive base of 
science. What parapsychology has thus attempted to do may be 
methodologically relevant to consciousness studies. If some aspects 
of consciousness do not indeed fit into the physical framework of 
our being and consequently do seem to involve extraphysical 
processes, can we ever understand these processes? Or are we 
destined to be “cognitively closed” to them, as some have despaired? 
In other words, is it possible to have a naturalistic understanding of 
the phenomena and processes that may not be translated into physical 
terms? Does the postulation of extraphysical processes necessarily 
lead to a radical dualistic metaphysics and all the associated 
d ifficulties o f accounting for their interaction? If there is a 
transcendental (extraphysical) realm of being, as most religious 
experiences are believed to attest (i.e. so-called pure conscious 
events), how can we account for our dual citizenship in the physical 
and extraphysical worlds? These issues confront both psi research 
and consciousness studies. I believe, however, that parapsychology, 
seen as constituting an interface between the two realms, may provide 




ESP and other psi phenomena are characterized as anomalous 
precisely because they are considered to be inconsistent with the 
scientific worldview and are seen as a kind that cannot occur in a 
universe that is fully described in physical terms and explained by 
physical laws. Paradigmatically, it is assumed to be self-evident that 
it is impossible for one to have any awareness of a physical event or 
a material object without being in sensory contact with that event or 
object, and that one’s mind/consciousness cannot direcdy cause any 
changes in the material world, other than changes in one’s own brain 
(Broad, 1953). These assumptions rule out a priori the possibility of 
ESP or PK. Moreover, if the cases suggestive of reincarnation are 
indeed what they are claimed to be by the investigators (Stevenson, 
1987), then the identity theory which equates conscious states with 
the brain states would lack all legitimacy. Thus paranormal awareness 
will have a decisive role in settling the question whether all forms of 
awareness can be realized by physical systems. The reality of psi is 
evidence against any materialistic conception of consciousness. 
Inasmuch as the brain’s capacity to receive information is strictly 
limited to that which is received via the neural pathways, ESP is 
simply beyond the reach of the brain. Again, PK demonstrates that 
minds/consciousness can do things that no brains can do. One may 
argue, how ever, that new advances in physical theory  may 
accommodate paranormal awareness. In the “weird wonderland” of 
subatomic and super galactic physics, as Arthur Koestler (1972) put 
it, phenomena which appear more “occultish” than psi are known to 
ex ist. H ow ever, as K eith C am pbell (1970), no friend  o f 
parapsychology, remarks on this point: “The doctrine that some 
science, we do not know which, is adequate to support a Central- 
State doctrine of the mind, is so vague and so weak that it is not 
worth holding or discussing” (p. 97).
That psi phenomena do not fit into the physical framework is, 
of course, no sufficient reason to embrace a radical dualism. Radical 
dualism on its part creates new problem by postulating entities that
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resist empirical testing. If the physical and nonphysical are considered 
to be so radically different as to have separate domains of existence, 
there is little hope of understanding how they may function in 
association with each other. In reality the normal and paranormal 
function together. Psi events take place in the physical world; and 
they are experienced by people with brains and bodies. Psi 
phenomenon, even if they were to involve processes qualitatively 
and fundamentally different from the known physical processes, 
manifest in such a way that we can study them in a naturalistic manner 
through observation and experiment. Therefore, psi may be usefully 
thought of as constituting an interface between the two fundamental 
processes. Conceived as threshold phenomena that link two disparate 
realms, psi may give us insights that could lead us to a common 
ground covering the two processes. We are thus led to the domain of 
process dualism rather than entity dualism.
Normal and Paranormal Processes
So far we have described “paranorm al” as that which 
transgresses what are believed to be the basic limiting principles that 
govern the physical framework of the universe and our place in it. 
When we use such expressions as extraphysical and nonphysical to 
convey the sense that paranormal phenomena are such that they 
cannot be contained in principle within a physical system, we are 
saying what the paranormal is not, and not what it is. The description 
is thus negative in its import. It casts the normal and the paranormal 
in contrasting roles and tends to set them in opposition in an “either- 
or” mode. Consequently it runs the risk of clouding their possible 
complementary function. In an attempt to throw some positive light 
on it, we may now allow ourselves to make some speculative 
assumptions about the paranormal in its relation to awareness.
In normal awareness, such as perceptual awareness, we 
postulate (1) a subject who has awareness, (2) the object of awareness, 
and (3) a process of awareness. The object is related to the subject
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through the instrumentality of sensory mediation and the processing 
in the brain. The resultant awareness is thus constructed to represent 
the world to us. In this situation the subject and the object are seen as 
divided and separate, but related by the mediation of the senses, the 
nervous system and the brain’s functions. If our sensory mechanisms 
and the cerebral processes were to be different from what they are, 
our perception of the world would be very different indeed. What we 
have in our perceptions of the world are the appearances of reality 
and not the reality itself. In that sense the “things-in- themselves” 
remain forever “unknown”.
Now, consider the possibility that a subject is in direct contact 
with and has unmediated access to the object. Awareness arising out 
of such unmediated access would be an instance of what we referred 
to as paranormal awareness. Such awareness would indeed be 
different in kind from normal awareness. In normal perceptions, for 
example, the object is represented, and it is these representations 
and our reflections on them that give us the “knowledge” of the object 
perceived. Since all of us have similar sensory systems and cortical 
structures that process the energy patterns emanating from the object 
in similar ways, we have shared representations that give us a sense 
of objectivity about them. Also, we make assumptions about reality 
as it is represented to us and we test these assumptions by means of 
other representations and thus attempt to verify and validate our 
assumptions about the objects of representations and the assumed 
nature of reality. Our knowledge of reality is thus indirect, mediated 
and in a sense inferential. On the other hand, the awareness we would 
have, if we had unmediated access to the object, would be direct and 
not represented via sensations, images and thoughts. Instead, such 
unmediated awareness would acquaint us directly with the object 
and we would have an awareness of the object in itself. In a sense, it 
would be knowing by being. In other words, the relation between the 
subject and the object of awareness is not representational and 
reflective but reflexive, one of identity.
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Awareness via sensory representations is “knowing” by 
d escrip tio n ;  unm ediated  aw areness is aw areness by direct 
acquaintance; or, to put it in another way, it is awareness by being. 
The former approximates to what we generally label as information. 
The latter may be thought of as revelation  or realization  as 
distinguished from knowing or understanding. Information is 
cognitively processed awareness whereas realization or revelation is 
consciousness-as-such, an experience by being. In paranormal 
processes, then, there is no information flow; and in a significant 
sense it is contentless awareness inasmuch as the content of our 
cognitions is always of a sensory nature.
We may speculate further that there is a primordial existential 
state, the ground condition, an amorphous and undifferentiated state 
in which knowing and being are indistinguishable, as they coalesce 
into a single state. With the development of the sensory and the cortical 
systems, knowing and being branch off and are differentiated. 
Awareness becomes a state of knowing instead of an experience of 
being. Consequently, we tend to be completely dependent on cortically 
processes and sensory mediated awareness, and lose touch with the 
aw areness by being. N orm al aw areness is aw areness of 
representations; paranormal awareness is awareness by being. The 
latter involves reflexive identity between the subject and the object, 
and their relationship may be conceived as teleological. The former 
involves subject’s reflection and the object’s representation. The 
subject-object relationship is causal.
If paranormal awareness is conceived to be awareness as such 
without content, how is it different from a state where there is no 
awareness at all? Accustomed, as we are, to depend almost exclusively 
on mediated awareness, it is only natural to think that it is the only 
kind of awareness there is. Recall that our perceptions are only 
appearances and their genuineness and veridicality are tested by 
appeal to inter-subject consensus and other assumptions we make of
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reality. Awareness as such, on the other hand, does not require such 
cross-validation because it is unmediated awareness of being, a 
relationship of identity and direct acquaintance, as distinct from 
descriptive awareness by representation. Its validity is reflexive and 
possibly self-certifying, unlike the awareness of cognitive awareness, 
which is reflective and consensual. Awareness as such, by assumption, 
does not involve any sensory processes, has no representational 
content, and yet it is believed to influence our lives in important 
ways.
In some of the Eastern traditions, awareness-as-such or pure 
consciousness is not taken as an intellectual abstraction, but presented 
as an empirical claim. The entire gamut of yogic practices and a host 
of other psychic development strategies are based on that claim. 
Therefore, the question whether awareness-as-such really exists need 
not be answered on theoretical grounds. Pure consciousness is not a 
mere logical presupposition; its existence is considered a fact of 
experience. I would like to add that awareness as such involves a 
s ta te  o f rea liza tion  as d is tin c t from  sim ple know ing and 
understanding. While experiencing sensory awareness, it is possible 
to dissociate cognition and conduct, because they are distinct at this 
level. One may know, for example, that smoking is bad for health, 
and yet continue to smoke. In a state of realization, however, there is 
no room for such dissociation. Knowing and being blend into one 
state and become inseparable. This is best exemplified in the 
Upanishadic saying, “to know Brahman is to be Brahman.” The lives 
of true saints and those who had genuine near-death and “peak” 
experiences, that were life transforming, may exemplify rudimentary 
states of realization.
Considered in this manner, the normal and the paranormal 
may indeed be complementary processes. I venture to speculate 
further that the basic principles underlying fundamental discoveries 
and the inspiration for artistic excellence may have an intuitive
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genesis. Their validation via scientific formulation or evaluation by 
art criticism, however, is a consequence of rational reflection. In 
fact we may conceive that the basic values that govern our conduct 
in general seem to pervade across cultures and persist over the ages 
are likely given to us intuitively. I adhere to the notion that there is 
nothing purely random in nature or in our behavior. Our behaviors, 
as well as the course of nature, are determined by normal or 
paranormal processes or a combination of both. It is likely that the 
apparent random behavior, where we find no normal causation, may 
have a paranormal source. Take for example the case of evolution. 
There are no generally agreed on probability formula among 
mathematicians and biologists to satisfactorily explain how our 
biosphere has evolved the way it did by random mutation and 
selection. The inherent difficulties in the classical Darwinian position 
has led at least one eminent biologist, Sir Alister Hardy (1965) to 
suggest that a paranormal system may interact with a normal physical 
system in the evolutionary process and thus account for the gaps left 
by the classical selection theory. Again, the distinction between 
explicate and implicate organizations made by David Bohm (1973) 
is similar to the one we have made between the normal and the 
paranormal processes.
The Two Aspects of Psi
ESP and PK may be seen as interactive phenomena, a combined 
product of the normal and paranormal processes. ESP exemplifies 
one of the ways in which awareness by being becomes mediated 
awareness. Unlike awareness as such, ESP has content, which means 
that it conveys information. Unlike in normal process, however, in 
ESP there is no information flow from the object to the subject. The 
ESP subject does not receive information from the target in the manner 
one receives information from the stimulus in perception. The 
informafion is generated from within; the being experience is 
transformed into an information state. Thus the paranormal finds 
expression in the normal cognitive processes.
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ESP then needs to be explained at two levels -  the level of 
being and the level of knowing. At the level of being, the paranormal 
process establishes the source of psi in the subject. Then at the level 
of knowing psi is cognitively processed so as to manifest in one of 
the familiar forms. L.E. Rhine’s (1961) analysis of the spontaneous 
cases revealed four basic forms of psi occurrence. They are (a) realistic 
dreams, (b) unrealistic dreams, (c) hallucinations, and (d) intuitions. 
In addition, laboratory studies have shown that ESP may manifest in 
a covert fashion as awareness does in subliminal perception; and 
sometimes psi information is revealed via physiological changes in 
the subject (Figar, 1959; Tart, 1963; Dean & Nash, 1967; Braud, 
Shafer, & Andrews, 1990; Wiseman & Schlitz, 1997).
GN.M. Tyrrell and L.E. Rhine among others recognized that 
psi functions at two levels. Tyrrell (1947) suggested that ESP 
phenomena first occur at the subliminal level and then they are obliged 
“to pass through the bottleneck at the threshold if they are to reach 
the normal consciousness” (p. 331). They pass over the threshold by 
making use of what Tyrrell called the “mediating vehicles,” which 
according to him include dreams, sensory hallucinations, automatic 
writing, mental images, and strong emotions. Following Tyrrell, L.E. 
Rhine (1965) hypothesized that psi involves a two-stage process. 
First is the paranormal stage about which we know so little. The 
second stage involves the normal cognitive processing, similar to 
the psychodynamic processes by which the unconscious material finds 
its way into subjective awareness. She points out that cases of 
incomplete and distorted psi information, including psi-missing in 
which the subject significantly misses the target (beyond chance 
expectation), while attempting to hit, are better understood in terms 
of the two-stage process.
In this context it would be of interest to note the striking 
similarities between ESP and subliminal perception (SP). In fact a 
number of researchers were sufficiendy impressed by their similarities
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as to undertake investigations to explore the relationship between SP 
and ESP (Rao & Rao, 1982; Krietler & Krietler, 1973). Norman Dixon 
(1979) identified several areas of contact between SP and ESP. He 
pointed out that a number of variables like motivation, memory, 
altered states of consciousness, such as relaxation and dreams, right 
hemispheric functioning, etc., have similar influence on both SP and 
ESP. Gertrude Schmeidler (1971) also observed that “whatever 
psychological laws apply to the processing of ambiguous sensory 
material will apply also to the processing of ESP information” (p. 
137). Another psi researcher Charles Honorton (1976) wrote: “Both 
subliminal and psi influences are facilitated by intemal-attention 
states, both are subject to subtle experimenter effects and situational 
factors, and both involve the transformation and mediation of stimulus 
influence through ongoing mentation processes” (pp. 215-216). It is 
also suggested that ESP and SP may represent primitive brain 
functions (Ehrenwald, 1979). Freud himself (1953) expressed the 
view that telepathy “comes about particularly easily at the moment 
at which an idea emerges from the unconscious or, in theoretical 
terms, as it passes over from the ‘primary’ process to the ‘secondary 
process’” (p. 89).
Double Aspects of Consciousness
By accepting, then, that there are normal and paranormal phenomena 
and that the latter are intrinsically incapable of being contained within 
a physical system, are we favoring radical dualist metaphysics of 
substantive independence ofbody and mind? It need not be so. That 
the normal and the paranormal processes appear to be two aspects of 
psi suggests that they may be complementary aspects of one and the 
same reality. Characterizing them as physical and nonphysical or 
material and immaterial is something that is better avoided than 
addressed at this point, because such dichotomous characterization 
will create additional problems without helping to solve any. However, 
the reality of psi decisively stands against all materialistic doctrines.
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whether state-central materialism or neural identity theory, as they 
are formulated now. At this stage, a double aspect theory appears in 
a better light. Whether the underlying reality of which the normal 
and the paranormal are two fundamental aspects is material or 
nonmaterial is perhaps, as Douglas Stokes (1997) says, is “a matter 
of semantics rather than substance” (p. 140).
The British philosopher C.D. Broad (1925/1951) proposed a 
theory of the mind that incorporates the normal and the paranormal 
processes into a single system. According to his compound theory, 
the mind is not a single substance, but a compound of two factors—  
the psychic factor and the bodily factor. In other words, the mind is 
the composite of consciousness and the brain. He suggests that mental 
functions such as perception, reasoning and remembering are not 
the products of either of the factors alone. Just as a chemical 
compound possesses characteristics that do not belong individually 
to any of the constituent elements of the compound, the functions of 
the mind are not found solely in one or another of the constituent 
elements. In functional terms, the two factors in Broad’s theory are 
the normal and paranormal processes of the mind. The shin theory 
proposed by Thouless and Weisner discussed earlier, leaving aside 
its dualistic overtone, may be interpreted as a dual process theory. 
Shin is the Hebrew word for mind. It would simplify matters 
considerably, if the normal and paranormal aspects are regarded as 
two processes of the mind, instead of assuming that the shin is a 
nonphysical entity in virtue of which psi becomes possible.
A similar point has been made more forcibly in some of the 
classical Indian theories of the mind (see Chennakesavan, 1991). In 
Samkhya-Yoga system, for example, reality is seen as governed by 
two fundamental principles -  consciousness (purusha) and matter 
(prakriti). When there is a conjunction between consciousness and a 
material form, a mind is formed. The mind is a functional trap where 
nonconscious material forms become conscious experiences, and inert
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and characterless consciousness assumes form and manifests activity. 
When consciousness is thus trapped we have subjective experience, 
which tends to bind consciousness more and more firmly to sensory 
processes. The mind functions via vrittis, the sensory modes. This is, 
however, not an irreversible process. By rendering the sensory and 
related systems quiescent through meditation and other techniques, 
it is believed, one can attain a state of samadhi in which the mind 
can experience consciousness-as-such, without the limitations 
imposed by the sensory system (Rao, 2005).
Even in Buddhism we find a similar approach. In Buddhism 
there is of course no substantive soul or mind. What we have is only 
consciousness, which is seen as a dynamic process. Consciousness 
is the stream of being and has subliminal and supraliminal existence 
and is governed by paranormal as well as normal processes. The 
supraliminal is our normal cognitive stream. In the manifest stream, 
consciousness, in the words of Buddhaghosa (1923) is “that which 
thinks of its object” (p. 148). It gives us discriminative information. 
The subliminal stream, the bhavanga, on the other hand, is a thought- 
free state. It is described as “the cause, reason, indispensable 
condition, the sine qua non of our existence, but without which one 
cannot subsist or exist” (Aung and Rhys Davids, 1929, pp. 265-266). 
The bhavanga and the cognitive consciousness are thus the two 
aspects of the functional mind corresponding to the normal and 
paranormal distinction we made.
So, we see in the Indian thought, whether one subscribes to 
dualism of the sort espoused by Samkhya-Yoga theorists, the monism 
o f A dvaita Vedanta, or Buddhistic functionalism , the mind is 
considered an interface between the normal and the paranormal, the 
phenom enal and transcendental aspects of being. Mind is the 
instrumentality of our experience; it is our reality connection. In its 
normal phase the mind with its associated cortical and sensory-motor
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systems connects us to the objective world and we have cognitive 
awareness of it. In its paranormal phase, the mind participates in 
pure consciousness and becomes one with reality, giving rise to 
transcendental realization.
Conclusion
Consciousness refers to a set of heterogeneous phenomena. 
These superficially diverse phenomena fall broadly into four 
categories -  (1) primary awareness, (2) paradoxical awareness, 
(3) pathological awareness, and (4) paranormal awareness. They 
manifest in two forms -  (1) the explicit and (2) the implicit. They 
appear to be governed by two fundamental processes -  (1) the normal 
and (2) the paranormal, which do not constitute an incongruous dyad. 
It is suggested that they may be seen as mutually complementary 
processes.
The normal processes of awareness are those in which 
awareness is mediated by sensory processes, the nervous system and 
the brain. They admit naturalistic explanations within the framework 
of a physical system. The paranormal processes, however, resist such 
explanations calling for fundamentally different assumptions. In 
paranormal awareness there is no sensory mediation. The awareness 
is direct. The subject and the object have an identity relationship. 
The subject realizes the object in his/her own being. A process we 
called awareness by being, distinguished from awareness by knowing. 
Awareness by being involves accessing pure consciousness. It is a 
state of awareness-as-such. It is a contentless and nonrepresentational 
state. Spontaneously on rare occasions and often by disciplined 
practice (if we may trust the yogic claims) a pure conscious event 
may manifest in a cognitively processed form. The mind as an 
interfacing instrum entality is involved in both the normal and 
paranormal processes. It is also the source of interplay between the 
two processes.
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There are good reasons to believe in the reality of psi. 
Carefully conducted experiments and frequently reported spontaneous 
experiences provide persuasive evidence in support of ESP and PK. 
The known characteristics of psi suggest that psi involves a two- 
stage process. One of the stages is conceived to be something that 
may not be realized by a physical system. The other is normal 
cognitive processing. Inasmuch as psi thus involves normal and 
paranormal processes, it may be usefully thought of as gateway 
between the two.
If ESP is real and can be investigated by deploying scientific 
methods, psi research may have profound conceptual, methodological 
and theoretical implications for consciousness studies and vice-versa. 
The fundamental distinction between awareness by being and 
awareness by knowing can play a crucial role in adding a new 
dimension to consciousness studies. It is important that researchers 
recognize that psi is one kind of awareness and that there is 
congruence and homogeneity among what at first appear to be a 
heterogeneous “hodgepodge” of disparate items of consciousness. 
Once there is such recognition, the researchers would begin to 
appreciate the important aspects in which they may benefit by leaming 
how consciousness manifests at implicit and explicit levels and how 
the normal and the paranormal interact. An understanding of the 
interaction between the two would help to explain the subjective, 
“what it is like,” experience and other aspects of consciousness that 
seem to defy physical explanations. As researchers learn more about 
the physical and psychological variables related to the occurrence of 
psi experiences, hopefully useful common ground between psi and 
other forms of awareness would be found.
Also, recognition of the reality of psi would take the wind out 
of the sail of state-central materialism and neural identity theories. 
Whether this necessarily leads us to favor radical dualism is, however, 
doubtful. A double aspect theory of the mind, which does not commit
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to either materialism or spiritualism, could account for all types of 
awareness including psi without the additional problems that radical 
dualism entails. Thus process dualism appears to be less problematic 
than entity dualism. Many classical Indian theories of mind consider 
the mind as matter in its subtlest form with normal and paranormal 
attributes. This line of thought deserves to be explored further with a 
naturalistic bias.
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"ras5 vai sah rasam hyevayam labdhvanandl bhavati"
“ yoganandaparah kecidbhoganandaparah pare 
vayam sarvapradataram rasanandamupasmahe "
Rasa, the essence of art experience is not a product of 
mundane logic for, any logic is cognitive in nature and is nothing 
more than an information. But experience, especially that of art is 
contemplative in nature and hence remains untranslatable.
The realization of Rasa happens through the synthesis of 
vibhdva (stimulus), anubhdva (responses) and vyabhicdribhdvas 
(transitory emotions). This has been codified by Bharata in the 
sutra: 'vibhdvdnubhdvavyabhicdrisamyogdd-rasanispattih
Accordingly, this synthesis sublimates the sthdyibhdva (latent 
emotion) to the level of Rasa - pure enjoyment, devoid of desire - 
akdmahata.
Bhavas or the emotions are termed as cittavrttis, attitudes of 
our mind. According to Ndtyasdstra, there are eight sthdyibhdvas 
and thirty-three vyabhicdribhdvas. The former are permanent while 
the latter are transient. Their number may be debatable. But their 
existence and implications are truly indisputable. Bharata also 
speaks of eight sdttvikabhdvas (involuntary psycho-mental 
responses) which can be effectively used in acting, dancing and 
poetic descriptions. They can also be roughly enlisted under the 
heading of anubhdvas.
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As mentioned earlier, art is metalogical. Hence, here the 
theory of causation and its physical or mundane sense is practically 
useless. Thus the equations of cause and effect, karana and karya 
give way to vibhava and anubhava respectively. Vibhava can be 
two-fold viz, alambana (supporting) and uddipana (encouraging). 
The synthesis of all these emotions leading to the sublimation of the 
sthdyin reveals the Rasa. However, the words samyoga and nispatti 
in the Rasasutra have given ways to many interpretations based on 
the governing philosophies behind them. Unfortunately, not all 
these theories are available in their original format. Only the 
interpretation of Abhinavagupta, in his magnum opus 
Abhinavabhdrati has summed up' some of the most striking 
interpretations propounded by people like Lollata, Samyukta and 
Bhattanayaka. However, some of the later writers like Bhoja, 
Ramacandra-Gunacandra, Jagannatha, etc have given their own 
interpretations in their treatises on aesthetics/poetics.
According to Lollata, who is highly influenced by the 
Vaisesika or MTmamsa schools of philosophies, nispatti means 
utpatti itself, i.e. Rasa is created. Acording to him, the word 
samyoga in Rasasutra means janya-janakabhava and posya- 
posakabhava with respect to the sthdyi and vibhava and sthdyi and 
vyabhicaris respectively. But this theory fails to explain the 
relationship between the art and the connoisseur, actor and the 
character, etc. However, by saying that the 'Rasa' is in the work of 
art itself, Lollata has indirectly emphasised a great deal on the 
structure of art alongwith its substance. However, the process of 
realization of Rasa, as an experience through art is left unexplained 
in this theory. Hence Rasa has become a mere objective and thus a 
quantified entity like other things in the mundane world.
Samkuka, interpreting the Rasasutra from the philosophical 
standpoint of Nyaya school opines that Rasa is inferred by the 
connoisseur. According to him, nispatti means anumiti or inference. 
He tries to see the relationship of gamya-gamakabhava between 
Rasa and the vibhavanubhdvavyabhicdris. Even the word samyoga, 
according to him, means the same. Thus Rasa is no more than 
pratTti or information or understanding at the most and not 
anubhava, experience. But if it were to be the reality, art experience 
would have led us towards rdga or dvesa leading to sukha or 
duhkah in the worldly sense and not ananda, selfless contemplative 
joy which is essentially non-materialistic. In Samkuka, art
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experience has become nothing more than an intellectual exercise. 
Added to this, the interpretation of Samkuka forces all bhavas 
aiding art experience to become either personally connected 
(svagata) or not (paragata). In both the cases, the resulting feeling 
will be either abnormal or subnormal, for svagata leads to sukha- 
duhkah and paragata to audasinya.
However, the analogy of ‘citraturaga’ adopted by Samkuka 
makes us realize the element of 'willing suspension of disbelief in 
art and his explanation of aharyajnana, knowledge by supposition 
or superimposition in the realm of art has opened greater vistas to 
reveal the secret of art experience and solve the riddle of Rasa. But 
the unconnectedness of the art-artist and the connoisseur remained 
as it is. Even then, the emphasis on inference (anumiti) influenced 
the actors to imitate well and the artists to paint or carve well the 
objects of reality. Hence, there is an element of realistic leanings in 
this interpretation.
Bhattanayaka, supposed to have been influenced by Samkhya 
and Ydga alongwith the canons of PurvamTmamsa philosophies, 
invariably inspired by the theories of dhvani or suggestion in art in a 
negative way, propounded his interpretation of Rasasutra. At the 
place of vyanjana, the way of suggestion, an invariable way to 
realize Rasa, he proposed the concept of bhavakatva (appreciation) 
and bhdjakata (enjoyment). These are mostly inspired by the theory 
of bhavana of MTmamsa. Accordingly, the concept of bhavakatva 
excludes an art-piece from all the biases of space and time. Thus the 
art being cultured to a level of impersonality becomes enjoyable due 
to its nature of bhdjakatva. In other words, the rajas and tamas in 
the content of art are purified to the level of sattva due to its 
structured uniqueness and thus enriched sattva will become 
exceedingly relishable to the sahrdayas (connoisseurs). This idea of 
bhdjakatva is naturally influenced by the philosophy of Samkhya, 
well-known for its gunatraya theory.
However, Bhattanayaka's interpretation falls short of some 
very valid requirements for. Rasa is not just a thing of enjoyment, 
that itself is enjoyment {na kevalamasvddyate rasah svayamasvdda 
eva). And also the superfluous dual concepts of bhavakatva and 
bhojakatva are not essential for they can be well replaced by the one 
concept of vyanjandvada. Above all, his theory does not raise Rasa 
beyond its relative level of plurality. Apart from this, Bhattanayaka
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has not solved the problem of whose sthayibhava is going to be 
sublimated. Inspite of all these wanting things, Bhattanayaka's 
theory finds a very high place in the history of Rasa theory due to 
his contributions such as sddharanikarana (universalization), 
sattvddreka (enriched consciousness), cittavisranti (tranquilling the 
mind), etc.
Now we may proceed to the interpretation of Rasasutra in 
the light of Abhinavagupta and his followers. This is essentially 
based on the Upanisadic philosophy, especially according to the 
Advaitic understanding. Accordingly, art experience is very unique 
for the various types of realities (sattas) such as pratibhasika, the 
seeming, pdramarlhika, the absolute and vyavaharika, the mundane 
are unable to explain its exact nature. It is only the aharyasatta, the 
reality of embelishment makes a convincing attempt in this regard. 
Thus, art experience becomes a meeting point of temporal and 
spiritual realities. Here though, the clutches of inherent ignorance, 
avidya is not wiped off, its sequential products such as adhydsa 
(superimposition), kdma (desire), karma (involved activity), etc. are 
all astonishingly avoided and thus a great deal of spiritual and hence 
obviously transcendental experience is attained.
In the mundane world, almost all activities end up either in 
profit or in loss. Thus they impart pleasure or pain in our hearts. But 
in art experience it is not so. Likewise, every object in the material 
world triggers either desire or reluctance in our mind. But in art 
experience neither of these reactions are felt. However, there 
continues a sustained disinterested belongingness or compassion - a 
selfless appreciation. That is why painted fruits do not kindle 
hunger or dismay in the hearts of an ideal art-lover, however hungry 
he may be.
All the activities of the materialistic world are driven by the 
forces of rajas and tamas. Hence pain or pleasure, hatred or fear, 
attraction or repulsion are the products of these forces. When the 
very desire, the root of all propositions and dispositions is not 
evoked, naturally its products like selfish activity, pain, pleasure, 
fear, hatred, etc are all completely avoided. Thus pure 
consciousness or suddasattva reigns supreme, however temporary it 
may be. This is the secret behind our enjoyment of a tragedy, 
appreciation of a beautiful painting or sculpture choosing 'ugliness' 
as its subject, appreciation of a villain or a vamp in a novel or play.
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This sort of 'involving without involvement' or appreciation 
independent of materialistic beauty or ugliness, ethical or unethical 
practices is essentially due to a selfless-universal-contemplative 
concern or involvement. It can be compared very well with the 
concept of Jivanmukta of Vedanta who likewise enjoys the world 
around him itself as a divine art, divine comedy! But a liberated 
soul like a Jivanmukta independent of any external stimulus lives in 
bliss forever unlike a true art-lover who should always depend on 
such an agency. As long as the art-piece, that which contains the 
ideal synthesis of vibhavdnubhavasdmagri, the emotional cocktail is 
under the purview of the said connoisseur, he will be in the state of 
bliss or rasdnanda. Once this arrangement disappears, he is left for 
himself in the mundane world. Therefore, unlike the worldly 
relationships of the order of jndpya-jndpaka or of kdrya-kdraka, the 
relationship of the vyangy-vyanjaka pattern is seen in the art 
experience with respect to vibhdvanubhdvas and Rasa. Here lies the 
secret of the metaworldly nature (alaukikatva) of Rasa. Such a 
nature of Rasa cannot be established externally using the techniques 
of either direct perception or inference. But this is not a failure for, 
the art-experience is truly felt and thus needs no more ‘proofs’. 
Thus, in total, rasdnanda is just one step below brahmdnanda, or 
rather it is brahmdsvdda sahodara. Here, enjoyment and awareness, 
i.e, prlti and vyutpatti (joy and wisdom) are no two things. They 
become one with our existence. Such Rasa is never realized through 
the art-pieces directly. It is always experienced through a trigger of 
oblique expression vakrokti and the process of realization is through 
the way of suggestion. The threefold nature of meaning associable 
with any expression, viz, abhidhd, the designated, laksand, the 
implied and vyanjand, the suggested have their supreme reigning in 
the logical, colloquial and aesthetic worlds respectively. However, 
acceptance of a suggested meaning is always contexted by the 
culture which has produced the art-piece and the art-lover. Such a 
cultural contextualization is termed as aucitya, propriety. Hence, 
vakratd, dhvani, aucitya and rasa become the key terms in art 
experience or aesthetics.
To conclude, art experience is essentially idealistic, i.e, 
spiritual. However, in India, both the realistic and the idealistic 
schools of philosophies tried to explain the riddle of Rasa. To sum 
up, in the words of Prof. M. Hiriyanna: “The aim of art according to 
both the systems, is to induce a mood of detachment. But according 
to idealistic Veddnta, the artistic attitude is characterised by a
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forgetting, though temporary of our individuality; while according 
to realistic Samkhya, it is due to an escape from the natural world. 
According to the former, art serves as a pathway to reality; but 
according to the latter, it is so to speak a deflection from reality. The 
one reveals the best in nature, while the other fashions something 
better than nature.” (Hiriyanna, 1978)^.
Appendix
Here are two graphical representations attempting at a 
simpler way of understanding the relationship between a few major 
key-terms in /?a5a-synthesis and even the process of the same. 
However, these graphical representations of mine are only 
analogous models and hence may not cover all the intricate features 
associated with the complex theory of Rasa.
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Microorganisms are commonly perceived primarily as the 
causative agents of most contagious diseases that plague the 
humankind. This view gradually changed during the first half of the 
twentieth century, whereby, they began to be recognized as model 
organisms to study fundamental aspects of life processes, giving birth 
to a new field called molecular biology. Recent studies have shown 
that bacteria are extraordinarily perceptive to their surroundings and 
can respond to changes in the most amazing ways. They can 
communicate with others and can collaborate as a group to mount 
elaborate behavioural responses to environmental challenges. The 
article aims to examine some of these recent findings in the context 
of cognition studies on “higher” organism. The major goal is to 
highlight the possibility that a rudimentary form of “consciousness” 
could be encountered in bacteria, forcing us to broaden the way we 
think about this enigmatic entity.
Introduction
A simple-minded definition of physiological consciousness, devoid 
of any philosophical or metaphysical implications, is the ability to 
perceive sensory stimuli and respond by purposeful movement or by 
a behavioural change. Studies in this area generally come under the 
broad grouping of cognitive neuroscience, intimately connected with 
the workings of the brain. This forces one to ask the question - Can 
organisms without a ‘brain’such as bacteria be conscious? As they
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dominated the scene for a substantially long period of time since life 
arose on this planet (multi-cellular creatures evolved much more 
recently), is it possible that a rudimentary form of consciousness is 
lurking within them? It will not be very surprising if it did, as bacteria 
have their own version of complex signaling systems and genes that 
regulate cell shape, growth and development that are in a sense the 
forerunners of the eukaryotic counterparts. They live in environments 
as varied as hydrothermal vents at substantial depths below the ocean 
surface to polar ice caps. They can detect traces of nutrients in the 
surroundings and move towards the gradient and similarly move away 
from low concentrations of repellants. They communicate with each 
other to coordinate responses such as sporulation to tide over adverse 
conditions or production of toxins to mount an attack against host 
defenses, thus optimizing the chances of successful colonization. This 
article is an attempt to highlight some of these recent findings to an 
informed but non-specialist reader. Therefore, technical references 
are avoided as much as possible.
The Rise of Microbiology
The early history of microbiology is closely associated with the 
discoveries that linked microorganisms and infectious diseases. This 
period was dominated by stalwarts such as Pasteur, Lister, and Koch. 
Even today, Koch’s postulates form the fundamental basis for testing 
the causal connection between a pathogen and the disease it is 
associated with. This was an important period in terms of recognizing 
some of the critical factors responsible for human health and welfare. 
Vaccines and other antimicrobial agents became possible because of 
these discoveries. The shift in the focus on microorganisms as the 
agents of disease to sources of basic knowledge was a transition that 
took place during the first half of the twentieth century. Interestingly, 
early attempts in this direction were prompted by the quest to 
understand the ability of bacteria to cause disease.
The "Conscious" Bacterium
109
The Birth of Molecular Biology
One of the turning points in the history of science was the discovery 
of the first genetic link in the pathogenicity of the bacterium 
Streptococcus pneumoniae (commonly known as pneumococcus), 
the causative agent of pneumonia. In 1928, Griffith, a physician 
studying pneumococcus, found that the virulent bacterium that 
normally forms shiny smooth colonies on a Petri dish can occasionally 
show up as a variant that forms rough colonies. Interestingly, the 
‘rough’ variant is harmless and cannot cause pneumonia in mice 
whereas the smooth variety is deadly. Even more puzzling was his 
observation that an extract from the smooth kind is able to “transform” 
the rough variant to the smooth type simply by mixing with it. In 
other words, “something” in the extract could bring about a genetic 
conversion of the rough form to the smooth type. The hunt for the 
agent that results in the transformation ultimately led Avery and his 
colleagues MacLeod and McCarty to the chemical basis of the gene, 
DNA, sixteen years later. This was at a time when the prevailing 
view was that the bacterium is nothing but a bag of enzymes, with no 
c lea r idea that they carry  genes. Just a year ago, another 
microbiologist, Salvador Luria, along with his mentor Max Delbruck, 
a theoretical physicist, had used the gut bacterium Escherichia coli 
to experimentally demonstrate the Darwinian idea of natural selection. 
In their now famous experiment, Luria and Delbruck showed that 
variants of the bacterium that are resistant to the T 1 virus preexist in 
the population and are selected when challenged with the virus. The 
discovery of sex in bacteria by Lederberg around the same time was 
a shot in the arm for bacterial genetics, an oxymoron only a few 
years ago. The double helical structure of DNA and the deciphering 
of the genetic code were soon to follow. Molecular biology, a new 
discipline prompted by the quest for the molecular basis of heredity, 
was bom in the mid twentieth century, primarily using E. coli as the 
workhorse. The bacterium as a model organism to investigate the 
fundamental properties of life had come to stay.
s. Mahadevan
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A Bacterial Paradigm for Gene Regulation
As the molecular basis of heredity was being uncovered, one of the 
fundamental questions to be addressed was how genes can be 
switched on and off, a feature essential for the integrity of the cell. 
The answers came with the striking discovery by Jacob and Monod 
that bacteria can turn on and turn off genes at will, depending on the 
requirement. Their studies focused on the breakdown of the milk 
sugar lactose by E. coli. The dramatic results that they came up with 
showed that the genetic information fo r  making the enzymes to 
breakdown lactose is accessed only when lactose is present in the 
medium. Their model for the first time proposed a molecular lock for 
the gene, with the key being provided by the substrate. The “operon” 
model of Jacob and Monod became a paradigm for gene regulation 
in all organisms, resonant with Monod’s famous line, “What is true 
for E. coli is true for the elephant”. The most significant feature of 
the model was that the bacterium can exercise a choice to express 
any of its genes. The ability to sense the presence of the substrate 
and respond by inducing the appropriate enzymes is a tremendous 
evolutionary advantage in terms of cellular economy.
An Example of Bacterial “Memory”
Parallel to the studies of Jacob and Monod, Novick and Wiener 
showed that E. coli can “remember” its metabolic history. Two 
independent cultures of E. coli were grown, one having a high level 
of inducer and another with no inducer. When the two were mixed 
and grown in a medium that had only a low maintenance level of 
inducer, half the cells in the mixture showed induction, whereas the 
other half showed no induction. Thus, the epigenetic states of the 
two cultures could be maintained indefinitely as long as the medium 
had only a maintenance level of inducer, the “memory” of the cell’s 




Bacteria move towards chemicals that are attractants (for example 
glucose) and move away from chemicals that are repellants (such as 
phenol). This is brought about by altering the frequency of “tumbling”, 
the process of changing direction rapidly. This involves the coupling 
of the chemical sensing system with the molecular motor, the 
mechanical system involved in motion.
Bacteria move primarily making use of flagella, the whip-like 
structures on the surface of the cell. At the base of the flagellum is 
the motor made of proteins that enables it to rotate clockwise or 
counter-clockwise. Uniform rotation of the flagellum results in a 
smooth swimming motion. A change in the direction of rotation of 
the flagellum causes a reversal of direction known as tumbling. The 
sensors that detect attractants or repellants are located on the cell 
surface. In response to a positive gradient of attractants, the bacterium 
continues to swim in the direction of the gradient without tumbling. 
The moment it starts going away from the gradient, the sensors trigger 
tumbling so that the cell is back towards the maximum concentration 
of the attractant. The situation is reversed in the case of the repellant, 
where movement towards increasing concentration of the repellant 
stimulates tumbling away from it. Bacterial chemotaxis is a fascinating 
example of discriminatory behaviour at the microscopic level.
Quorum Sensing in Bacteria
Bacteria regulate many of their physiological and behavioural 
properties based on their numbers, using a sophisticated signaling 
mechanism known as “quorum sensing” This was first demonstrated 
in the marine bacterium Vibrio fischeri that emits light only when 
the bacterial numbers cross a threshold. Many other bacterial 
responses also involve a measure of the population size or quorum. 
This is achieved by each cell secreting a signaling molecule that can 
diffuse in and out of the cell and by having receptors that detect the
s. Maliadevan
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signal. The threshold concentration of the signal molecule is achieved 
only when the cell number reaches a critical value. In many cases, 
success of an operation, such as colonization of the host, depends on 
the strength of the bacterial army. Quorum sensing provides an 
extraordinarily elegant mechanism to have a headcount.
In the case of the pathogenic bacterium Enterococcus faecalis, 
the quorum sensing system has evolved to a higher degree to measure 
both bacterial cell numbers as well as to detect the presence of host 
cells. In this case, the signaling molecule has two interacting 
components that can dissociate. One of the components has a higher 
affinity to receptors on the surface of the host cell and binds to it. 
This results in a higher concentration of the counterpart of the 
signaling pair, now left without a partner, leading to turning on of 
the genes involved in colonizing the host. Thus, “the quorum sensing 
mechanism is used to detect host cells without actually coming in 
contact with them like the bat using sonar signals and then locates 
its prey detecting the echo...Although it has long been suspected 
that the chemical signals used by bacteria to sense members of their 
own species could also be used to detect other types of cells, this is 
the first example of quorum-sensing molecules directly detecting 
target host cells” (Garcin 2004).
Conclusions
Microorganisms live in a fiercely competitive environment 
where survival or extinction depends on slender adaptive advantages. 
As the oldest living inhabitants of the planet, it is not surprising that 
they have evolved survival strategies that allow them to sense and 
respond to environmental challenges. At a rudimentary level, many 
of the sensory mechanisms in bacteria are reminiscent of the cognitive 
mechanisms operational in higher organisms. Therefore, as evident 
from the results described above, studying bacterial consciousness 
might provide us insights on cognitive mechanisms that operate in 
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Neurological Narratives: A Humanistic Study 
of Oliver Sacks’ Narrative Medicine
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Introduction
Our birth is a heroic act of pain painting the pleasure of 
pinching the unborn. By oscillating between these extreme emotions, 
we enliven a routine yet extraordinary activity of everyday living. 
However, the last century and the past half-decade has feared a 
vehement visitor: illness. By illness, I mean something subjective 
like feelings of malaise or pain. Quite different from something like 
a disease physiologically rooted in pathogens like viruses or in 
revealing symptoms like memory loss.
At the onset of illness, citizens turn into patients and normal 
life is stalled. This break in the grand continuity of life is even more 
severed if one is gutted by mental illnesses. Something tries to tear 
down our mental fabric and strike us out of reality so much so that 
we begin to contemplate upon the inviolable self that has sustained 
us in health. Among mental illnesses, neurological disorders (affecting 
the human nervous system extending into the brain) have a special 
status because unsupported by nervous system, human body is hardly 
functional. These disorders cut off the crucial supply for human 
sustenance: self-awareness and thereby, a healthy existence. Yet, at 
the same time, the same disorders often reorganize and restrengthen 
the lost self.
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Everybody aspires to tell and retell their story or else “a self 
without a story contracts into the thinness of its personal pronoun.” 
(Polkinghome, 1988,72) “I” [the personal pronoun] -  through a story
-  seeks to organize the world, which the Greeks called Kosmos [order.] 
On the odyssey to order life, the patient’s story (or its recounting by 
a neurologist or a psychiatrist) is a deepest attempt to “mend 
discordance with concordance.” (Ricoeur, 1984, 31) Thereby, 
revitalizing simple stories into impressive narratives. Neurological 
Narratives nourish human meaning not by dull documentation of 
medical case-studies but by cutting through the clinical constraints 
to return to the critical centre of human existence: self.
Maddening History
It has taken at least thousands of years for man to be made the 
“measure of all things.” And, thereby discharge mental disorders from 
the heavens and safely lodge them in the human mind. From Greeks 
to the geeks, mental disorders have journeyed along with the 
development of human consciousness. In its long endless voyage, 
mental disorders have absorbed emerging thinking and adopted new 
meanings.
A gifted Greek, also called the father of medicine, Hippocrates 
(460 BC -  380 BC) had largely rationalized illness through his theory 
of humors. Hippocratic humors are juices or fluids in our body, namely 
four: blood, choler, phlegm and melancholy. As the medical historian, 
Roy Porter explains:
Blood was the source of vitality. Choler or bile was the gastric 
ju ice , indispensable for digestion. Phlegm, a broad category 
com prehending all colorless secretions, was a lubricant and 
coolant...m elancholy...[is a] dark liquid...reckoned responsible for 
darkening of other fluids, as when blood, skins or stools turned 
blackish. (2002, 38)
p. Sliarat Chandra Shastri
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For the body to remain healthy, these humors had to strike the 
right balance. An imbalance or one humor overpowering the other 
resulted in illness. The fourth humor, melancholy, was largely 
responsible for the dark temperament that was commonly observed 
in the mentally ill. What is interesting about Hippocrates’ humoral 
theory is that it is holistic in its approach and moreover, it centered 
diagnosis around human body, not on any superhuman Greek god or 
goddess. As with the treatment for the mentally ill, Hippocrates 
suggested a regulated mild diet and a simple lifestyle limiting 
achievable desires.
Indian Ayurveda similarly had three humors (doshas): Vata 
(air). Pitta (fire) and Kapha (water.) In their metaphorical sense, Vata 
is air that circulates thoughts in human mind as well it regulates the 
blood flow. Pitta, as fire, helps maintain body heat and metabolism 
and in turn, the sensory reactions to the outside world. Kapha, as 
water, provides the essential body mechanisms with liquids and 
thereby restores biological strength. Again, a balance of these humors 
is critical for human sanity; else, one tends to lose the mental 
capability of discrimination (vivekam.) Madness or unmada was a 
result of humoral imbalance and in this regard, Ayurveda strived to 
sift through rich inheritance and sought to blend the physical 
background of medicine with religious thoughts, spiritual life and 
ideals.
Meanwhile, Greek philosophy was a major impulse behind 
starting a long-standing battle between reason and unreason. Greek 
thinkers had a balanced emphasis on reason and they didn’t deny the 
reality of madness manifesting as unreason. Plato thought that some 
geniuses were consumed by the divine fire of madness. Greek tragedy 
was one of the earliest art form that tried to make sense of madness. 
Unreason was dram atized by playwrights like Sophocles and 
Euripides as a fate of a divided mind. In Euripides’ drama, Orestes, 
the mortal protagonist Orestes is ordered by the Greek God of
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Medicine, Apollo to kill his mother and he abides by it. His choice: 
either to listen to an immortal God or listen to his immortal Soul rips 
Orestes apart and because of a malicious outcome, he collapses into 
madness. These kinds of heroes were consumed in the cauldron of 
hubris and ambition to be torn apart and bring madness upon 
themselves. In fact, tragedy was used as a therapeutic to inform the 
mortals of their immoral acts and reform their profane existence into 
a blissful perseverance.
Meanwhile, the Stoic philosophy also stressed on the conquest 
of avoidable desires (some may lead to chronic madness) as they 
brought disappointment to the human soul. So, Hippocratic medicine 
flourished with Greek drama. But, a Roman physician, Galen was 
primarily responsible to sustain the Hippocratic spirit till Renaissance. 
Galen dissected the human body and was responsible of reinstalling 
human mind in the brain rather than in heart as Aristotle thought it 
out to be.
Though the Christian Church had colored madness in 
supernatural contours like the Holy Ghost and the devil fighting for 
the possession of the individual soul, it also embraced the mysticism 
of some saints as the visitation of the Holy Spirit. There were patron 
saints like St. Dymphna of Netherlands who was revered as possessing 
exceptional healing powers and so is St. Christina the Astonishing 
and St. Teresa of Avila. Above all, one should view the overarching 
message of love and compassion towards any sufferer as the greatest 
gift that Christian medicine has given to the world.
In Christian medicine, there is a concept called anastasis, 
literally meaning resurrection. Among many interpretations of Christ’s 
resurrection, the spiritual meaning points to the fact that a manlike 
messiah is revivified with Godlike perfection. This act of Christ allows 
the sufferer to bounce back from his debilitating condition into an 
entirely new pattern where God in the form of love would envelop 
the patient with his grace. This doesn’t mean that every one should
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await to contract illness to enjoy God’s grace but illness often has 
the power to reward the sufferer with abundant solitude to resurrect 
himself into a finer human being.
The Somatic T\irn
During the Age of Reason, keeping up with the all-out assault 
on Aristotle, Hippocratic medicine was abandoned for the machine 
medicine of the French polymath, Rene Descartes. Human body was 
depersonalized and extensive research was done on nervous system 
and its role in governing emotions and motion. The progress of 
science, managing society through economy and bureaucracy and 
the spread of literacy and education contributed in privileging 
rationality. To bring about order in the society was the Zeitgeist and 
any aberration to this was thought to be something that must be 
quelled. Descartes’ separation of body and mind had an important 
consequence for medicinal approach to mental illness;
As consciousness was inherently and defmitionally rational, 
insanity, precisely like physical illnesses, must derive from body, or 
be a consequence of some very precarious connections in the brain. 
Safely somatized in this way, it could no longer be regarded as 
diabolical in origin or as threatening the integrity or salvation of the 
immortal soul, and became unambiguously a legitimate object of 
philosophical and medical inquiry. (Porter, 2002, 58)
This approach found the fault of mental illnesses not in evil 
passions or humors but in the cognitive capabilities of the patient. 
So, a patient could be educated and corrected by restoring sanity in 
his mind.
As the humoral theory was being replaced by mechanical 
medicine, the “new science refigured the body in mechanical terms 
which highlighted the solids (organs, nerves, fibers) rather than 
fluids.” (Porter, 2002, 124) So, insanity was specifically spotted as 
the malfunctioning of some body part. During this period, an English
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physician, Thomas Wilhs (1621-1675) dissected the human nervous 
system and coined the term “neurology.” He provided elaborate and 
exquisite descriptions about the workings in the brain based on the 
Cartesian and Newtonian mechanistic views of the world. Body 
became the vantage point from which mental illnesses were spoken 
about and the nervous system was given unprecedented importance 
in doing so.
Right into the 17th century, philosophers like John Locke 
analyzed the mold of human mind through perception of the sense 
data that it receives. Knowledge arising from sensations is perfected 
by reflection, thus enabling humans to convert the sense data into 
ideas like space, time and infinity. Madness of the mind was a 
consequence of wrong association of ideas, faulty logical processes; 
this development remolded conceptions of madness in new directions:
The emerging model of madness as a psychological condition 
pointed to an alternative target for psychiatric inquiry: rather than 
organs of the body, the doctor had to address the patient’s psyche, as 
evidenced by his behavior. The case history approach this entailed 
demanded the transformation of the old craft of minding the insane 
into the pursuit of systematic psychological observation. (Porter, 2002, 
129)
Several case studies of patients with detailed observations of 
their behavior were regularly documented from now on. As this 
psychological way of reading derangement emerged, intrapersonal 
dynamics between the doctor and the patient was stressed. And, the 
best platform for such encounters to prosper was an asylum. The 
driving force for such an asylum need not be to completely isolate 
the patients from the society but to secure them from the assaults 
and stigma of the society. In turn, helping them to reintroduce 
themselves into the society afresh and saner. The point was to revive 
the dorm ant hum anity  o f the m ad by w orking on residual 
abnormalities to stimulate normal emotions. During 18th century,
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this unfettering of mind was the liberating vision of Phillipe Pinel of 
France, Chiarugi of Italy, the Tukes of York Retreat in England.
With a resolute humaneness, these reformers valued above all 
kindness as the right medicine for regeneration of patients. Old 
methods like whipping, bloodletting, straight-jacketing, starvation 
were replaced by innovative regimes of disciplined work and exercise 
under vigilance but not confined. The asylum became a self-sufficient 
outpost where patients labored for their needs by farming, etc. Till 
today, several pioneering ways of treatment like community centers 
where patients and psychiatrists live together have been evolving. 
This points to the fact that asylums are not a permanent solution and 
the only way out to treat the mentally ill; rather, as new illnesses 
outnumber the known ways of treatment, novel approaches will 
continue to emerge.
The Psychoanalytic 1\irn
One such approach in the twentieth century was the talking cure 
therapy of the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (1856- 
1939). Freud was an exceptional molder of modem thought in the 
sense that he was the first to spot the difference between what one 
says and what one believes. This is a radical dim ension o f 
understanding the everyday operation of the human mind as there is 
an unconscious belief or striving unknown to us. Freud moved beyond 
the conceptual understanding of the subject as illness and therapy 
and was more concerned with human salvation. Freud sought the 
triumph of the irrational and unconscious passions by reason; the 
liberation of the man from the power of unconscious within the 
possibilities of man. Though Freud was a neurologist, he quickly 
abandoned this career to nourish his genius in an innovative discipline 
altogether: psychoanalysis.
Freud was adept at writing wonderful narratives about his 
patients like his famous Dora or Wolf-man clinical case-studies. What
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Freud did -  in the case of Dora -  was to analyze hysteria (a 
psychological or emotional disorder in which a psychological conflict 
is turned into physical conflict like blindness) by encouraging patients 
to freely talk and elicit as many psychological incidents as possible 
to associate them with the roots of the current conflict. In fact, Freud 
established:
.. .a logical continuity in the mental life of the individual, and 
therefore symptoms were not mysterious incursions from without 
but rather exaggerated expressions of processes common to everyone 
which revealed the specific stresses of the patients.(Brown, 1985,3)
Freud was fervently devoted to extract the aim of mental 
phenomena whereas psychiatrists were eagerly searching for general 
principles by which to treat the patient. Simply put, Freud’s model 
was based on the idea that our basic drives are covert, lurking in our 
unconscious and suppressed by layers of social rules and expectations 
of civilization. But, as one prominent psychiatrist points out:
Nobody in any society lives his life by rationally planning 
every single act of emotion, since normal, as well as abnormal, goals 
are largely unconsciously determined and the essence of normality 
is that his unconscious goals and conscious aims should be in harmony 
with each other and appropriate to the situations in which he finds 
himself. (Brown, 1985, 10)
This idea of the cultural impact upon the mental mould of a 
person was taken up by neo-Freudians like Karen Homey, Henry 
Stack Sullivan and above all, most brilliantly by Erich Fromm. A 
sociologist and psychologist, Erich Fromm (1900-1980) based his 
theory of individual not on the satisfaction of biological drives (as 
Freud did) but on the relatedness of the individual to the world. 
Fromm assesses the extent to which psychoanalysis was successful:
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..w hile psychoanalysis has trem endously increased our 
knowledge of man, it has not increased our knowledge of how man 
ought to live and what he ought to do. (1966, 16)
Fromm’s cultural approach to psychoanalysis seeks to remedy 
the above drawback. This approach contends that human nature 
should not only be explained rationally and biologically but also 
sociologically  as individuals are a cultural product of their 
environment and Zeitgeist. This idea is echoed in a neuroscientific 
phenomenon called ontogenesis -  the development of an individual 
as an exquisite interplay between genes and the environment. For 
Fromm, man in interacting with the environment, not only changes it 
but also changes himself in the process: develop his potential and 
transform it in sync with his possibilities. But:
Man’s evolution is based on the fact that he has lost his original 
home, nature -  and that he can never return to it...there is only one 
way he can take: to emerge fully from his natural home, to find a 
new home -  one which he creates, by making the world a human one 
and becoming truly human himself. (Fromm, 1968a, 25)
Squeezed between regression and progression, man has to 
make a choice that will either aid in his psychological growth or 
reduce him only with his physiological growth. If Freud had rooted 
the motivating energy behind human passions and desires in libido, 
Fromm roots the impulse in the human situation itself common to all 
human existence. Every individual wants to realise his potential 
whereas society frustrates and binds him. So, a society’s prevalent 
structure and ethos largely determine the idea of the conscious and 
unconscious. Fromm points out that:
Consciousness represents social man, the accidental limitations 
set by historical situation into which the individual is thrown. 
Unconsciousness represents universal man, the whole man, rooted 
in the Cosmos; it represents [everything everywhere and] his past
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down to the dawn of human existence, and it represents the future to 
when day when man will have become fully human. (1986, 58)
We are powerful enough to be aware of our existence but at 
the same time are faced with utter powerlessness and usurping 
lim itations. Fromm resolves this paradoxical situation in the 
wellspring of wellbeing.
All Shall be Well
Our wellbeing is influenced by intricate and subtle psychological 
principles that build and guide our self-understanding. For Fromm, a 
healthy existence doesn’t just lie in physiological fitn'ess but in 
psychological wellness whereby an individual develops totally and 
to the best of his capabilities of mind.
When once cannot face his frailty and make himself fragile 
with a fa9ade of illusions about himself that others tell him and he 
himself imagines, he begins to taste the recipe of despair. And no 
one has extensively studied the roots of despair as S0ren Kierkegaard, 
who according to Nathan Scott Jr. has studied the human situation 
animated by:
.. .despair [which] is the sickness unto death precisely because 
it is that illness of the spirit which is the consequence of a man’s 
flight from the reality of his own selfhood. (1978,44)
There is a pervasive unavoidable sense of suffering in 
everyone’s life. One has to accept the way he is first and has to 
acknowledge that existence is the gradual triumph over suffering. 
Either we thirst for a glorious Edenic past and remain underdeveloped 
or we absorb ourselves in the humdrum of the present so much that 
we deliberately disconnect ourselves from the real world and the 
human reality. Fromm strikes at the root of our very existence:
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Birth is not one act; it is a process. The aim of life is to be 
fully bom, though its tragedy is that most of us die before we are 
thus bom. To live is to be bom every moment. (1986, 31)
In the process of living, we acquire a wealth of knowledge 
about ourselves. Through this self-knowledge, we take hold of the 
liberating forces of spontaneous growth. Using these forces, we have 
to gradually loose the neurotic obsession with ourselves and develop 
love and concern for others. In developing a healthy friction with the 
wishes and wills of others, one is regularly challenged by choice- 
making: in this situation, should I preserve myself or surrender myself 
to a greater self of others? One may choose to submit oneself to an 
overarching Other like God, but the prudence of this choice can be 
understood in the light of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the story of 
Abraham’s sacrifice of his son, Isaac in the Old Testament.
The Jewish patriarch, Abraham, in spite of an ethical obligation 
to preserve his son’s life, obeyed the word of God as he was tom 
between the love towards his son and love of the God while sacrificing 
his son. This doesn’t imply that Kierkegaard wants us to give in to 
universal norms but he takes the story further by inferring that only:
...when a man has really submitted himself to the universal 
norm and found it insufficiently comprehensive of his reality, he must 
then -  and only then- dare to transcend it, dare to declare himself an 
exception: namely, one the concreteness of whose individual life is 
not fully reckoned with by a universal norm. (Scott Jr, 1978,41)
The courage to make such a cracial decision is called “faith.”
It is:
.. .a matter of the courage with which man, in the most critical 
situations of his life...dares to take a stand in behalf o f  his own 
humanity, choosing that which promises most deeply to validate what 
he has found to be the essence of his manhood. (Scott Jr, 1978, 41)
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So, one has to consistently make priceless or worthless 
decisions in life and their consequence is determined by the faith 
with which one takes them. One such profound faithful decision is 
taken by Fromm to decide what well-being is:
Well-being means to be fully related to man and nature 
affectively, to overcome separateness and alienation, to arrive at the 
experience of oneness with all that exists - and yet to experience 
myself at the same time as the separate entity /  am, as the in-dividual. 
(1986, 36)
Nowadays, patients function well socially without any illness; 
but, they suffer from the malaise of inner deadness. Without knowing 
what they suffer from, they make various complaints which are only 
the conscious form in which our culture permits them to express 
something. These symptoms become obsessive once they enter 
everyday business of life. This common suffering is the alienation 
from oneself, from one’s fellow human and from nature. For those 
who suffer from alienation, “cure doesn’t consist in absence of illness 
but in presence of well-being.” (Fromm, 1986, 28)
The Need for Narrative
Narratives amaze, console and make the reader filter meaning out of 
quotidian existence. Narratives enfold the human self in cognitive 
activities bigger as well as other than itself. Is the real world already 
organized into a narrative or we transform reality into a narrative? 
Every narrative aims to tidy reality through various techniques 
involving time, sequence and order of storytelling.
Factual narratives enjoy an alliance with reality -  however 
distorted it may be. Medical narratives first preserve the anonymity 
of the patient and thereby, rename them into fictitious characters. 
Through a felt (essentially phenomenological) experience, narrators 
excel at recording these experiences. By just telling stories, we make
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sufferers as bland human subjects. They not only succumb to the 
disease but are consumed by it. A patient’s inviolable self narrows 
down to a diseased or drugged self. So, a master storyteller transforms 
soulless case-histories into soulful narratives. In the process, the 
patient becomes the protagonist so that “we have a ‘who’ as well as 
a ‘what’, a real person, a patient, in relation to disease -  in relation to 
the physical.” (Sacks, 1985, xiv) To talk about illnesses is quite 
different from writing about illnesses. As Hayden White explains:
Narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of 
general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate 
knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human experience 
into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally 
human rather than culture-specific. (1980, 5)
Neurological narratives are telling ways of moving across and 
beyond cultures to create shared realities which enhance and endorse 
human experience. Neurological narratives excel at the prescription 
of Paul R icoeur that narrative conclusions “rather than being 
predictable ...m ust be acceptable.” (Ricoeur, 1980, 174)
Because these narratives always don’t have a happy end, there 
are quite unpredictable yet most of them leave us at various levels of 
acceptability. This suggests that while treating disorders, we may not 
anticipate complete amelioration but rather hope that the treatment 
acquires a teleological strength as time passes by. So, narrative time 
coincides with the time taken to better the patient’s condition.
The overriding theme of Sacks’ neurological narratives is the 
loss or excess of a critical role of a specific portion of the brain and 
the events that em erge out of such circum stances and how a 
neurologist diagnoses and elucidates the problem and decides the 
course of treatment. These narratives cover copious aspects of human 
life tinting it with the various contours.
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Starving for the Self: the Existential 'Rirn
Everyone has an inviolable innerm ost centre from which we 
participate in life: self. Most identify this centre as brain but in fact, 
our self is an indescribable ever-accumulating essence of existence. 
One of the most incisive approaches towards the study of self has 
been done by existentialists. To exist is not that one is but to be and 
become what one is potentially capable of and stand out in the world 
not only in uniqueness but also in oneness.
Existentialism has been a major philosophical movement that 
has richly contributed about the limited freedom and unlimited 
possibilities of human life. Through its meticulous analysis about 
the human situation, existentialism has sustained a scrupulous “style 
of philosophizing.” (Macquarrie, 1978,14) With existence peculiarly 
possible to man, existentialism places man at the centre and studies 
his situation from various foci like his “quest of authentic selfhood,” 
(ibid, 17) strong emotional life.
For existentialists, being is what envelops the whole of cosmos 
and to delve into the meaning of being, man is specially qualified. 
Endowed with openness and freedom, man can inquire into who he 
is in particular and the meaning of being in general. The gravest 
threat to being is nonbeing that generally manifests in the form of 
death. Though death is extensively dealt by existentialists, they are 
not limited by any fixation with death. They acknowledge that being 
can only be savored in a context permitting an awareness of the ever­
present possibility of nonbeing or death. Once the realization about 
this finitude dawns on oneself, each moment becomes more precious 
and one takes stock of one’s own life.
Everyone is enlivened by an ambition to move ahead in life 
and actualize a possibility. For the Danish philosopher S0ren 
Kierkegaard, freedom is possibility, which is animated by our 
decisions and choices and the impossibility of evading the outcomes.
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For possibilities to be actualized, we require to plod through “an 
intermediate determinant [called] anxiety.” {1976, 128}
One comes to realize that there is a point at which they might 
cease to be and their encounter with reality becomes characterized 
by anxiety:
Anxiety is the awareness of unsolved conflicts between 
structural elements of the personality, as for instance conflicts between 
unconscious drives and repressive norms, between different drives 
trying to dominate the centre of the personality.. .between the will to 
be and the seemingly intolerable burden which evokes the open or 
hidden desire not to be. (Tillich, 1977, 64)
According to the existential theologian, Paul Tillich, there are 
two types of anxiety: existential and pathological. Existential anxiety 
is embedded in our existence as we are constantly threatened by 
nonbeing or death. In the face of meaninglessness or death, everyone 
is existentially empowered with this basic anxiety. To reject it is a 
fatal mistake; one has to live with it as it cannot be removed.
If one evades existential anxiety by running away from it or 
refuting its continuation in one’s life, then pathological anxiety erupts. 
For Tillich, pathological anxiety is “a state of existential anxiety under 
special conditions.” (ibid, 65) What these conditions are depends 
upon how one tackles nonbeing. One of the principle ways of dealing 
with anxiety is courage which emerges from an in-spite-ofch&\\en%t: 
the self triumphs over that which prevents it from affirming itself. 
This self-affirmation is the first step towards contracting with courage. 
Courage helps us to deal with anxiety as it “resists despair by taking 
anxiety into itself.” (ibid, 66)
If  one fails to confront anxiety and avoid it, then one 
disintegrates into neurosis. Tillich applies the term neurosis generally 
to “the way of avoiding nonbeing by avoiding being.” (ibid, 66) One
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may have a fervid sense of self-affirmation but on a limited scale 
where the self erects a strong defense against actualization of the 
numerous potentialities. Simply, the self “surrenders a part of [its] 
potentialities in order to save what is left.” (ibid, 66) So, pathological 
anxiety makes one intensely obsessed about the power of nonbeing.
Neither can one be bogged down by anxiety nor should one 
by gripped by the threat of nonbeing. Incompleteness of the realizable 
possibilities in life may evoke a sense of guilt but out of this 
acceptance, there emerges not despair but a hopeful entry into the 
realm of promising possibilities. Though the dividing line between 
sanity and insanity is thin, one needn’t give overabundant relevance 
and emphasis to either. In admitting the inevitability of anxiety, one 
has to cut through this threat towards an ever-possible actualization 
of the self.
The em inent neurologist, O liver Sacks, has an abiding 
existential undercurrent in doing medicine:
Complementary to any purely medicinal, or medical, approach 
there must also be an existential approach: in particular, a sensitive 
understanding of action, art and play as being in essence healthy and 
free and this antagonistic to crude drives and impulsions. (1985, 91)
The Neuroanthropology of Oliver Sacks
Nowadays, where anxiety has been reduced to physical illnesses, 
neurology has been nourished by narratives that bring alive these 
anxieties witii limited yet extraordinarily effects. Among the pantheon 
of prominent neurologists of the twentieth century, Oliver Sacks 
stands out because of two main reasons: for prescribing treatment 
tracking wholesome health and prefer psychological wellbeing over 
plain physiological health.
Sacks was bom  in 1933 in London into a medical household. 
Both his parents were physicians and two of his elder brothers are
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doctors. He was molded to become a surgeon with his father’s passion 
for social medicine and his mother’s exuberant zeal in seeing human 
body in unison with human nature. He was excessively interested in 
chemistry and marine biology till he moved in 1950s to Oxford and 
in early 1960s to California to become a resident in neurology and 
neuropathology. Later he settled down in New York to work at the 
Beth Abraham hospital. He still works with this hospital and he is 
the clinical professor and adjunct professor of neurology at Albert 
Einstein School of Medicine and New York University respectively. 
He has treated patients with a wide variety of complaints from 
Parkinson’s, Autism, A lzheim er’s, and Schizophrenia to Color 
blindness, and Tourette’s and Korsakoff’s syndromes. He has received 
numerable awards and numerous honorary degrees and numberless 
blessings from his patients.
Sacks has written scintillating narratives in more than 8 books 
about unusual circumstances that arise in one’s life due to the 
appearance of neurological disorders, which range generally from 
memory loss, loss of recognition to identity crisis. His writing is dense 
with medical humaneness sensitized with suffering of his patients. 
The rare remarkable empathy of Sacks towards every one of his 
patients is a striking feature in every narrative. His cure with care 
attitude throughout the treatment is exceptional; he has stayed on 
within the hospital premises to remain accessible to his patients 
anytime. His life is in fact a reference manual for the finest doctor 
one can be; he has remained unmarried undoubtedly for the sake of 
his patients.
There is a kind of democratic quality to Sacks’ narratives which 
are open for anybody to read and immerse in its intricateness. And 
yet, readers emerge with a consolation at the courage of the patients 
to face the unim aginable pain or with glee at the incom plete 
improvement of the circumstances. In fact, readers -  even if they 
haven’t acquired such disorders -  are either transformed by the
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momentous suffering of their fellow humans or reminded of the 
fmitude of the human life. Readers are alerted to such wacky illnesses 
not to succumb to helplessness but to become aware of our limited 
existence. Most of Sacks’ narratives are instances of perpetual human 
struggle and partial amelioration in the process.
Sacks’ Philosophy of Medicine
The great Canadian physician, William Osier, once said that “he who 
studies medicine without books sails an uncharted sea, but he who 
studies medicine without patients does not go to sea at all.” Sacks 
has fanatically lived up to O sier’s suggestion and has churned 
narratives out of his patients so much that nowhere in these clinical 
tales, would the reader find any reference to himself but to his patients 
and to remedy their problem. Sacks uses the collective “us” referring 
to everyone involved in the treatment.
Some say medicine began in the Genesis itself when God 
breathed life into a lump of clay and made Adam. So, it is the primary 
medical act of breathing life into an organ that must carry on 
sustenance of life. As Deuteronomy of the Old Testament instructs, 
we need to choose life over anything else and stand out in the face of 
any scourge of suffering. Sacks would have learnt it at an eariy age 
when he used to visit synagogues and even listen from his father 
who was a prolific Jewish scholar-physician. The exquisite narrative 
description of the books of the Pentateuch like the Exodus and 
Numbers would have been an impulse to his mastery of narrative 
writing.
For Sacks, narrative writing is salvation from bearing witness 
to human condition. Medicine has correct diagnosis as its inevitable 
goal but for Sacks, it is just one among the many perspectives to treat 
the patient. Since many of the conditions chronicled by him are 
incurable, the force driving his tales is not the race for a remedy but 
the patient’s striving to maintain his or her identity in a world utterly
p. Sharat Chandra SItastri
132
changed by the disorder. In Sacks’ case histories, the hero is not the 
doctor, or even medicine itself. His heroes are the patients who learned 
to tap an innate capacity for growth and adaptation amid the chaos 
of their disordered minds. By restoring narrative to its rightful place 
in medicine, Sacks has remodeled the way physicians have to deal 
with their practice. Medicine insularly focused on a patient only as a 
diseased subject. In his narratives. Sacks has irrevocably restored 
human selfhood at the centre of his diagnosis. Sacks succinctly 
explains:
Our health, diseases, and reactions cannot be understood in 
vitro, in themselves; they can only be understood with reference to 
us, as expressions of our nature, our living, our being-here in the 
world. Yet, modem medicine, increasingly, dismisses our existence, 
either reducing our existence, either reducing us to identical replicas 
reacting to fixed stimuli in equally fixed ways, or seeing our diseases 
as purely alien and bad, without organic relation to the person who is 
ill. (1990, 228)
This is the starting premise for Sacks to treat his patients who 
are thought to be transformed by diseases as much as the literature 
of the diseases is affected by the patients. This is the reason for Sacks 
to write about the transformative capacity (to whatever little extent) 
of illnesses in patients and in turn, help enrich neurological literature. 
For Sacks, patients are not pieces of neurological disorders but an 
orderless reality with borderless possibilities for recovery.
Sacks has based his philosophy of medicine strongly on 
another prominent neurologist of 20'*' century: Alexander Luria (1902- 
1977), the Soviet neuropsychologist. Luria was one of the first to 
blend neurological case studies with exceptional narrative style and 
in the process develop something Luria called the romantic science. 
Luria was one of the wellsprings of inspiration for Oliver Sacks. 
Luria used novel ways to describe his extraordinary patients like 
Sherashevsky who had such vast memory that he could not forget
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anything and the effects of this indehble memory on his identity and 
life.
Another patient Zasetsky had a bullet-pierced brain because 
of which many abnormalities developed ranging from complete loss 
of perception of right side of vision to memory loss. Yet, Luria 
developed a unique way to alleviate the pain of the patient. Luria 
came to know that Zasetsky had an intense interest to write though 
he lost his reading ability. So, Luria encouraged Zasetsky to plainly 
write, fearless of any grammatical rules. Luria believed that Zasetsky’s 
introspective writing would become his most reliable form of 
communication and his reason for living.
Ultimately, Sacks’ philosophy of medicine rests on two pillars 
of doing medicine: identification and understanding. (Sacks, 1990, 
226) When a patient meets the physician for the first time, he indulges 
in identification. This involves recognizing the outward symptoms, 
scurrying for signs that are characteristic of the disorder and tests to 
verify or rebut the suspicions. In fact, this has become the general 
attitude towards illnesses. What happens with pure obsession with 
identification is put across in a poem by Philip Larkin delightfully:
Even to wear such knowledge -  for our flesh 
Surrounds us with its own decision -  
And yet spend all our life on imprecisions.
That when we start to die
Have no idea why. (Drownie, 1995, 269)
But, Sacks’ scope of medicine extends to another aspect called 
understanding. By which, he means the human level of approaching 
the patient. After completing the technical review of the patient’s 
situation, the physician has to invariably set out into the realm of 
cure, care and compassion. In fact, this must go hand in hand with 
the identification phase. A physician should never lose the humane 
understanding for the sake of diagnostic precision of the disease. 
Because, as Sacks indisputably points out:
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Patients need proper diagnosis and treatment, but they also 
need understanding and care; they need a human relationship and 
existential encounter, which cannot be provided by any technology. 
(1990, 226)
So, identification and understanding have to harmonize each 
other because as the great Jewish physician-philosopher Maimonides 
(1135-1204) suggested:
[The remedy for sick souls is to go to] wise men -  who are 
physicians of the soul -  and they will cure [the] disease by means of 
the character traits that they (the physicians) shall teach them, until 
they make them return to the middle way. (Drownie, 1995, 92)
And the middle way, as Maimonides too pointed, is also Sacks’ 
scruple: to tread a balanced path between identification and 
understanding, and allay the suffering of the patient by allying him 
with the reality of life.
Neurological Narratives of Oliver Sacks
Oliver Sacks, in self-consciously practicing narrative medicine, 
prefers not to reduce and localize the illness to a specific body-part 
but to look at the inherent inhabitant in the body. It is weird to imagine 
the incapacity of a husband to recognize the face of his wife with 
whom he has been life half of his life or a woman who deliberately 
impairs her hands or a 93-year old man who has to be shown a 
videotape of his movement to make him realise that he walks tilted. 
These clinical tales are narratives that will confound the reader with 
their unusual behavioral patterns that are a result of some damage to 
a 1.3 kg jelly that sits right on our top; the brain and the nervous 
system that supports it. Yet, one must remember that the manner and 
matter of illnesses depends as much on the damages to the brain as 
on a variety of psychological and sociological factors.
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The best part of these narratives is that they are about someone 
really out there who is facing a nasty reality of his life knowingly or 
unknowingly. These narratives may alarm readers because of their 
bizarre descriptions and tribulations. But, at the same time, they also 
alert readers that they may also face a similar situation in their future. 
In a sense, these narratives inform the reader immediately of the 
prospect of contracting such illnesses common to the human situation 
and a variety of ways to alleviate the situation. As the philosopher- 
theologian Paul Ricoeur explains:
A story describes a series of actions and events [in which] 
characters are represented either in situations that change or as they 
relate to changes to which they then react [and] reveal hidden aspects 
of the situation and of the characters and engender a new predicament 
that calls for thinking or action or both. The answer to this predicament 
advances the story to its conclusion. (1980, 174)
So, Oliver Sacks disrupts his narrative order of outlining the 
plight of his patient to infuse the narrative with his medical as well 
as philosophical insights to pause the reader to think while 
encountering situations that move across from one trauma, joy to 
another. He is extremely careful in choosing Wittgenstein to elucidate 
on the ro le  o f language or N ietzsche or K ierkegaard  for 
philosophically reading illnesses or the neuropsychologist Alexander 
Luria or neurosurgeon William Osier to medically interpret illnesses 
with humaneness. Never does Sacks stumble the reader into distress 
as he sees an absolute trust between the physician and the patient to 
be the touchstone of recovery.
Bodiless Narratives
Human brain adapts to new challenges posed to it by coordinating 
with the whole of human body or simply put, we have an embodied 
brain. Without the body to interact, brain can be chemically stored 
but in a soulless void. Brains live in and with bodies. But, sometimes
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due to a stroke that affects the brain, patient have a false sensation of 
the some body part. We all have what neurologists call proprioception: 
an ability to sense the location, position, orientation, and movement 
our body. Without this, we will be left disoriented and lost in the 
world. But, shortly after the American Civil War of 1860s, soldiers 
displayed a peculiar experience: even after unfortunately getting their 
limbs amputated, they still felt their presence in the body. This was 
called phantom limbs. Ever since, they have been numerous similar 
cases with patients being engulfed in such bizarre circumstances 
where they become incapable of perceiving the absence of certain 
parts or portions of the body.
Generally, individuals turn into patients because of the onset 
of some illness. This new labeling of individuals shouldn’t discredit 
them as beings in the world. They only turn into patients due to their 
entry into a distressing phase of their life from which they may or 
may not have an exit. The neurologist team is responsible as much as 
the patient for charting out the path to recovery. The physician must 
be proactive enough to be sensitive towards the suffering of the patient 
and that’s why we term them illnesses (as they are subjective) rather 
than diseases (which are nearly objective.)
A 93-year old man young with bustling energy steps into the 
clinic and Sacks is astonished at his gait. He doesn’t walk upright 
but a certain angle to the floor and the funnies thing is that he is 
worried over others telling him that he isn’t walking normally and 
moreover he puzzles Sacks with his question:
How could I be tilted without knowing I was? (1985, 67)
This incapability to perceive his slanted gait would be really 
confounding because it is usually unbearable for anyone to be told 
of anything unusual about oneself through others. It is a typical 
reaction to the threat of understanding oneself through others.
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But, the most fascinating thing about this narrative is that it 
abounds with self-reflexivity. Before Sacks suggests anything, the 
wise old man dissects his situation by seeking an analogy from his 
profession: carpentry. In fact, the neurologist is quite aware that the 
carpenter is suffering from a disease apparently common in old 
people: Parkinson’s disease. Due to this disease, patients lose their 
ability for voluntary orderly movement and their muscles become 
rigid and hands display tremors. Neither does the carpenter know 
these overt symptoms nor is he aware of the dreaded disease. But, 
the carpenter breaks through the neurological tags (Parkinsonism) 
usually assigned to a patient like him and understands his plight 
through metaphors of his own profession. He puzzles Sacks when he 
asks him:
[As a carpenter] we would always use a spirit level to tell 
whether a surface was level or not, or whether it was tilted from the 
vertical or not. Is there a sort of spirit level in the brain?
[whose knocking out results in Parkinson’s] (1985, 69)
For quite sometime, the medical profession has been ruthlessly 
assaulted for increasing the patient’s trauma by tagging them with 
scary diseases and creepy symptoms. This narrative brings out a fresh 
outlook towards this allegation suggesting that by allowing patients 
to reflect on their condition and gain self-understanding about their 
situation, they themselves may come up with strategies to deal with 
it. With this assurance of self-sensitivity to their suffering, patients 
can pool up with physicians to mutually sort out a way ahead. In 
fact, this is possible in cases where patients retain some self-awareness 
towards such insightful thought or else it completely depends upon 
the physician (and his team) to lonely unknot the course of treatment.
Ultimately, the carpenter himself scurries for ways to make 
him aware that he is walking skewed. Should I use a mirror but I 
can’t self-reflect on myself all the way through? But, this self-healing 
carpenter thought it through:
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‘Yeah, Doc, I’ve got it! I don’t need a mirror - 1 just need a 
level [that] I can’t use the spirit levels inside my head, but why 
couldn’t I use the levels outside my head -  levels I could see, I could 
use with my eyes?’ (1985,71)
So, the carpenter hints at the possible remedy for his 
predicament: fashioning a new form of spectacles that would make 
him aware of his tilted posture. With the help of the neurologist and 
his team, the carpenter creates a special spectacle that - though 
awkward -  perches on his nose to keep a constant vigil on his posture. 
These glasses are initially bulky to wear but gradually become 
wearable. For some recourse to the disease to be jointly amenable to 
the patient and the physician, there must be an unequal participation 
from either side in the course of treatment. The same principle can 
be extended to any relationship in life: until we play our part, we 
can’t expect to move ahead.
A prevalent point that these narratives reveal is that such 
situations turn into spectacles of insight into our life as we progress 
through the enveloping of illness as well as engulfed by our self- 
understanding.
As they say, the partial understanding is itself a progress made 
towards the whole. Yet, someone like Mrs. S (described in Eyes 
Right'.) has a fractional view of the world that makes her imperceptive 
of the remaining fraction. She cannot view anything to her left, 
whereas everything to her right is perfectly perceptible. How can 
one have such an unfair worldview? She had suffered a massive stroke 
whereby portions to the right of the brain dealing with visual spaces 
on the left have been damaged. Unlike the proactive old man in the 
previous narrative, this nearly-old woman doesn’t know that she’s 
missing out half of her view. As Sacks explains:
She knows it intellectually, and can understand, and laugh; 
but, it is impossible for her know it direcdy. (1985, 73)
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But, this intellectual understanding has helped her evolve ways 
to compensate her invisible left view. Her solution is explained by 
Sacks in her act of trying to eat up everything in the plate. Mrs. S 
gets a rotating wheelchair and she takes a complete circular turn to 
her right until she feels that the food on her left is perceptible for 
eating. Even after eating out all that’s in her view, she may feel hungry 
or the plate may not yet be empty. Then she takes another complete 
right turn allowing her to eat out a portion of the remaining uneaten 
portion on her left.
So, she has to make as many right swivels as needed until she 
feels bellyful. She could have rotated the plate or using a video system 
that would mirror her such that she can see the left side on her right 
on the screen. But, neither of these experiments is amenable to her 
condition but as Sacks points out:
The m atter is so physically, or indeed m etaphysically, 
confusing that only experiment can decide. (1985, 75)
Sacks general approach to treatment involves a metaphysical 
orientation as evidenced in the above line. But, what does he mean 
by metaphysical aspect of the medical narrative? By metaphysical. 
Sacks stacks up the infinitely complex answer behind an infinitely 
simple question like how is your health. One can reply affirmatively 
or grudgingly but words are quite inadequate to explain the inside 
reality and something beyond these expressions is inherent in our 
existence, and by not acknowledging it, we run into the risk of 
masquerading our troubled existence as blissful living.
When we deliberately prevent or are scared of our growth, we 
not only  ham per our psychological evolu tion  but also our 
physiological performance. This has been cussedly noticed in the 
case o f M adeleine in the narrative Hands. In spite of being 
congenitally (acquired at birth but need not be hereditary) blind, 
Madeleine is a vivacious woman with exceptional intelligence. Yet,
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she has depended only on others for her growth; she has been babied 
from birth so much so that she doesn’t even learn Braille. Her speech 
is infested with too many cannots, among which the most striking is 
her self-chosen disuse of her hands, which are for her:
Useless godforsaken lumps of dough [that she doesn’t feel to 
be a part of her] (Sacks, 1985, 56).
In fact, this abandonment of hands is due to the replacement 
of their function by others’ hands. Though she can sense her hands, 
their use or the perception of hands has been shrunk by the supporting 
hands around her. In a sense, her environment stalled her growth and 
the top of it, made her feel as if she doesn’t need hands at all. So, 
right from her birth she has been insulated from attempting to recover 
her hands. And this was a daunting task as she had to perceive 
something that she never did in her life, discover their presence and 
use. Sacks tries to make her recognize the importance of her hands 
and to do that, she had to learn to use her hands unassisted. One day, 
without anyone accompanying her and overcome by hunger, she grabs 
a bagel with her hand and activates her hands progressively to even 
shape clay molds. Her blindness didn’t hamper her adeptness at 
sculpting objects exquisitely. But, she soon moved on from objects 
to people:
There were limits, after all, to the interest and expressive 
possibilities of things [so that] she needed to explore the human face 
and figure, at rest and in motion. (Sacks, 1985, 60)
It was only for her to discover and explore her true self to 
realize the latent potentials waiting to blossom out. Further, Sacks 
writes about another patient who is a simpleton and relatively not as 
extraordinary as Madeleine. He too has remained handless for most 
of his life but using the impetus given by Madeleine’s case. Sacks 
motivates him to use his hands and he begins to employ them in all 
kinds of ways. With these two cases, Sacks tries to disprove a pertinent 
misgiving about individuals:
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The essential achievement of hands proved wholly possible 
for him as for her [and this clarifies] that intelligence, as such, plays 
no part in the matter -  that the sole and essential thing is use. (1985, 
61)
Humanist psychologists like Abraham Maslow have brilliantly 
explained these losses. Body organs have capacities that clamor to 
be well-used and if the needs of the organs are not satisfied, then:
The unused skill or capacity of organ can become a disease 
centre or else atrophy or disappear, thus diminishing a person. 
(Maslow, 1968, 201)
Scary Surpluses
If the previous section dealt with narratives that are livid with losses 
of certain portions in the nervous system, then Sacks offsets those 
narratives with others that abound with excesses in the brain. If losses 
are characterized by some kind of shortcoming in one’s life due to 
the malfunction of some part in the brain, then excesses are even 
more terrifying as it reaches extreme ends of human existence.
One can enjoy the experience of extrem e exuberance, 
incredible rapture of the body; but at the same time, one can be swayed 
to excessive states of involuntary movement and unwelcome 
liveliness. Euphoric states are often sought after by artists and others 
as an essential sickness for the mind to journey to the edge of 
consciousness and reap benefits out of such an experience. But, to 
stubbornly seek eccentricity nearly nudges individuals into neuroses 
and gives them a false feeling of wellness. Growth doesn’t lie to 
artificially inducing it in one self but to naturally spark it out in the 
human situation of everyday sanity.
To be Ourselves We must have Ourselves
On acquiring fatal illnesses, patients are often confounded at the 
sudden overturn of the familiar world that they experienced before.
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Meanwhile, the world in which one was at home gradually retires 
into a remote world. As memory becomes luxury, people are stripped 
of their identities and are tom apart from reality. This nowhere selfless 
existence may not be even perceptible to patients as they move from 
one confabulation of world to another. One such narrative is that of 
an ex-grocer, Mr. Thompson (in A Matter o f  Identity) who is mired 
in:
Abysses of amnesia [which] continually [open] beneath him, 
but he would bridge them, nimbly, by fluent confabulations and 
fictions of all kinds (Sacks, 1985, 104)
This is what one makes of the glimpsing reality out there when 
affected with what is called a severe Korsakov’s psychosis. Mr. 
Thompson replaces the world and self with what has been forgotten 
and lost. He is caught in cycles of chimeras which manifest as made- 
up stories about every perceivable situation. Sacks sees, in Mr. 
Thompson’s hypothetical narratives, the need to tell stories about 
one’s encounters in life. In outlining the need for a narrative, Sacks 
justifies - within his narratives - the nourishment that narratives reward 
us by their richness of storytelling. Until one enacts the inner drama, 
he may not be able to live in a logical continuity with life.
Mr. Thompson is tormented by the continuous business of 
inventing illusions to satiate his inner drive to catch up with reality. 
This is usually the case with most of us as the Existentialists have 
regularly warned us that we try to escape reality by erecting a facade 
of delusions. We mistake the sparkling superficial surfaces of reality 
to possess the ultimate depth of meaning. Mr. Thompson too presents 
dazzling surface anecdotes that lack the profundity of meaning. 
Moreover, what startles us about Mr. Thompson is that he has;
...no  feeling that he has lost feeling, no feeling that he has 
lost the depths, that unfathomable, mysterious, myriad-leveled depth 
which somehow defines identity or reality. (Sacks, 1985, 107)
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But, say, Mr. Thompson suspends his gibberish for sometime 
for some aspect of reality to penetrate his chimerical worid. Then, it 
can be expected that something unexpected can happen. Medicine is 
full of miracles where something unknown unlocks its grace on the 
patient to redeem him of his suffering. In another clinical narrative 
{The Lost Mariner,) Sacks writes about a former submarine radio­
operator, Jimmie. After more than thirty years of the Second World 
War, Jimmie is caught in time: he still feels that it is wartime. He has 
typically lost memory and cannot remember anything after the war 
till today: a vast span of more than 30 years. And when Sacks consults 
the erudite neuropsychologist, Alexander Luria, he suggests that:
Do whatever your ingenuity and your heart suggest. There is 
little or no hope of any recovery in his memory. But a man does not 
consist of memory alone. He has feeling, will, sensibilities, moral 
being -  matters of which neuropsychology cannot speak. And it is 
here, beyond the realm of an impersonal psychology, that you may 
find ways to touch him, and change him. (Sacks, 1985, 32)
So, Sacks seeks various ways of Jimmie’s redemption from 
this memory blackout; but with a haunting question: does he have a 
soul at all to be recovered or that too has been drowned by the disease? 
The solution Sacks finds in Jimmie’s marvelous conduct in the chapel:
He was wholly held, absorbed.. .there was no forgetting.. .for 
he was no longer at the mercy of faulty and fallible mechanism -  that 
of meaningless sequences and memory traces -  but was absorbed in 
an act, an act of his whole being, which carried feeling and meaning 
in an organic continuity and unity...so seamless it could not permit 
any break. (1985, 36)
In hopeless neurological situations, patients like Jimmie can 
still find a communion with the spiritual Ground o f  Being to reconnect 
them with their truer self. But, in the case of Mr. Thompson, even 
this reconciliation seems unlikely. Whenever he is among the crowd
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or enclosed by things, Mr. Thompson frenziedly and superfluously 
connects with them by a veritable delirium of identity making and 
seeking. But, if supplied with solitude, he nevertheless experienced 
a spiritual communion with something other than himself. Though 
there was no marked recovery in his situation, this quite time he had 
for himself could give him a respite from his uncontrolled chatter.
Usually, we experience nearly controlled movement in most 
of our daily activities. If we accidentally stumble in our movement, 
we may feel embarrassed and correct it immediately as we are 
conscious of such slip-ups. But, there is a typical situation where 
one experiences involuntary movement abundant with nervous 
energy, extreme emotions and excessive motions, terrifying twitches 
(called tics). This is called the Tourette’s syndrome. One such patient’s 
narrative is the most famous oft-cited Witty Ticcy Ray.
Ray is a 24-year old dilettante who is thrilled as much by his 
jazz-drumming as with his tics. He was fired from his jobs because 
these tics tripped him into sudden outbursts of excitement and 
surpluses of irritation. Yet, he was endowed with a keen musical 
sense that was floridly displayed during his weekend jazz drumming. 
His tics tapped into his dexterity at drumming - discounting him of 
any upsetting situations as such. He lost himself to music to recover 
in other situations to be thwarted by tics.
A person suffering from Tourette’s syndrome seems to be living 
in a public dream of his private unconscious as he is disoriented and 
dissociated with his surrounding world. This psychoanalytic aspect 
of the syndrome refutes the obsession of most neuroscientists today 
that psychoanalysis is a defunct discipline.
Anyhow, Sacks -  on learning about a new drug (haldol) that 
could abate the tics of Touretters -  gave a minute dosage of it to Ray. 
When he turned up a week later, he walked into the clinic with a 
black eye and broken nose. As a Touretter is often lured by “spinning
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things and revolving doors,” Ray -  managing witii a minute dose of 
Haldol -  had mistimed his movements and ran into the revolving 
doors to get knocked out. The drug had reduced the intensity of the 
tics and this cutback had affected his normal movement and reaction 
itself. So, neither can tics be completely abandoned nor can their 
overabundance be tolerated. Because as Ray himself admits;
Suppose you could take away the tics... What would be left? 
I consist of tics- there’d be nothing left. (Sacks, 1985, 93)
This is what usually happens with patients enduring extreme 
suffering: their identity aligns with the illness; their self sums up 
with symptoms. Sacks, in just giving us few details and administering 
the drug, had experimented with the drug’s effect and this narrative 
proves the inadequacy of a pill for every ill. Just by spotting the 
symptoms, labeling patients with diseases (especially in the case of 
mental illnesses) and delivering them over to drugs, can never help 
the patient. Drugs and scans are a part of the treatment; not the whole 
treatment itself.
For the physiological imbalance to be transcended, the 
existential balance has to be enriched. Though Ray was continuously 
drowning himself with the disease. Sacks examines Ray’s life with 
and without Tourette’s. He collaborates with Ray on a three-month 
ordeal about Ray’s hidden potentials that survived unexplored during 
his 20 years of endurance with the disease. Even Freud devoted a 
protracted time (sometimes years) to his patients in understanding 
their tribulations; but, ultimately for the benefit of maximally 
diagnosing their illnesses. Sometimes, a lack of such commitment to 
the patient results in what Sacks had done to Ray in drugging him 
with haldol. But, it is the wisdom of Sacks to renounce such isolated 
approaches and reconcile with Ray in coordinating with him to 
discover an amenable treatment with him. This co-working with Ray 
resu lted  in a reuse of haldol on Ray but now with a better 
understanding of the potentials of the patient and the physician by 
each other, the ill-effects (that arose earlier) are absent.
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Living with Tourette’s from the age of four, Ray was fascinated 
by the disease so much that he was not willing to give it up. Because 
of the three moths of deep preparation and analysis, he has now 
skimmed out the surface obsessions with the disease to plunge into 
the profound depths of his personality. Ray and Sacks etch out a 
prodigious plan to help Ray enjoy a normal life as well as the 
extraordinary life that tics had provided him:
[Ray] would take haldol ‘dutifully’ throughout the working 
week, but would take himself off it, and ‘let fly’, at weekends... 
There is a sober citizen, the calm deliberator, from Monday to Friday; 
and there is ‘witty ticcy Ray’, frivolous, frenetic, inspired at weekends. 
(Sacks, 1985, 95)
The dullness that haldol drowned Ray during weekdays was 
nevertheless unequally compensated by the vivaciousness of off- 
haldol weekends. In finding this balance in life, Ray reminds the 
equilibrium with which one has to negotiate his inner freedom with 
outer captivities.
A Child follows the Bible before he follows Euclid
Finally, a neurological narrative in which the patient herself uses 
narratives to connect with an otherwise empty meaningless world. 
Rebecca  was a physiologically grown-up girl of 19 but was 
psychologically still a child. She was -  to use a medically derogatory 
word -  a “retarded” child colored by utter confusion and clumsiness 
of activity, complete withdrawal from the outside world, along with 
a wide variety of cerebral and mental defects. Our general attitude 
toward people like Rebecca is to flush out pointless sympathy 
(originating from pity) whereas the least that was needed was to 
empathize with Rebecca and make her feel at home.
Orphaned at an early age, Rebecca was cared by her loving 
grandmother. Though Rebecca could neither write nor read, she 
listened to stories and poems recited by her granny, who almost 
enacted them in her majestic voice.
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Though Rebecca seemed utterly emotionless, she was deep 
down an adoring girl with profound love for her grandma. In spite of 
her incapacity with simple principles and instruction, Rebecca wanted 
the world to be re-presented to her in verbal images, in language, 
and seemed to have little difficulty following the metaphors and 
symbols of even quite deep poems. Though abstract concepts were 
imperceptible to her, she absorbed herself in concrete poems and 
coalescing narratives. Rebecca may be crippled intellectually but 
spiritually somewhere deep down her soul, she had a spiraling sense 
of completeness.
Unlike other narratives in the book. Sacks, in Rebecca, speaks 
with a special sincerity. Initially, he mentions all the noticeable signs 
and symptoms of Rebecca to confirm her shortcomings. Later, he is 
awestruck at her profound insights and observations in her delightful 
encounter with nature. Sacks first saw her -  with a neurological vision
-  as a casualty whose impairments were diagnosed with precision. 
Next time, he saw her -  with his human vision -  to be baffled at her 
beautiful vision of nature. Rebecca would be spellbound by nature 
and lose herself among the flora and fauna - stilled by moments of 
illumination and contemplation. She was also a devout Jew who may 
have been similarly wondered in synagogues by the tale of Moses 
who brought down from Mt. Sinai, not just the guidebook of God 
but the overwhelming wonder of God. Marveling at the Cosmos is 
an available experience to all of us but we are deliberately turning it 
into an unaffordable luxury.
Deficits were so promptly diagnosed that what was outside 
those deficits was blatantly neglected. Tests and scans could never 
show these inherent abilities of Rebecca and it is always advisable 
for the physician to treat the man not the scan. Though she was de­
composed by her deficits, she re-composed herself with a stillness 
that -  as Sacks analyzes -  emerged out of her fondness for tales, for 
narrative composition and coherence. This is what most physicians 
tend to ignore:
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.. .Evaluations [display] deficits [masking us from the patient’s] 
powers.. .they only show us puzzles and schemata, when we need to 
see music, narrative, play, a being conducting itself spontaneously in 
its own natural way (Sacks, 1985, 172)
Narratives -  derived out of watching and wondering about 
nature -  helped Rebecca to reconfigure her world and re-place herself 
as a worthwhile participant in it. Even when her storytelling grandma 
died, Rebecca acts with great poise and dignity -  reacting to a dear 
one’s demise with an unretarded touching mourning. When Rebecca 
was advised and attended some workshops and classes, it didn’t work 
as she was constandy reminded her of her limitations because as 
Sacks so wonderfully puts it:
...w e were far too concerned with ‘defectology’, and far too 
little with ‘narratology’, the neglected and needed science of the 
concrete. (1985, 174)
Narratives come naturally handy for us to deal with a wide 
variety of situations in life; Bible is easier to follow as it is “cast in a 
symbolic and narrative mode.” (ibid, 175) Rebecca searched for that 
one narrative in life that could give her a genuine meaning and she 
expresses it in an amazing analogy:
I’m like a sort of living carpet. I need a pattern, a design, like 
you have on that carpet. I come apart, I unravel, unless there’s a 
design, (ibid, 175)
In the changing patterns of life, Rebecca was searching for 
that distinctive pattern that would give her a glimpse of her life’s 
true meaning and purpose. At last, she herself expresses her love for 
theatre. She is enrolled into a theatre group, where in the shifting 
patterns on the stage, she dons various roles and does exceedingly 
well in spite of her mental deficits. Unless we find what is that which 
kickstarts the real self in us, every one of us are virtually mentally
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defective. Narratives are everywtiere around us; it only taices a keen 
inner eye to pick out the perfect narrative and engage in the ever­
lasting episodes of self-realization.
A Starting Conclusion
...it is silly
To refuse the tasks of time 
And, overlooking our lives,
Cry -  “Miserable wicked me,
How interesting I am.”
We would rather be ruined that changed.
We would rather die in our dread 
Than climb the cross of the moment 
And let our illusions die.
— W.H. Auden, The Age o f Anxiety
Almost all these narratives are sewn with strands of the 
patient’s awakening to the presence of some illness, the physician’s 
diagnosis and deliberations, the ensuing tribulations and revelations. 
But, there are knots of existential dilemmas that must be unknotted 
in the process o f ultim ately fashioning the cloth of health. 
Neurological narratives challenge us with their complexity in realizing 
the constraints of human existence. The so-called healthy readers 
are confounded by the others’ illnesses that the reader has to rethink 
about what it means to be hearty and healthy.
In fictitious narratives, readers are asked to cognitively fill in 
the gaps left open by the author so that the meaning of the text is 
completed by the active involvement of the reader. Paradoxically, in 
neurological narratives, readers are not only required to bridge the 
breaks in the text outside them. But, there is a stronger emphasis to 
refill and renovate their selves with novel understandings from 
participating in making the meaning of the medical narratives. When 
these narratives decompose the line separating illness and wellness,
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the reader is handed over the responsibility to make a meaningful 
judgment about the dividing line. In fact, as this subject is quite 
subjective and unique to every individual, it is audacious for the 
psychiatrist or neurologist to pass an absolute ruling on it.
Whatever may be the degree of outside relief a patient can get 
like drugs and therapy, it u ltim ately rests with the p atien t’s 
unassailable inner self to promote his psychological health. Actually, 
the way in which the organs disobey the human will and degenerate 
into disorders reflects the manner in which an individual willfully 
collapses into his cocoon of cravings and revels in his separateness.
Medical facts keep on restocking the infinite space created by 
myriad possibilities of human pathology and health. Every medical 
procedure is only a step closer to the source of illness whereas it is 
inherent in illnesses to take an astonishing form. As soon as a 
physician offers certainty o f curing an illness, there are new 
manifestations of the illness as its biological variability and the ever- 
changing human condition are inbuilt into it. So, listening to thousands 
of years of medical advice, it is always favorable for patients to have 
as much as self-understanding as possible to brave and combat 
illnesses. Until we acknowledge our innate natural levels of suffering 
of being bom as a human, we cannot grow over them and overpower 
them with our uniqueness of being a human.
What has been lost is the capacity to experience and have 
faith in one’s self as a worthy and unique being. At the same time, 
we have distanced ourselves from our fellow human beings to such 
an extent that we have made ourselves incapable of acknowledging 
our separateness - let alone experiencing it. This disharmony with 
others can be resolved by the sufferer as he alone has got the freedom 
to pick among these three choices:
The effects of suffering...m ay stimulate in the sufferer a 
conscious or unconscious craving for in tensification  o f his
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separateness; or it may leave the craving such as it was before the 
suffering; or finally it may mitigate it and so become a means for 
advance towards self-abandonment and the love and knowledge of 
God. (Huxley, 1972, 263)
Most of the patients in the neurological narratives have made 
one among these choices outlined by Aldous Huxley and lived with 
till they turned into patients. Then, they have sustained their choice 
or preferred another choice that has changed their very mode and 
functioning of life.
As was observed  befo re  (see page 10), the m arked 
manifestation of suffering is existential anxiety, which as patients 
are awakened takes the form of:
...apprehension cued off by a threat to some value that the 
individual holds essential to his existence as a personality. (May, 
1977, 80)
Threats can originate from the body or the psyche but one 
must remember that there is no threat-less existence in anyone’s life. 
As long as individual hold a variety of values central to their existence, 
they have to encounter anxiety but not succumb to it. Instead, this 
anxiety-rich existence gives us ample opportunity to rekindle our 
untapped possibilities and refurbish our self. Illnesses often lead to 
redemption as the self is nearly emptied of all humdrum of outside 
quotidian existence and focuses on the inner promise of potentials.
As the awareness of existence expands, the patient discovers 
what value is threatened and becomes aware of the conflict between 
his goals and how these conflicts have developed. Then, the individual 
restructures his goals, makes a choice of values and proceeds towards 
the realization of these values responsibly and realistically. In the 
recovery and reorganization of the self, patients may experience self- 
realization that is:
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...the expression and creative use of individual capacities 
[which] can occur only as the individual confronts and moves through 
anxiety-creating experiences. (May, 1977, 354)
Enriched by anxiety-creating experiences, the patient becomes 
creative and constructively deals with the prevalent situation readily 
and responsibly. Then, a surfeit of possibilities emerges and selfhood 
gets strengthened. But if:
...individuals seek to avoid anxiety, responsibility, and guilt 
feeling by refusing to avail themselves of their new possibilities, by 
refusing to move from familiar to unfamiliar, they sacrifice their 
freedom and constrict autonomy and self-awareness. (May, 1977, 
356)
So, every one of us everyday combats with the illness of 
preserving our autonomy continuously assaulted by nothingness in 
life; yet, there are infinite possibilities for us to overcome the 
debilitating distresses in life and it is only up to us to do so. And one 
of the ways is to perpetually wait for a wise “storyteller [to bless].. .an 
unending [unfmalized] world [with] the bliss of untold stories.” 
(Ashok, 1998, 128)
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Introduction
In the past few decades, self-regulation of physiological processes 
has received immense attention from the psychology and neuroscience 
communities. The complex task of meditation is an important self- 
regulatory process that is practiced world over. The process of 
meditation is associated with certain aspects of consciousness i.e. 
the human “altered states of consciousness” and its phenomenological 
experience. The problem of defining consciousness and explaining 
the relationship between physical and mental is one of the oldest and 
most important questions of philosophy and science. According to 
Chalmers (1995), “consciousness poses the most baffling problems 
in the science of mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately 
than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to 
explain”. Despite the rich first person descriptions, very little is known 
about brain or cognitive mechanisms that give rise to such altered 
states of consciousness like meditation. Meditation can be defined 
in various ways. According to Farthing (1992), “Meditation is a 
ritualistic procedure intended to change one’s state of consciousness 
by means of maintained voluntary shifts in attention” (Farthing 1992). 
According to Wallace and Fisher (1991), “Meditation can be regarded 
as slow unmutative long-term procedure for producing an altered 
state of consciousness”. Meditation significandy differs from other
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altered states in terms of its method of induction (driven by voluntary 
processes), long-term behavioural changes due to meditation and 
phenomenal experience associated with meditation. The meditative 
states can be accompanied by states of exceptional concentration, 
clarity, perceptual sensitivity, transience, optimism and ineffability.
A general approach to meditation that draws heavily on 
cognitive science and neuroscience sees both state and trait changes 
due to meditation as a resultant of brain activity and related to 
cognitive processes like attention. Although there are constraints of 
empirical data and cognitive dimensions of these experiences across 
various types of meditation, the emphasis is to extend meditation 
research from the realm of speculation and anchor it against a 
neurocognitive basis. An important sub-discipline in cognitive science 
that makes such an attempt is cognitive neuroscience which brings 
together cognitive psychology and neuroscience to study cognitive 
processes in the brain (Gazzaniga et al., book).
The emergence of cognitive neuroscience is not only linked 
to studying  a conscious brain  in action but also  to link 
phenomenological, psychological and neural levels of explanation. 
Cognitive neuroscience involves methodologies ranging from 
electrophysiology, psychophysiology and neuroimaging that are 
employed to study all cognitive processes including meditation. A 
cognitive neuroscience of meditation focuses on finding out the 
cognitive faculties of meditation linking brain activity with meditative 
experience and behavioural changes due to meditation. We emphasize 
the findings from the cognitive neuroscience approach for 
understanding meditation in this paper.
Before we explore the changes in brain activity and cognitive 
processes due to meditation, we discuss different methods of 
meditation and highlight some similarities and differences between 
different methods of meditation. We also summarize findings from 
some important behavioural and neuroscientific studies on meditation.
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We discuss some of the implications of these studies in understanding 
the mechanisms underlying meditative experience.
Methods of Meditation
Meditation is primarily considered to be a process of calming the 
mind. Most methods of meditation have religious origins such as 
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sufism in particular but comparable 
methods have been found in other traditions too such as Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam. Most recently secular methods have appeared 
which train people in meditation without focusing on any religion. 
The most popular m editation techniques are Transcendental 
Meditation (TM), Sahaja Yoga meditation, Kundalini meditation. Raja 
yoga, Bhakti yoga etc. (Satprakashananda, 2004). Meditation usually 
involves sitting in a special posture and keeping the body alert but 
relaxed at the same time. The best-known posture is the fu ll lotus 
position forming a stable triangle of contact with the floor. It requires 
one to sit in an upright posture with straight back and encourages 
breathing from abdomen rather than chest. Other postures include 
half lotus and simpler Bunnese position. There are several hand 
positions related to these postures in different types of meditation.
M editation can be categorized mainly into two types -  
mindfulness or open meditation and concentrative meditation. The 
mindfulness meditation allows any thoughts or feelings to arise while 
maintaining a specific attentional stance whereas the Concentrative 
Meditation involves focusing on specific mental or sensory activity 
like a repeated sound {mantra), an imagined image or any specific 
body sensation such as breath. Mindfulness meditation allows 
awareness of the phenomenal field as an attentive and non-attached 
observer without judgment or analysis. Mindfulness meditation allows 
maintenance of an attention in a state of open perceptivity while 
concentrative meditative forms allow narrowing of attentional focus. 
Forms of yogic meditation, TM, Buddhist Samatha meditation that 
focuses on sensation of breath are some forms of Concentrative 
meditation.
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Open or Mindfulness meditation is usually practiced with eyes 
open or half open and in Buddhist meditation or Zazen (Austin, 1999) 
it’s often done facing a blank wall. The basic idea is to be continuously 
mindful, attentive and fully present in the moment paying attention 
to anything and everything. It is done w ithout m aking any 
discriminations and treating every stimuli with equal importance. 
One of the interesting effects of this is that sights, sounds, events and 
thoughts pierce into the attention and mind is continuously distracted, 
categorizing and commenting on everything that happens. With 
practice Mindfulness meditation leads to what is known as bare 
awareness/bare attention which means never giving in to distractions 
or desires and being open to everything all the time.
In one of the experiments where people rounded around a 
blue vase to concentrate on it and restrain all distractions, striking 
effects related to the perception of the vase were observed (Tart 1969). 
The vase appeared more vivid, rich and even more luminous as the 
m editation progressed. It was argued that we norm ally start 
increasingly attending to thoughts and distractions and so our 
perception becomes automatized and dull. The effect of Concentrative 
meditation was “deautomatization”. However, in Zen Buddhism and 
in particular in Rinzai School, practitioners concentrate on a koan or 
hua tou, which are questions or stories designed to challenge the 
intellectual mind. These are asking the meditators to think of nothing 
good or evil but of the original features before their parents gave 
birth to them. These koans are not to be understood with ordinary 
logic but one must penetrate to the state of mind, which they express. 
Usually a graded series of koans is used which focuses the student’s 
mind toward satori and gives the Zen master a means of judging the 
progress of the student. All of these more advanced meditations 
require supervision.
The conceived objectives of various practices are as follows: 
(1) a heightened awareness of physiological and psychological
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processes lead ing  to their vo lun tary  con tro l, (2) inducing 
psychobiological and psychotherapeutic effects, (3) effecting changes 
in different aspects of mental functioning and personality, and 
(4) inducing changes in interpersonal and social behavior. The aims 
of these practices are understood as the development of insight into 
the nature of mental functioning, consciousness, identity and reality. 
To achieve these objectives, many postures and methods are used 
for meditation and some of these are discussed below:
•  Sitting Meditation: The classic sitting meditation is a vital 
part of all the meditation techniques and has many forms. 
Some traditional approaches involved the student to sit 
motionless for hours. All forms of classic sitting meditation 
are done in silence. The meditator is required to sit cross 
legged Asian style on a meditation pillow on the floor or 
use the recliner chair method described below. Eyes may 
be fully open, half open, or slightly open, letting in only 
small slits of light. Meditating with eyes fully closed is 
allowed as long as the room remains brightly lit so that 
enough light passes through the eyelids which would keep 
one alert.
•  Sit-Stand Method: This form of meditation was introduced 
as a defence against sleepiness that involves breaking up 
formal meditation into three 15 minute sessions. It involves 
sitting quietly for 15 minutes and then standing for 2 
minutes, repeating this thrice. The goal here is to become 
meditative continuously.
•  Recliner Chair Method: With this method one can sit in a 
recliner chair with the soles of the bare feet pressed against 
each other and your legs relaxed, knees pointed out to the 
sides of the chair. Hands are generally locked together, 
laying comfortably on the lap, or pressed against the centre 
of the chest, one on top of the other. This method of sitting
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can be used in conjunction witii any of the sitting meditation 
techniques described earlier.
D Self-inquiry Incantation: This type of method involves 
asking some questions to one’s own self and performing 
certain hand gestures like making right hand into a fist and 
hitting with upturned left palm. The meditators are thus 
able to resonate the questions that arise deep inside while 
thinking of their intellectual explanations which progresses 
into further contemplation. This questioning technique is 
used only at the beginning of formal sitting meditation 
sessions.
□ Mirror Gazing: Some of the practitioners of meditation 
have been found to use a mirror which is believed to 
virtually double the power of their meditation sessions. It 
requires one to sit in front of the mirror and gaze onto the 
reflected image, setting the focus on just above the head 
so that the wall behind could be viewed.
Out of the methods of postures described above, sitting type 
of method is most widely used. Besides these, there are several other 
traditional techniques which involve focussing certain aspects of the 
body such as body-parts, breath, etc. The Taoist meditation requires 
one to direct attention towards the centre of the torso at about the 
level of the navel. Thoughts, when arise should be placed in this 
centre of the body as if they arose there. This method especially 
helps to promote a feeling of vitality and strength from the belly. 
B reathing is a function which may be either voluntarily or 
involuntarily controlled. To meditate on breathing is to deal with 
how you allow your spontaneity to flow. The breath concentration as 
used in Japanese Zen Meditation involves shift of attention to the 
lower part of the body, the pelvis or the abdomen, accompanied by 
relaxation. The meditators are instructed to inhale in air maximally 
and then exhale maximally while counting each exhalation and
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descending their attention and thougiits down to tiie stomach. Another 
group of meditative exercises focuses the attention directly on the 
contents of consciousness, drawing on yoga practices. Here the 
meditators are asiced to do nothing and to think nothing to let go 
ones feelings and ideas. Sudarshan Kriya Yoga is another popular 
technique of meditation which involves certain specified rhythms of 
breathing, whereas the Transcendental meditation is practiced with 
sitting quietly with eyes closed.
Meditation has been a subject of deep study, research and 
experiment from times immemorial. A variety of meditative practices 
have been developed and systematized in different spiritual traditions 
over several centuries especially in the Indian tradition. Meditative 
practices first commenced in the background of Vedic religion as a 
tradition known as upasana. The word literally means “sitting near”. 
upasana is objective meditation. Objective Meditation involves 
concentration of mind on an object, which may be a deity, light, sky 
or some qualities like love, compassion or ones own self objectified. 
In upasana attention is focused on an object by the effort of the will. 
Samyama has been described as a nature-oriented meditation by some 
of the followers of meditation in Indian context. Unlike upasana 
whose focus is the principle of consciousness, Samyama is centered 
on the unconscious principle. Concentration practiced is essentially 
a process of nirodha (suppression) and object of concentration chosen 
for meditation is any concrete form or idea or feeling, because 
smayama is not governed by any rigid conceptual framework.
Buddhism has incorporated many procedural elements of both 
upasana and samyama that existed in India even before Buddha was 
bom. The goal of buddhist meditative practices are to realize the 
emptiness of the self and are called 'bhavana' in buddhism one can 
find both objective and subjective types of meditation. Samartha is 
mental concentration and is a type of Objective meditation practiced 
in Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhists are specialists in this kind. Vipassana
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is the well-known example of subjective meditation practiced in 
Southern Buddhist tradition. It is analytic method, which involves 
constant mindfulness and awareness of all experiences. The tantric 
tradition started developing with the end of Vedic Period. Some of 
the important changes introduced by tantric tradition to meditative 
practices in India include replacement of vedic images of fire, sun, 
air etc., with images of gods and goddesses; indirect approach to 
ultimate reality with use of words with purported mystic power to 
produce changes in consciousness.
Scientific Studies on Meditation
The self-regulatory processes of meditation and yogic relaxation 
procedures have received mounting interest from cognitive scientists 
and neuroscientists. This growing research bears upon time-honoured 
questions such as the nature of conscious experience, mind-body 
problem and other inter-related areas of consciousness (Schwartz & 
Shapiro, 1978). Approaches including psychophysiology and 
neuroimaging have been used to investigate the neural mechanisms 
and bra in  ac tiv ity  changes accom panying m editation . 
Psychophysiology includes electroencephalogram (EEG) and event 
related potential (ERF) studies. These techniques have also been used 
to study cognitive processes such as attention (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995, Hillyard, et. al., 1998, Luck et. al., 1997), emotions (Lane & 
Nadel, 2000), and language (Geschwind, 1965). These techniques 
have also dem onstrated changes in brain activity as well as 
physiological state due to changes in the states of consciousness that 
differ from the normal state of consciousness (Aftanas & Golosheikin, 
2003, Arambula, et. al., 2001, Deepak, 2002, Newberg, et. al., 2001, 
Young & Taylor, 1998). Thus, it provides a way of measuring changes 
in cognitive functions due to changes in these states and correlating 
it with the normal states of consciousness. Based on these studies, it 
has been proposed that these ASCs are the result of dynamical and 
constantly interacting neural activities between cortical and sub- 
cortical regions.
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EEG Studies
The history of electroencephalography, the measurement and study 
of brain’s electrical activity began in the late nineteenth century when 
advances made in the science of electromagnetism began to be applied 
to human physiology. In the late nineteenth century, a technique was 
developed for detecting the electrical activity from the exposed 
surfaces of the brains of the animals, demonstrating the ability to 
d e tec t e lec trica l brain responses to stim uli. L ater, these 
electroencephalographic techniques were developed to be applied 
to the humans (Berger, 1929). This discovery promoted several other 
discoveries and findings related to brain activities while performing 
different cognitive tasks. The normal human EEG has a frequency 
content of 0.5 to 30 Hz which is usually subdivided into four or five 
bands: delta (0.5 to 3.5 Hz), theta (3.5-8 Hz), alpha (8 to 12 Hz), beta 
(13 to 28 Hz) and gamma (28+ Hz). Each of these bands is correlated 
with specific brain/behavioral states. Delta frequency is generally 
associated with deep sleep, theta waves with light sleep or dreaming, 
alpha waves with relaxed consciousness and beta/gamma waves with 
active consciousness. Modern computerized EEGs can provide 
immediate information of brain’s large-scale electrical activity 
according to location, frequency and amplitude. This information 
can be utilized to identify specific functional/cognitive states of an 
individual.
EEG is a crude method that measures summed up post-synaptic 
electrical activity of the neurons especially in the cortical areas. EEG 
is typically recorded by placing the electrodes on the scalp. EEG 
recorded without any external stimulation is called spontaneous EEG 
(or just plain EEG). These recordings are done at various scalp 
locations that are chosen according to International 10-20 system 
(Jasper, 1958) or expanded versions of this system. EEG recorded as 
a response to external stimuli is called an Event-Related Potential 
(ERP). The positive and negative peaks in ERPs that are obtained
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after sampling and averaging of time-locked electrical potentials can 
be described in terms of their characteristic scalp distribution, polarity 
and latency (Cacioppo et. al., 2000). It has a widespread use as a 
diagnostic aid and clinical tool for various neurological disorders 
(Albuquerque et al., 1976; Kolb & Whishaw, 2003; Rechtschaffen 
& Dement, 1967). EEG and ERPs have been used to study various 
cognitive processes as well as altered states of consciousness like 
sleep, dreaming, and meditation.
There has been a plethora of electroencephalographic studies 
on meditation, but no clear consensus about neurophysiological 
concomitants of meditative practice has emerged so far. Sensory 
evoked potential and cognitive event related potential assessments 
of meditative practices also reflect variegated results. Some reliable 
meditation related EEG-frequency effects for theta and alpha activity, 
as well as EEG coherence has been observed.
An initial EEG study performed with subjects under eyes 
closed condition showed decreased sensory input and increased alpha 
output predominantly over the occipital scalp (Berger, 1929). Since 
then the researchers have tried conducted a large number of EEG 
and fMRI studies and have tried to correlate the results for 
understanding brain activity associated with states of consciousness. 
The association between EEG and fMRI has shown increased alpha 
power being related to decreased blood flow in the inferior frontal, 
cinguiated, superior temporal and occipital cortices (Goldman et. 
al., 2002). Pre-dominance of alpha power of EEG was observed 
during meditation as compared to the control conditions has been 
observed in several eeg studies done with different meditation types 
(Anand et. al., 1961, Aftanas & Golosheikin, 2003, Arambula et a!., 
2001, Banquet, 1973, Wenger & Bagchi, 1961). It has been argued 
that the dramatic increase in alpha abundance is not particular to 
meditation but it is the unusual ability of the meditators to maintain 
the alpha activity after the end of meditation with eyes open and
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diffusion of large amplitude alpha waves to anterior region that 
characterizes meditational state from other states (Banquet, 1973). 
Thus increase in alpha power has been reported not just during 
meditation but also during the baseline condition. Critical change in 
EEG activity may also be related with clarity of transcendental 
experience. It was reported that a highly accomplished Japanese Yogi 
and the founder and Director of a school of meditation, who practiced 
Kundalini Yoga meditation produced five fold increase in alpha band 
activity during the meditative practice and only moderate increase in 
theta after meditation. The moderate increase in theta activity could 
be associated with the feelings of pleasure.
The effective generation of an altered state of consciousness 
by experienced meditators was found to be associated with increase 
in local theta and alpha power over the anterior cortical regions as 
well as theta coherence in the antero-posterior direction. The increased 
theta power in these cortical areas is associated with increase in 
orientation response, concentration of attention and processing of 
emotional information (Aftanas & Golosheikin, 2003). Recently it 
has become more evident that the emotional cognitive component in 
humans is connected with increases in theta rhythm that relates to 
the cortico-limbic interactions. Increased theta activity was also found 
to be associated with proficiency in meditative technique (Aftanas 
& Golosheikin, 2002,2003). So several studies point out that increase 
in the power of theta frequency band marks the state specific to 
m editation rather than increase in alpha pow er (A ftanas & 
Golosheikin, 2003, Anand, 1961, Fenwick et al. 1977).
Besides changes in the alpha and theta frequency bands, 
alterations in the higher amplitude gamma frequency bands have also 
been observed due to long-term practice of meditation. Long-term 
Buddhist practitioners were found to induce high amplitude gamma 
band oscillations and phase synchrony that differed from the controls 
over fronto-parietal regions during meditative and post-meditative
Meditation: Brain Activity and Cognitive Changes
165
periods (Lutz et. al., 2004). The EEG gamma band source localizations 
have also been found to be different meditation types i.e. whether 
focusing on verbalization or visualization (Lehmann et al., 2001) 
that is consistent with our present knowledge about the neural 
circuitries. The long distance synchrony is thought to reflect large 
scale neural co-ordination (Varela et al., 2001) and can occur when 
two neural populations recorded by two distant electrodes oscillate 
with a precise phase relationship that remains constant during a certain 
number of oscillation cycles. There was also a positive correlation 
found with the hours of practice of meditation (but not with the age) 
and EEG activity. Thus the baseline activity during resting state of 
brain may be altered by long-term meditative practice.
Assessment of EEG coherence refers to the squared cross- 
correlation between EEG powers from two scalp locations within a 
frequency band and indexes the functional co-variation of activity 
among different cortical areas. There is an increase in theta range 
coherence in the frontal region intra and inter-hemispherically during 
meditation (Travis et. al., 2002, Aftanas & Golosheikin, 2003). Higher 
levels of coherence are associated with functional coupling, functional 
co-ordination and information exchange between brain regions.
Given the spectral changes accompanying meditation, sleep 
and drowsiness states have also been compared with meditative states. 
Several EEG studies have reported sleep like stages with increased 
alpha and theta powers (Pagano et al., 1976). Subsequent studies 
have tried to differentiate states of drowsiness and sleep from 
meditation. While meditation produced continuous trains of theta 
activity at a constant frequency, drowsiness produced a mixture of 
alpha, low delta and theta frequencies. Theta waves were also found 
to persist in post-meditative period with eyes-open (Banquet, 1973). 
Several studies have hinted on meditation being the state that is 
suspended between wakefulness and sleep and EEG can distinguish 
between meditation, sleep and baseline conditions (Fenwick, 1987,
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Fenwick et al., 1977, Young & Taylor, 1998). Recent PET studies 
have also started elucidating neural substrates associated with 
meditative and hypnotic states (Kosslyn et al., 2000, Lou et al. 1999, 
M aquet et al., 1999, R ainville et al. 1999). Thus states of 
consciousness are being associated with different patterns of 
activations depending on the content of consciousness or the mode 
that leads to a specific state of consciousness.
Some of the advanced EEG studies like the low resolution 
tomography algorithm  (LORETA) of EEG signals selects the 
smoothest of all possible three-dimensional current distributions to 
localize scalp signals in a manner comparable to fMRI (Cahn & 
Polich, 2005). The results of LORETA studies have reported of EEG 
gamma activity that differed significantly between five different types 
of meditations. During volitionally self-initiated altered state of 
consciousness that were associated with different subjective 
meditational states, different brain neuronal population was found 
to be active. The brain areas predominantly involved during self­
induced meditation aimed at visualization (right posterior) and 
verbalization (left central) were agreed to have different functional 
neuroanatomy. The brain areas involved in self-induced meditational 
dissolution and reconstitution of experience of self activated at right 
fronto-temporal regions. This is suggestive of the fact that altered 
states of consciousness are associated with different patterns of brain 
activations depending on the content of consciousness, which the 
above mentioned studies continuously point out. It is evident from 
the above mentioned studies that there exist certain asymmetries in 
brain activations due to meditation. There is also problem gaining an 
accurate measure due to variable experimental conditions and 
differences in the types of meditation. Yet, a number of EEG studies 
on meditation propose that a fundamental part of the neural substrate 
for this particular state of consciousness is likely to involve a specific 
kind of brain activity irrespective of the extemporaneous effects.
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Neuroimaging Studies
A close analysis of a number of neuroimaging studies on meditation 
with different forms of meditation show significant increase in 
activations in the cingulated gyrus and the prefrontal cortices 
especially the dorsolateral (DLPFC) and orbitofrontal areas of the 
frontal cortex (Lazar et al., 2000, Lou et al., 1999, Newberg, 2001 & 
2003). The increased activity of the DLPFC may contribute to self­
regulation of brain functioning as it has been shown to contribute to 
self-regulating emotional reactions and also preparation for voluntary 
action. The orbital prefrontal cortex is said to have a role in the circuit 
for emotional processing and the cingulated cortex is more active 
while attaching m otivational significance while selecting the 
appropriate response. All the three areas are also involved in the 
network for selective attention (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003). A PET study 
with yoga meditators showed an overall increase in activities in 
bilateral hippocampus, parietal and occipital sensory and association 
areas across all phases of meditation along with a general decrease 
in orbitofrontal, dorsolateral prefrontal, anterior cingulate, temporal, 
inferior parietal and other limbic as well as brain stem areas (Lou et 
al., 1999 in Cahn & Polich, 2005). The symbolic representation of 
self and body sensations can be correlated with increased parietal 
activations; limbic system is involved in emotional processing and 
the brain stem regions in volitional motor acts. There are yet other 
neuroimaging studies that show increased activity in the neural 
structures such as the dorsolateral prefrontal, parietal, anterior 
cingulated, temporal lobe striatum, hippocampus, parahippocampus 
during Kundalini meditation (Lazar et. al., 2000) that are recruited 
in attention (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003).
Other imaging studies have been used to detect changes in the 
cerebral blood flow during different types of meditative practices, 
which can be associated with different neurophysiological correlates.
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A single photoemission computed tomography (SPECT) study with 
subject performing verbal meditation (Franciscan nuns) and subjects 
performing visual meditation (Tibetan Buddhists) was conducted. 
Compared to the baseline, mean verbal and visual meditation scans 
showed increased blood flow in the prefrontal (Newberg et al., 2001, 
2003). In the study with Tibetan Buddhists who reported “becoming 
one” with the visualized image, the baseline activation patterns 
revealed a difference in the thalamic laterality index in which 
meditators showed a significantly greater rightward dominance of 
thalamic regional cerebral blood flow relative to the control subjects. 
Meditation (when the meditators reported entering into deepest part 
of meditative session after one hour) compared to the baseline was 
related to increased activity in the cingulated gyrus, inferior and orbital 
frontal cortex, DLPFC, midbrain and thalamus. The midbrain activity 
can be correlated with alterations in the autonomic functions (Infante 
et al., 2001, Newberg & Iversen, 2003, Travis & Wallace, 1999, 
Wenger & Bagchi, 1961). In the study with verbal meditation 
compared to the baseline, scans during prayer revealed increased 
blood flow in the prefrontal cortex (7.1%), inferior parietal lobes 
(6.8%) and inferior frontal lobes (9.0%) along with a strong inverse 
correlation between the blood flow changes in the prefrontal cortex 
and in the ipsilateral superior parietal lobe was found. The de- 
afferentiation of the ipsilateral superior parietal lobule can help 
generate an altered sense of spatial awareness (d’Aquili & Newberg, 
1993 & 2000).
Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic 
imaging (fMRI) are beginning to refine the neuroelectric data by 
suggesting possible neural loci for meditation effects, although how 
and where such practice may alter the central nervous system have 
not well been characterized (Cahn & Polich, 2005). Comparisons of 
Kundalini with Vipassana show differences in fMRI activations across 
different areas (Lazar et al., 2003).
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In spite of variations in the meditation data from a number of 
neuroimaging studies there is clear indication of certain key areas 
that are common across these studies. The prefrontal, parietal and 
cingulated activity has been dominant in most of the studies. The 
human studies with stimulating cingulated cortex (for longer duration 
at a rate of sixty stimulations per second) shows occurrence of positive 
responses. These include, relief from anxiety and tension, feelings 
of well-being and relaxation. The parietal cortex functions in relating 
the self of our own physical body to the world outside it besides 
playing a key role in spatial attention especially processing in the 
outer visual fields. The prefrontal cortices especially the dorsolateral 
and the orbitofrontal areas functions as a part of the consortium. 
Normally, the orbitofrontal areas helps to control impulsive behavior 
that maybe socially  undesirable if carried to extrem es. The 
dorsolateral prefrontal regions have its major interconnections with 
the parietal lobes. On one side the parietal tends more to foster 
behaviors that respond to the pull of the outside world, the prefrontal 
counterpart distances us from the pull of the environment. The 
prefrontal has major contributions in nourishing out inner-directed, 
egocentric attitudes. The key element of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
areas has been found to be higher order executive functions that also 
include judgement, foresight and exercise of will (Austin, 1999). 
The roles that these brain areas have been found to play definitely 
have implications for our quest for understanding brain activity during 
meditation.
Other Physiological flndings related to Meditation
Studies have also tried to compare meditative states with other 
hypometabolic conditions such as sleep, hypnosis and the torpor of 
hibernation and it was found that there are several analogies that 
exist between the physiology of long-term meditators and the above 
mentioned conditions. The analogies reflect the idea of plasticity of
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consciousness that exists among these conditions. Studies have shown 
that there is a rapid decrease in the whole blood and red cell glycolytic 
rate in the advanced meditators, a process that is very similar to the 
glycolytic changes seen in lower organisms going into and coming 
out of hibernation (Young & Taylor, 1998). This is corroborated by 
studies of individual practitioners who have been meditating for 
decades and who have gained phenomenal control over typically 
involuntary bodily processes. The practitioners of Kundalini yoga 
meditation cause a reduction in the thoracic breathing rate and an 
increase in the abdominal breathing rate (Arambula et al., 2001). 
The practitioners of transcendental meditation also experienced lower 
breath rates during the practice (Travis, 2000). Other personality trait 
changes include lower anxiety and narcoticism due to meditation 
(Aftanas & Golosheikin, 2003). Tibetan Buddhist monks studied in 
their natural environment in a Himalayan monastery practicing G 
Tum-mo yoga have been shown to first enter into a state of quiet 
meditation after which they are able to generate such body heat that 
can dry wet sheets on their back in freezing weather. Yogis in deep 
bodily rest, lowering their body metabolism while meditating are 
able to remain in small underground pits under naturalistic conditions 
and in airtight boxes in laboratory conditions. Researches have also 
observed significant effect on body’s hormonal responses (Infante et 
al., 2001) and immune functions (Davidson et al. 2002) due to regular 
practice of meditation.
Cognitive Changes
There has also been a recent interest in identifying behavioral and 
cognitive changes immediately after meditation (short-term or 
transient changes) and long-term changes due to meditation (Carter 
et al., 2005). Two phenom ena that have been used to study 
consciousness include binocular rivalry and motion induced blindness 
(Bonneh et al., 2001). In a study with Tibetan meditators, a significant
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portion of meditators showed large increases in the durations of 
perceptual dominance after one-point meditation compared with 
compassion meditation as well as controls (Carter et al., 2005). In 
addition, the mean disappearance duration in the motion induced 
blindness task was significantly higher for meditators compared to 
control subjects. It has been reported that one very experienced 
meditator can voluntarily maintain motion induced blindness for as 
long as 723 seconds!
Effect of Sahaja Yoga meditation was observed in a study done 
on 3 groups of epileptic patients. The first group practiced meditation 
twice a day for 6 months; the second group practiced postural 
exercises mimicking the meditation for the same duration and the 
third group was the control group who did not receive any meditation 
instructions. Sahaja Yoga emphasizes on witnessing the thoughts that 
come to one’s mind without flowing deeper into it while sitting in a 
quiet well illuminated room. With gradual practice the participants 
reported to be into a state of “thoughtless awareness”. Auditory 
Evoked Potential (AEP) and Middle Latency Potential (MLR) were 
measured prior to meditation intervention, three months and six 
months later. No AEP effects were obtained but the meditation group 
demonstrated an increase in MLR Na-Pa amplitudes at six months 
interval. An improvement in Visual contrast sensitivity at all spatial 
frequencies provided evidence that Sahaja Yoga meditation made 
the individuals more responsive to specific stimuli. These findings 
indicate beneficial effects of meditation (Panjwani et al., 2000). 
Similar studies with Qi-gong meditation showed that ABR waves 
increased whereas MLR Na and Pa amplitudes decreased 50-73% 
during Qi-gong meditation relative to before and after conditions 
(Lou et al., 1990). It has also been shown that critical flicker fusion 
frequency increases by 11.1% and 14.9% with just 10 and 30 days of 
yoga training respectively (Vani, et al., 1997). Transcendental 
meditation practitioners when presented with auditory tones during 
resting meditation and baseline demonstrated reduced P I, N l, P2,
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N2 amplitudes, compared to the controls (Wandhofer et al. 1976). It 
was demonstrated in an oddball paradigm where the standard and 
the deviant tones were presented with a ratio of 1:15, that there was 
reduction in the N1 amplitudes when recorded at baseline rest, breath- 
focused awareness and mantra meditation (Corby et al. 1978). In 
conjunction with the N1 a positive potential was detected at a latency 
of approximately 250ms. This positivity is termed as P2-3 and is 
similar to P200. P2-3 amplitudes were decreased for infrequent tones 
whereas increased for frequent ones, reasons for which are unknown. 
Thus the changes in these waveforms of the meditation practitioners 
when compared to the controls show alterations in the kind of 
discriminative processing that occurs in the brain due to the practice 
of meditation. The data is also suggestive of altered perceptual 
changes in due to indulgence in the practice.
Long-term changes that reflect proactive preparatory processes 
along with effective allocation of perceptual, cognitive and attentional 
resources have been observed in long-term  practitioners of 
Transcendental meditation (Travis et al., 2002). EEG waveforms were 
recorded during two contingent negative variation (CNV) tasks. CNV 
is an event-related potential, which is observed between the 
appearance of a warning stimulus and an imperative stimulus that 
requires a response (Walter et al., 1964). A Simple CNV task is similar 
to a stop-signal kind of a task where one is required to press button 
to stop the running stimulus presentation. A Choice CNV task involves 
comparing pairs of stimuli, such as numbers that are presented serially. 
The appearance of lower CNV amplitudes during Choice CNV task 
and higher CNV amplitudes during the Simple CNV task in the group 
of participants that reported of frequently occurring transcendental 
experiences implies efficient cognitive processing. These subjects 
were analyzed by the method of unstructured interviews that revealed 
fundamentally different descriptions of their self-awareness. The 
individuals who described themselves in terms of concrete thoughts 
and actions (lower Consciousness Factor) showed less efficient
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cortical preparatory responses during CNV tasks. The individuals 
who described themselves in more abstract and self-referral terms 
(higher Consciousness factor) showed better cortical responses during 
the task (Travis et al., 2004). These results imply that experienced 
meditators waited for the second stimuli more efficiently. The findings 
are indicative of neurocognitive changes produced by the long-term 
practice of meditation.
Concluding Remarks
The problem  o f defin ing consciousness and explaining the 
relationship between physical and mental has been the oldest 
questions of Philosophy. We normally use words such as trance, 
illumination, enlightenment, samadhi, hypnosis, dream and ecstasy, 
but none of them have clearly been defined. It is also not clear how 
such experiential states can be studied especially in subjective context 
associated with a conscious sensation (qualia) termed as the hard 
problem (Chalmers, 1995). The study of consciousness can be 
fundamentally subdivided into two approaches -  the objective third 
person approach and the subjective first person approach. Between 
these two are sometimes added inter-subjective or second person 
approaches. At present, the cognitive scientists prefer the objective 
third person approach and are trying to probe the brain mechanisms 
involved in altered states of consciousness especially meditation using 
objective techniques. By and large, cognitive scientists and 
neuroscientists have made a number of working assumptions and 
have focussed on easy problems (Blackmore, 2004). This is a prudent 
approach for understanding and furthering our knowledge on 
consciousness
The cognitive neuroscientific studies reviewed so far in the 
paper ind icate  that m ed ita tiv e  experiences com prise  o f 
phenomenologically and neurophysiologically distinct states. The 
main inferences that can be drawn from the cognitive neuroscientific 
studies can be in terms of theta and alpha band activity which
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increases during the process of meditation and this may alter the 
neural processes and produce brain and behavioral changes. This 
increase in theta band activity is typically accompanied by overall 
slowing and alteration of coherence and gamma effects. While these 
similarities exist across many EEG and imaging studies, many 
differences have also been observed between the results from different 
findings which have to be accounted for and explained. Many factors 
could contribute to the observed variability (Cahn & Polich, 2005): 
(a) the word “meditation” differs in terms of the techniques, like 
Zen, Transcendental meditation, Vipassana meditation, etc. Specific 
practice may lead to different state and trait changes, (b) Even within 
a specific meditation tradition, practitioners differ in their degree of 
meditative practice. In addition their self-selection for participating 
in scientific studies like EEG, or neuroimaging studies could affect 
state and especially trait measurement outcomes—  for example it is 
not clear how constitutional variables such as affective valence, 
personality, and anxiety level affect these measures from empirical 
studies is unknown. (3) Neurophysiologic markers of meditative states 
could alter baseline EEG patterns, such that clear within-group 
meditation effects are obscured—e.g., overall large spectral power 
would mask pre- vs. post-meditation state changes. (4) It has been 
established that sleep patterns demonstrated by EEG change with 
age. However, it is not clear how EEG measures during meditation 
are affected by age. (5) Sometimes methodological difficulties limit 
the generalizability of early recordings and analysis, especially when 
external stimuli were used to elicit different alpha activity levels.
The method adopted for meditation makes differences in the 
patterns of brain activity especially in terms of the brain regions that 
get activated (Lazar et al. 2003, Lehmann et al 2001). One common 
feature about all the studies is that there are alterations in frontal 
activity which needs to be further studied. It has been proposed that 
a necessary prerequisite to the experience of a highly practiced skill 
is a state of transient hypofrontality that enables a temporary
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suppression of the analytical, meta-conscious and higher cognitive 
capabilities of the frontal lobe. The central idea is that the altered 
states of consciousness are due to transient prefrontal cortex hypo- 
activity. The underlying assumption is that the proposed hypofrontality 
is unifying feature of all altered states and the phenomenological 
uniqueness of each state is the result of differential viability of various 
frontal circuits (Dietrich 2002). The hypothesis is evidenced from 
various psychological and neuroscientific studies of meditation, 
dreaming, endurance running, day-dreaming, hypnosis and various 
drug-induced states. Consciousness can be conceptualized as a 
hierarchically organized cognitive function which localizes the most 
sophisticated layer of consciousness in the zenithal higher order 
structure to be the prefrontal cortex. The hallmark of altered states 
of consciousness is the subtle modification of behavioural and 
cognitive functions that are typically ascribed to prefrontal cortex 
which needs to be tested empirically. Discrepancies between fMRI 
and EEG studies are also found. A study is required to identify specific 
neural substrates based on the putative general differences between 
meditators and non-meditators.
The process of meditation entails heightened awareness and 
focused attention while concentrating on a mantra, breathing events 
or any internal or external events. This activates the frontal attentional 
networks. The neuroimaging studies like PET, fMRI, SPECT etc. 
show converging evidence of the dorsolateral prefrontal activations. 
This data appears to contradict the transient hypofrontality hypothesis 
of altered states of consciousness but the EEG studies with meditation 
have consistently shown increased alpha and theta activations across 
the frontal lobe. The alpha and theta waves show the state when the 
subjects are neither excited nor aroused state. Given that meditation 
increases attentional focus and awareness, one would expect increased 
beta activity across the frontal lobe which is detected when the subject 
is alert and attentive. Putting it precisely, if meditation is considered 
a method of attaining higher states of consciousness one would expect
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the neural structures responsible for higher cognitive functions to be 
more active. The presence of alpha waves in EEG studies with 
meditation is in severe contrast to the neuroimaging studies that show 
increased neural activity in the prefrontal cortex. Physiologists have 
observed that individual neurons in the cerebral cortex are capable 
of increasing or decreasing their activity from a baseline condition 
to any other mental state (Raichle, 1998). An accepted view has been 
that the decreases in neural activity (like increases in frontal alpha 
rhythm in the case of meditation) reflect the activity of inhibitory 
intemeurons in the cerebral cortex. Since inhibitory processes itself 
would require energy (Ackerman et al. 1984, Batini et al. 1984, Biral 
et al. 1984), it would be difficult to distinguish inhibitory from 
excitatory neural activity based on blood flow and metabolic changes. 
This is because total increase in the inhibitory activity is just as likely 
to increase the blood flow as an increase in excitatory activity. Thus, 
the inhibition of the frontal areas as exemplified by the EEG studies 
can be accompanied by increases in oxygen consumption and blood 
flow in these areas during meditation. This also elucidates the 
significance of EEG studies and temporal changes in understanding 
the process of meditation.
The decreased frontal activity is also suggestive of reduced 
metabolic activity. Phenomenologically also, meditators report a state 
that is consistent with reduced frontal function such as sense of 
timelessness, denial of self, little sensitivity to emotional stimulation, 
sensation of unity and abstract thinking. The desynchronized activity 
of beta waves reflects differential activations of neurons, overlapping 
circuits or modules resulting in overall noisy signal. The neuronal 
synchrony that is reflected by alpha activity indicates that large 
number of neurons fire in a harmonious fashion. As a result, more 
amount of research is required to resolve the observed discrepancies 
among EEG and the neuroimaging studies that exist presently.
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Attempts have been made to explore different altered states 
of consciousness including meditation using four phenomenological 
dimensions, namely, activation, awareness span, self-awareness and 
sensory dynamics (Vaitl et. al., 2005). It has been pointed out some 
altered states like m editation and hypnosis pose problems in 
classifying altered states of consciousness in terms of these four 
dimensions. It is instructive to note that these four dimensions differ 
for different methods of meditation making it difficult to come up 
with similarities in terms of specific dimensions or variables. A future 
research which would require a collaborative effort to use a stronger 
methodology and study the above mentioned dimensions to compare 
various types of meditation can help point out the neurocognitive 
substrates that mark meditational state of consciousness. Moreover, 
inferences drawn from our present understanding of the meditation 
can help us identify what one needs to look for in these studies. 
Further longitudinal studies which are scarce at the moment, will 
add to out knowledge about the process of meditation.
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Introduction
People are poor in detecting change, even if the change is large and 
observers are expecting the change. This inability to detect change is 
termed Change Blindness (CB). Whenever a change occurs there is 
a motion transient associated with the change. Since in natural 
conditions change is always associated with this motion transient 
due to change, observers believe that they will be able to detect any 
change occurring in their near surroundings. CB occurs when this 
motion due to change is not perceived by the observer. To study this 
phenomenon, CB is induced in experimental conditions by masking 
the motion due to change.
In contrast to this difficulty, some studies from scene 
perception have argued for existence of detailed representations based 
on good performances. Conceptual short-term memory was proposed 
by Potter (1993) who described it as consisting of fleeting conceptual 
representations that are generated early in perceptual processing and 
can be regarded as conceptually structured as very short-term memory 
(VSTM), tightly linked to long term memory (LTM). Potter argued 
that pictures could be identified in very brief period of time (100m 
sec) maintained in conceptual short-term store for few hundred 
milliseconds while it gets consolidated in memory. Although this 
representation is not susceptible to masking, conceptual masking can 
disrupt its consolidation by new visual information.
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Studies with CB iiave been arguing against this view of detailed 
representations of visual scenes. Simons and Levin (1997) suggest 
that current-state buffer may not contain as detailed information as 
suggested. Grimes (1996), in his experiment, tracked observers’ eye 
movements while they viewed scenes for 10 seconds, in a change 
detection experiment. Scenes were altered during eye movements, 
and a single object was changed either in size, color or location or 
they could disappear. Observers were surprisingly blind to changes 
and detection accuracy was only 33%. In a study by O’Regan, Rensink 
and Clark (1996), they tried to find whether scene changes producing 
transients were likely to be detected, and whether unrelated transients 
occurring simultaneously will affect detection. Their original and 
modified scenes appeared alternately every 6.2 seconds. In ‘mud 
splash’ condition, 6 small ovals or squares were spattered on the 
pictures and did not obscure the change in scenes. Changes were 
made in color, position or presence of objects. Changes without mud 
splashes were detected immediately but with mud splashes, several 
transitions were needed. Also, changes to objects of central interest 
were detected faster than changes to objects of marginal interest.
Mack & Rock (1998) proposed the concept of “Inattentional 
blindness” to explain failure of change detection. Their hypothesis 
is that we do not consciously perceive objects to which we have not 
attended. In their experiment, observers were briefly presented a cross, 
whose vertical and horizontal component differed slightly in length. 
Observers were asked to judge whether the vertical or horizontal 
component of it is longer. In one of the trials an irrelevant stimulus 
was flashed in one of the quadrants formed by the cross. After the 
trial, observers were asked if they saw anything out of ordinary. 
Observers failed to report the irrelevant stimulus when they were not 
aware that such stimulus might appear, however normally irrelevant 
stimulus was easily visible. Mack & Rock (1998) argued that in the 
absence of attention, the irrelevant stimuli never rose to the level of 
conscious perception.
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The inattentional blindness argument is used to explain failure 
of change detection in Grime’s (1996) experiment. Inattentional 
blindness argues that the changes are not seen because the changed 
object was not attended and thus not consciously perceived. However, 
inattentional blindness fails to explain convincingly results of Simons 
and Levin (1997) or Rensink et al (1996) experiments in which stimuli 
is presented for very long time. In their experiments observer surely 
attended to the object and yet not detected changes to them.
Observers fail in tasks which involves making decisions 
utilizing information from representation. Sperling (1960) in his 
experiment asked the observer to report all letters which were briefly 
flashed in a matrix of four columns and three rows. The observers 
were 25 -30% accurate. However, when they were asked to recall 
from a single row which was cued after the stimulus offset, their 
perform ance improved. In Sperling’s experim ent participants 
responded after the stimulus has been removed but information about 
the stimulus was still available in iconic memory. In experiments by 
Mack & Rock observers where asked to report if they saw anything 
unusual after the trial. In experiments by Simons and Levin observer 
had to compare the current speaker with the previous one. In all 
these experiments, unattended stimuli cannot be accurately reported 
after the stimulus offset. Wolfe (1999) proposed two possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. First, as suggested by Inattentional 
blindness, stimulus may not be seen or if they have been seen they 
are not remembered, i.e. Inattentional Amnesia. The Inattentional 
amnesia hypothesis proposes that we perceive information (visual 
stuff) at all the locations of visual field under normal circumstances. 
At the current attended location, interaction with other memory 
processes may occur, resulting in object recognition and transfer into 
memory. Visual representations may be different while they are 
attended. The cun'ent conscious visual representation is composed 
of “visual stu ff’ and effect of attention. The visual representation is 
not remembered, it exists only in present tense. When visual stimulus
Farah Naai & Narayanan Srinivasan
186
is removed, its representation is lost. When attention is allocated to 
new object trace of previously attended object is lost. According to 
this hypothesis, if “visual s tu ff’ is unattended, it will be seen but 
instantly forgotten.
Explanations for Change Blindness
Different views have been proposed to explain the cause for CB. In 
the absence of motion transients, change can be successfully detected 
if the object to be changed is represented in a detailed fashion and 
observer is able to compare the old information with the new 
information. Since CB is very common phenomena, it leads to the 
interpretation that the nature of visual representation might not be 
very detailed or the problem is at the level of encoding and retrieval. 
Some of the possible explanations of CB (Simons, 2000) are
]. Overwriting - Overwriting models propose that CB is 
due to the overwriting of old information by the blank 
or new inform ation. When the representation of 
prev ious stim ulus is overw ritten , only abstract 
information about the previous stimulus is retained. 
Successful change detection can occur only if the 
information about changed object is the information 
that is retained as abstract information in VSTM.
2. First Im pre^ions -  This model argues that CB arises 
when the original scene is encoded successfully but 
the changed scene is not stored. The visual system 
actively updates information and tries to find the 
meaning of the stimulus. Small changes to scenes fail 
to be represented if the meaning of the stimulus is not 
affected by the change.
3. Nothing is stored- This model is based on the view that 
nothing is stored and the world itself acts as a memory 
store. Only the information that is abstracted from the
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stimulus is retained and successful change detection 
occurs if the information about the object to be changed 
is stored as abstracted information.
4. Everything is stored but nothing is compared- This 
model proposes that representation of both original and 
modified stimulus is stored but CB occurs because 
people do not realize that there is difference in the 
information in the two representations. Comparison 
occurs only when there is change in the semantic 
content of the stimulus.
5. Feature combination- This model is argues that CB 
occurs because the representation of pre-change and 
post-change stimulus is not kept separate but integrated 
together. Some information is retained from first 
stimulus, when second stimulus is presented features 
of earlier representations are combined with features 
of new representations. Change is detected successfully 
when these two representations have information which 
when integrated leads to semantic inconsistency.
However, evidence has been found which suggest that CB 
might arise due to absence of conscious representation of change; it 
is possible that implicit representation of change is there even if 
observer is not aware of it. All these explanations fit partially with 
the results of CB studies. Systematic study of all possibilities has not 
been done, and hence conclusion in the favor of only one of the 
explanations is not possible at the present time.
Is Attention Necessary for Change Detection?
Studies on CB make a strong claim that attention is necessary to 
perceive change. Change cannot be detected unless the motion due 
to change attracts attention to the location of change. In experimental
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conditions, when tiiis motion due to change is masked, change is 
detected only when the object to be changed is in focus of attention. 
Rensink et al (1997) argued that attention is required to perceive 
change and in the absence of motion signals it is guided on the basis 
of level of interest. It was proposed that it is possible that allocation 
of attention causes the relevant information to form object files or let 
them enter into a durable store so that comparisons can be made 
later. It was found in their experiment that change blindness was 
reduced for items that were considered “interesting” or were cued.
Irwin (1996) proposed an Object-file theory o f  transsaccadic 
memory, which emphasizes role of attention as feature binder in 
representations. This theory explains perception of objects using four 
levels representation: Feature maps, a master map of locations, 
temporary object representations called object files and an abstract 
long-term recognition network. According to this theory, when a scene 
is presented, features in the scenes are represented in feature map 
that registers the sensory features like color and shape in the scene. 
Master map of location contains the spatial location information of 
each feature. Attention is required to combine separate feature of 
scene and to obtain precise location of features to produce an 
integrated object file. Limited number of object files (three- four) 
can be maintained across saccades because of short-term memory 
limitations. These object files activate information stored in long­
term information network so that long-term memory representations 
can also occur across saccades. According to Object-file theory of 
transsaccadic memory, we perceive changes that occurred in scene 
during saccades only when one of the few objects encoded in 
transsaccadic memory is changed. The stability is assumed by 
perceptual system if changes occur to objects that are not encoded in 
transsaccadic memory.
Rensink (2000) proposed Coherence theory which is similar 
to object-file theory in emphasizing role of attention in building
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coherent representations. The important aspects of coherence-theory 
are-
1. Prior to focused attention, early processing occurs 
which is low level, rapid and carried out in parallel 
across visual field. This early processing results in 
proto-objects that can be complex and describing 
several aspects of scene structure. However, they have 
limited spatial and temporal coherence and can be 
replaced easily by new information.
2. Focused attention selects these constantly generating 
proto-objects, which form a part of coherence field 
representing an individual object. These coherence 
fields are formed by feedback between proto-objects 
and mid-level nexus. Coherence so formed maintains 
continuity across brief interruptions (e.g. saccades).
3. Attention is released when this feedback loop is broken. 
Coherence of field is lost and representation of the 
object converts back to proto-objects.
According to this theory when scene is initially processed only 
its gist, layout and abstract identities are remembered.
Attention is Necessary but not Sufficient
While there is one view that strongly supports the claim that 
attention is necessary for explicit reporting of change, another view 
proposes that attention might not be the only critical factor in detecting 
change. Levin and Simons (1997) in their experiment showed that 
change detection was poor even when the changed object was 
attended. Forty observers were shown a movie clip in which a single 
actor was performing some actions. When actor was switched across 
the camera positions, observers failed to notice the change. When 
observers were warned about the change, performance was better. It
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was concluded that object features do not integrate automatically to 
form different views of the scene.
Results o f experim ent by Mack and Rock (1998) were 
interpreted by Braun (2001) as an argument to support that attention 
is not sufficient to detect change. The failure of change detection in 
their experiment was due to lack of expectation rather than attention. 
Rensink et al (1997) found in their study that changes to objects of 
central interest are easier to detect than changes to object of marginal 
interest. This faster detection of change to object of interest could be 
due to the fact that we are expecting change to significant objects of 
the stimulus. Simons et al (1998) found that people do not notice 
even when person to which they were talking is changed. This failure 
to detect change could be because of our expectation of stable world. 
We do not expect people to suddenly change into someone else. These 
studies on inattentional blindness and CB suggest that blindness is 
more from observer’s inability to anticipate the stimulus than from 
lack of attention. Thus, it can be concluded that attending to an object 
is necessary but not sufficient for change detection.
Knowledge and CB
CB is closely associated with the representations of stimuli and the 
information that is available from these representations. CB studies 
have been used to make inferences about the nature of representations 
and knowledge about the world provided by these representations. 
While studies on scene perception claim that though a single glimpse 
corresponding to an eye fixation is sufficient for comprehending the 
gist of the scene (Potter, 1993), and the detailed representation features 
of the scene are built in by discrete views of the parts of the scene. 
Experiments on iconic memory (Sperling, 1960) indicate that 
representation are fleeting and decay rapidly. CB studies give support 
to two different views about representations. First, representations 
are not detailed and only limited information can be stored and 
compared, the information that is not attended is overwritten by new
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information. Second, the representations are sufficiently detailed and 
can give information about change even when retrieval cues appear 
after change.
Support for the firs t view, w hich argues that visual 
representation if detailed cannot be coherent and if it is coherent, it 
cannot be highly detailed, comes from Rensink (1997). Rensink 
(2000) proposed that there is a possibility that instead of static all 
purpose representation a dynamic representation is used which is 
highly sensitive to observer’s expectations. He proposed the triadic 
architecture (2000), which has three independent systems, early 
processing, object system and setting system. Early processing is a 
low level system that generates highly detailed volatile structures 
continuously. Object system is a coherent object representation that 
is formed by limited capacity attentional system, it stabilizes the 
structures created by early processing. Setting system is a limited 
capacity non-attentional system that guides the attention. This system 
may be based on gist and layout of the items. In Triadic architecture, 
rapid and constant generation of representation of proto objects forms 
the basis of rapid determination of scene gist.
The evidence for second view comes from a study of 
Hollingworth and Henderson (2001). In their study change in objects 
were made during saccade to another object after the target was 
attended. The change was either in the form of type change (where 
object is replaced by another object of different basic level category) 
or token change (where object is replaced by another object of same 
basic level category). Participants were able to detect changes when 
the target was attended but was not within the focus of attention 
when the change occun'ed. Using forced choice method observers 
correctly identified change (type or token change) during a subsequent 
long-term memory task. These data suggest that visual memory for 
previously attended object in natural scenes is relatively detailed. 
Hollingworth (2003) explored whether encoding, retrieval and
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comparison failures are the major causes of change blindness. He 
argued that encoding failure occurs when changing object is not 
attended before the change. Either attention was not allocated to the 
target object or though some information is encoded, it is not sufficient 
to detect change because of the limitations of viewing time. Visual 
transience theories propose that representation of the object decays 
immediately after attention is withdrawn from them or new visual 
input overwrites the information in memory. In this experiment, the 
object either changed in orientation or token (object of one basic 
category is replaced by object of same category). They found that 
change detection was higher when target post-cue (cuing the object 
after change has occurred) limited the number of items to be retrieved 
and compared. Change detection was high even when target was not 
attended at the time of change and when verbal memory load 
minimized the possibility of verbal encoding. These results indicate 
that visual representations of attended objects accumulate in memory, 
as the eye and attention are oriented within the scene. It was also 
emphasized that change blindness arises at least in part due to retrieval 
and comparison failure.
Landman et al. (2003) also argued for large relative storage 
capacity. They proposed that representations are detailed (close to 
six to eight items can be held in memory, compared to four objects 
proposed by object file theory) and capacity to detect change is high. 
However, post-cues, that is, cuing after the change occurred, were 
ineffective, suggesting that the CB could be due to limitations of 
visual system to process information rather than failure to retrieve 
and compare information.
CB studies were also used to study effect of familiarity and 
knowledge in change detection. Earlier studies indicated that change 
detection in unfam iliar visual stimuli is mediated by sensory 
persistence and visual short-term memory. It is widely supposed that 
the information about fam iliar stimuli is encoded rapidly and
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automatically and comparable level of encoding is not available for 
unfamiliar stimuli. Pashler (1988) investigated the role of familiarity 
in visual change detection arguing that detection of change in familiar 
object might be purely based on visual codes or on identity 
information. In the experiment he displayed ten alphanumeric 
characters were displayed and after a brief offset were presented 
again at same locations with or without change in a single character. 
Participants did not show preservation of information except when 
offset duration was very small (50 ms). Detection of change appeared 
to depend upon limited capacity visual memory and knowledge about 
identities and location were not important for change detection. Visual 
system continuously selects the items to be selected and as a result 
large changes are not observed to the unattended item. Another study 
(Beck et al, 2004) investigated whether the knowledge about the 
probability of particular change to occur increased their chances of 
being detected. This study showed that participants were more likely 
to detect probable changes whether or not they processed scenes 
meaningfully. Changes that are likely to occur in real world are 
detected more frequently. However, observers are unaware that they 
detect probable changes more frequently.
Thus CB studies give information that representations have 
some information about the stimuli, these representations are volatile 
decaying as soon as attention is withdrawn from them, if there is 
over-load of information. When there is no immediate demand on 
attention, these representations are accumulated in memory to form 
a coherent representation of complete stimulus. Familiarity and 
knowledge about probability of an object to change affects how these 
objects are encoded, indicating involvement of LTM in encoding of 
information.
Change Blindness and Awareness
Usually CB studies involve explicit reporting mechanism to report 
change under the assumption that only those information that we are
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aware of will affect the behavioral response. Change is reported 
explicitly only when it is represented clearly. Attention is necessary 
for this coherent representation of visual stimuli as it binds the ‘object 
files’ together across saccades to form a detailed representation 
(Treisman, 1988). It is argued that without attention coherent 
representation cannot exist. Rensink (2000) in his ‘Coherence Theory’ 
emphasized the importance of attention in building a coherent 
representation. A ttention is not only im portant for coherent 
representations but also for awareness. Attention and awareness are 
usually associated with each other as attention determines the content 
of awareness. However, attention and awareness are not synonymous. 
Attention is responsible for coherent representation and modulation 
of awareness but it is not sufficient for detection of change (Thornton 
and Femandez-Duque 2002). Representation of change can be built 
without attention, which can be later affected by attention.
Classic work with human amnesic patients and patients with 
blindsight show that encoding and retrieval can occur even in the 
absence of explicit awareness. Weiskrantz (1991) discussed various 
studies with amnesic and blindsight patients, giving support to claim 
that behaviour is affected by unconscious information. The patients 
with anterograde amnesia, who cannot remember new events, show 
learning for motor and other procedural memory tasks. They are good 
in learning tasks which involve procedural memory because it does 
not require them to be explicitly aware. Patients with blindsight lose 
awareness of certain parts of their visual field but retain ability to 
correctly guess the stimulus property of the object in the region they 
are unaware of as visual connection of that region is not disconnected. 
Humans as well as monkeys with blindsight when forced to make a 
decision about information in blind region, they perform above chance 
level. These results indicate that although information is available, it 
does not reach conscious awareness and yet it can affect behaviour. 
Femandez-Duque and Thornton (2000) have argued for the existence 
of sensitivity to change in the absence of awareness and this sensitivity
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does not rely on redeployment of attention. In their experiment, a 
distracter appeared at the location opposite to change. When observer 
was uncertain about change they were asked to guess the location of 
change. It was found that even in the absence of awareness the 
performance was above chance in two alternative forced choice 
localization tasks. They proposed a non-attentional representational 
system capable of registering change in the absence of awareness. 
This representational system is outside the reach of attention.
While people can use information of which, they claim they 
were unaware, people are remarkably wrong in estimating their ability 
to detect change. Levin et al (2000) found their experiment that people 
over estimated their capability to detect change. They called this 
m etacognitive error as “Change Blindness B lindness” . They 
explained this error as result of bias, that people think that since 
they have detected some changes in the past (which were probably 
accompanied by motion due to change), they will be able to detect 
changes in future. Another important explanation was that, such a 
change is implausible to occur in natural conditions. People do not 
expect objects to appear or disappear suddenly as we rely strongly 
on spatio-temporal coherence.
Rensink (2004) in his study tried to find if observer could 
consciously sense that a change is occurring without actually seeing 
it. In his experiment observers were presented with a flicker sequence 
in which a real world image alternated with its modified form. 
Observers were asked to press button first (tl) when they are aware 
of the change and (t2) if they can see the change. Catch trials were 
12.5%. Results indicate “considerable fraction of observers can have 
abstract mental experience without sensory experience”. Rensink 
(2004) proposed that mindsight may allow exploration of processes 
that were not possible using conventional techniques. Mindsight may 
correspond to ‘sixth sense’ that is believed to warn us of dangerous 
situation. However, this conclusion about mindsight was strongly
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criticized by Simon et al (2005), who got similar results in his 
experiment but explained it in terms of observer being more cautious 
in reporting change and holding on to the decision unless they are 
sure of change.
Thus CB studies help in make a very important distinction 
between role of conscious and unconscious information. Detection 
of change does not depend on conscious perception of change as 
information we are not aware of also help in detecting change. While 
conscious perception is necessary for explicit reporting of change, 
information we are unaware of show their effect by indirect means.
Conclusion
CB studies have been used successfully to probe involvement of 
attention, knowledge and awareness when involved in a task like 
change detection. While it was claimed that attention is necessary 
for detection of change, it was also emphasized that attention plays 
an im portant role in binding features of object in coherent 
representation. This representation is consolidated if not distracted 
by task demanding attention. This representation is influenced by 
long term memory of objects and events as objects that are familiar 
or are known to be important are processed in detail while rest of 
information are represented as a gist. Though we rely on awareness 
to make critical judgments, we are not really aware of our capacities, 
resulting in wrong estimation of our abilities (CBB).Awareness of 
the information arise when attention is allocated to it, however, 
awareness is not necessary for any information to effect behaviour. 
Unaware information are also available and affect behaviour, however 
to find proof of such information indirect methods like forced choice 
are required. Claims have been made about the possibility of existence 
of mindsight which enables to sense information before actually being 
aware of it.
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Introduction
The one neglected, or rather taken for granted, characteristic of human 
behavior is the role of action in cognition and consciousness. Recent 
evidence from cognitive science shows that action plays an epistemic 
(i.e. knowledge) role in some cognitive tasks (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; 
W exleretal, 1998;Wexler& van Boxtel, 2005). In this view, actions 
provide knowledge. Extending this possibility, we ask the question: 
What role could action play in consciousness? Would it be possible 
to establish action as a link between knowledge o f  the world and 
consciousness?
The paper is organized into three sections. The first section 
presents the basic frameworks used to discuss the relationships 
between perception and action. Milner and Goodale’s work on the 
“what” and the "how" system as well as Alva Noe’s position on 
perceptual experience and action are discussed. The next section 
discusses the role actions play in acquiring knowledge. We consider 
actions in general, and then the role of epistemic actions in cognition. 
Finally we discuss the relationship between action and consciousness. 
We end with a call for adopting dynamic approaches to studying the 
relationships between action and perceptual experience.
Action and Perception
Traditionally, actions are viewed as a response to stimulus from the
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external world. However, the response is not considered to be direct. 
The stimulation from the world is considered to pass through a 
perception and a cognition phase before an appropriate action is taken. 
Perception creates representations that get passed onto cognition. 
The agent (modules that are involved in higher cognitive processes 
like decision-making) then calculates the best course of action based 
on goals and this is achieved by manipulating representations and 
this is achieved through mental processes (computations). After these 
manipulations, a decision is taken about the course of action and 
appropriate commands are sent to the action system. The action 
system then triggers behavior. This is a standard information 
(computational) processing view. According to this standard view, 
action would be an output of a cognitive process (see Figure la). 
Hurley (1998) calls this the classical sandwich view of perception 
and action.
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F i g u r e  1 :  ( a )  C l a s s i c a l  v i e w  ( b )  D y n a m i c a l  v i e w
In contrast to this view stands the dynamical/interactionist 
view. Here all the components of mind and behavior are coupled 
strongly. The components are action, perception, cognition and world. 
Perception, action and cognition form a coupled loop with interactions
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between them (see Figure lb). The loops provide cognition with 
messy, partial information. According to dynamical approach, there 
is no need of detailed internal representation. The world would be 
its own best model. Historically many psychologists and philosophers 
have emphasized the interdependence between action and perception. 
For example, Gibson (1979) in his ecological approach to perception 
has argued for the important role of action in perceiving optical 
information. Optic flow patterns generated when the observer moves 
actively or passively in an environment is correlated with information 
regarding various aspects of objects. This information is not available 
when the observer is stationary. Here, the action (motion of the 
observer) is intertwined with optical information about objects 
(perceptual knowledge) arguing for the active nature of perception.
There are various ways in which the relationship between 
action and perception is characterized based on empirical evidence 
from behavioural and neuropsychological studies. In vision, models 
have been proposed based on the active nature of perception (Ballard 
et al., 1997). In the domain of speech, Liberman and his colleagues 
have proposed the motor theory of perception (Liberman & Whalen, 
2000). A theory of action, common coding theory, has been proposed 
in which actions are coded based on the effects they have on 
perception (Hommel et al., 2002). Recent neurophysiological 
evidence on “mirror” neurons (Gallese et al., 1996) also supports 
models that propose a closer link between perception and action.
One influential view on the systems governing action and 
perception and the way these functions are organized comes from 
the work of Milner and Goodale (1998). Milner and Goodale (1998) 
have found that there are two major pathways in the visual system, 
ventral stream and dorsal stream. The ventral stream forms the 
percept-cognition pathway independent of visuomotor pathway, 
dorsal stream. The former is for constructing representations and 
manipulations of it, whereas the latter is for direct vision-action
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Stream . One set o f ev idence for their view  com es from  
neuropsychological studies of patients with specific cognitive 
disorders. In support of the two system view, Milner and Goodale 
(1998) discuss a patient named D.F. who developed visual form 
agnosia, a disorder where the patient loses the percept of the object. 
The damage was seen in ventrolateral region of occipital lobe (ventral 
stream). Interestingly, the person is able to perfectly grasp objects 
which he says he does not see. The motor movements are perfectly 
aligned and oriented towards the objects. This dissociation, Milner 
and Goodale (1992) propose, is because of separate neural pathways 
for transform ing incoming visual inform ation for action and 
perception. Though you don’t have perceptual knowledge of the 
object, you are able to act upon it. This they say is possible because 
the spatial/motion information from the primary visual pathway goes 
to action module directly without being mediated by visual object 
representations. This visuomotor pathway (dorsal stream) is what 
they call the ""how" system. Based on an evolutionary point of view, 
they propose that vision was developed to guide movements and 
later evolved to become an independent representational system, 
where you have a percept of the object. The transformation from 
visual information to direct output -  action, through visuomotor 
modules, are not available to our consciousness as the output of 
cognitive processes are available to us as a percept.
An important aspect to consider actions is the ways in which 
they are characterized. Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes a distinction in 
actions by talking of intentional motor actions and non-intentional 
reflex action which constitute different forms of actions. An example 
of the two forms of action would be ‘pointing’ and ‘grasping’. For 
him ‘pointing’ to an object differs from ‘grasping’ an object. This 
distinction is made clear by considering a patient, Schneider, who 
was unable to perform any abstract irrelevant actions like moving 
arms and or legs, or opening and closing fingers, with eyes closed. 
However he was able to do routine actions like taking handkerchief
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from pocket and blowing his nose and lighting a lamp using match 
stick with eyes closed and with precision. However, he was unable 
to describe abstract actions like the position of his body or head and 
also to point to a body part. On contrary that was not the case with 
concrete actions. For example, he reacted accurately and moves his 
hand to the point on his body where a mosquito was sitting. Given 
this case as an example Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between 
‘pointing’ and ‘grasping’ and call traditional cognitive scientists to 
consider the implications of different forms of action while studying 
actions. One possible mapping is to link ‘pointing’ to what-system 
and ‘grasping’ to how-system. Given these different views on the 
relationship between perception and action it is important explore 
how actions in acquiring knowledge.
Knowledge and Actions
Goodale and Humphrey (1998) talk of two forms of knowledge of 
objects in the world. When we see an apple, we recognize it as an 
apple. This recognition happens by accessing our perceptual 
representation from long-term memory. The percept formed now with 
the given input is tallied with the representation of the object we 
have and then the final decision is taken about the identity of the 
object. This is perceptual plus cognitive process, by which 
identification happens. In contrast, the knowledge of the object also 
includes its relation in the world with other objects spatially and 
temporally. This knowledge, they argue, is also obtained from the 
perceptual-cognitive system. Their claim is that to obtain objects 
spatial and temporal knowledge your direct perception through 
visuomotor modules is not necessary. Because, your knowledge about 
them is never an accurate metrical knowledge and it is sufficient for 
you to have relational knowledge of them to navigate through the 
world or to act upon it. But it should be reminded here, in D.F.’s 
case, though you don’t have a perceptual representation formed when 
watching an object you are able to act upon it exactly as a normal
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person does. This shows that you have knowledge about the object, 
maybe only visuomotor, but you don’t have perceptual knowledge. 
It should be mentioned here that D.F. only lacks in perceptual 
knowledge. Neither the knowledge of the object in relation to the 
world (both spatially and temporally), nor perceptual awareness is 
lacking. You can see actions or the motor knowledge is always 
coupled with knowledge of the object. Thus, in normal situation, it 
is the interaction between the proposed systems by Goodale et al., 
perceptual -ventral stream and visuomotor -  dorsal stream, which 
mediates our knowledge system. Goodale and Humphrey (1998) say, 
“Certainly there is evidence that, on the neuronal level, the two 
systems are interconnected, allowing for communications and co­
operation between them (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Milner and 
Goodale, 1995). Thus, although there is clearly a division of labor 
between the perception and action systems, this division reflects the 
complementary role the two systems play in the production of 
adaptive behaviour”. It seems, however that the role of actions is not 
ju st com plem entary but a necessary requisite for you to have 
knowledge at awareness level. In other words whenever you perform 
an action on an object, it assumes that you have to have knowledge 
of the object without which you cannot act.
Another perspective on relation among action, cognition and 
knowledge comes from situated cognition and imitation literature. 
Kirsh and Maglio (1994) showed that even in a fast-paced task 
environment like the Tetris video game, players use actions to lower 
computational load. Tetris involves maneuvering falling shapes 
(zoids) into specific arrangements on the screen. Players execute 
actions on the falling zoids, to expose information early, to prime 
themselves to recognize zoids faster, and to perform external checks 
and verifications to reduce the uncertainty of judgments. The point 
of taking such actions is “is not for the effect they have on the 
environment as much as for the effect they have on the agent” (Kirsh 
& Maglio, 1994).
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Such actions are termed 'epistemic actions', which are defined 
as “physical actions whose primary function is to improve cognition 
by; 1) reducing the memory involved in mental computation;
2) reducing the number of steps involved in mental computation;
3) reducing the probability of error in mental computation” (Kirsh & 
Maglio, 1994).
The primary computations involved in Tetris are mental 
rotation of the zoids and matching of zoids to available slots. 
Participants physically rotate the zoids to significantly lower the 
amount of mental rotation required to judge the ‘fit’ of a zoid to 
available slots. This involves an ongoing visual comparison between 
slots and the physical rotation. However, a visual comparison is not 
required for actions to aid in mental rotation; actions could contribute 
to cognition via proprioception (i.e. knowledge of movement). Wexler 
et al. (1998) show that unseen motor rotation in the Cooper-Shepard 
mental rotation task (Cooper & Shepard, 1973) leads to faster reaction 
times and fewer errors when the motor rotation is compatible with 
the mental rotation than when they are incompatible. They also report 
that in some cases motor rotation made complex mental rotations 
easier. Also, speeding (slowing) the motor rotation speeded (slowed) 
the mental rotation. Similar effects have been shown to exist in 
children (Frick, et al. 2005). Manipulating virtual objects have also 
been reported to improve subsequent mental rotation and recognition 
of such objects (Wexler & van Boxtel, 2005).
On a different vein from mental rotations, Kirsh (1995) reports 
higher accuracy in a coin-counting task when participants pointed at 
the stimulus, compared to a no-pointing condition. Gestures during 
cognitive tasks have been shown to lower cognitive load and promote 
learning (Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005). Humans and other 
animals exploit head and eye movements to better perceive depth, 
absolute distance, heading and 3D objects (Wexler & van Boxtel, 
2005). Bergen (2004) reports that processing time for sentences
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involving actions increases when participants perform incompatible 
actions in parallel.
Besides these, there are numerous other studies that show a 
possible link between actions and cognition, particularly a large body 
of imaging evidence shows the automatic activation of motor 
representations while observing actions (for reviews see Metzinger 
& Gallese, 2003; Svenson & Ziemke, 2004; Brass and Heyes, 2005, 
Gallese, 2005). It has also been shown that motor areas are activated 
more while participants observe human hands than robotic hands, 
and motor areas are not activated when humans watch actions not 
part of human repertoire (such as barking). Related studies show 
more motor activation for dancers while watching dance and pianists 
while watching piano playing. The emerging consensus in cognitive 
science is that action plays a crucial role in cognition. Given this 
crucial role of action in cognition, it is important to understand and 
analyze the relationship between action and consciousness.
Action and Consciousness
However the relation between action and consciousness is not the 
same. It does not go without saying that whenever you are acting on 
an object you are aware of your action being made on it. You might 
be aware of you acting on it, but you might not be aware of how you 
are acting on it. These two forms of awareness are different. For 
example, you might be aware that you are lifting your hand, but you 
might not be aware of how much you are lifting or how high you are 
lifting. This seems counterintuitive at first glance. This could be quite 
well explained if we look at the study done by Goodale and Murphy 
(1997). They presented participants with five different rectangular 
objects of the same overall size but different in dimensions. The 
objects were presented at different retinal eccentricities that varied 
from 5° to 10°. Participants were asked to categorize these objects 
into previously instructed categories. Their categorization varied 
increasingly as eccentricities increased. However, interestingly their
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aperture of grasp and width of the object were well tuned through 
out varying eccentricities. This shows that though they are conscious 
of the categories which they choose according to their perceptual 
judgments, they are not conscious of their action or motor judgments 
in grasping. There was another interesting finding in the same 
experiment. “Although, subjects reported that objects did not look 
as wide in the periphery as the objects in more parafoveal regions, 
the aperture of their grasp was actually larger for objects in the 
peripheral visual field (even though the grasp continued to be well- 
calibrated with respect to the object’s dimensions).
This mismatch between verbal reports and visuomotor control 
not only emphasize different parts in visual system for action and 
perception, but also explains the mismatch between knowledge 
available to consciousness and actions made though you are not 
conscious of it. This clearly shows that, it is not necessary that 
whenever you act, you are always conscious of it. There are quite a 
few results on this sort of dissociation  betw een action and 
consciousness. In an experiment to test dissociation between vision 
and action, (Aghoti et. al., 1995) used visual illusions. In visual 
illusions you are visually aware of a stimulus and its properties which 
actually do not correspond to the physical measurements of that 
object. In visual illusions you have access to only to your perceptual 
knowledge. You do not have access to your m otor or action 
knowledge. They used a three dimensional version (discs instead of 
circles) of Ebbinghaus Illusion (El). Ebbinghaus illusion is one where 
a circle (tai'get circle) surrounded by bigger circles seems to be smaller 
than when the same circle is surrounded by smaller circles. Aglioti 
et al.,(1995) presented the three dimensional version of El in one set 
of trails where the target circle appeared different though they were 
identical physically and in another set of trials they physically 
manipulated the size of the target circle (made bigger) so that they 
look identical perceptually. Subjects were asked to pick up the circle 
(or disc) which is there on right side if circles appeared equal in size
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and if they appear different in size, pick the one on left. Subject’s 
grip aperture was tracked using opto-electronic recording.
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The results they obtained were surprising. On trials in which 
the two discs were perceived as being the same size, subjects opened 
their hand wider for the larger disc than they did for the smaller one. 
The calibration of grip size seemed to make no difference to the 
effects of the size-contrast illusion. This makes our point clearer. 
Though to your conscious knowledge which you have accessed 
through perceptual representation, the disc seems to be identical and 
make judgments based on that, you are in fact, opening your hand 
accurately corresponding to the physical size of the disc which you 
are not aware of it. But you do have access to your action or 
visuomotor knowledge though you are not aware of the output as 
you are aware of the perceptual output.
Thus it does not become necessary that when ever you act 
you are aware of your actions. But it is evident that for you to act it is 
necessary to have some implicit knowledge of the object. In other 
words whenever you act the knowledge tag of the object on which 
you act is always tagged to it, and comes along with it. In that sense.
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all actions lead to knowledge. All actions could be called, in a broader 
sense, epistemic actions.
Another perspective on the relationship between perceptual 
experience and action and the role of action in consciousness is the 
enactive approach to phenomenology, where the central idea is that 
our ability to perceive qualitative experience is because of our 
possession of sensorimotor knowledge. Alva Noe (2004) argues that 
when you see a tomato you also experience its back though you are 
provided with only the front side through your senses. He attributes 
the presence of back of the tomato in your experience, though absent 
to your peripheries, to the possession of your sensorimotor bodily 
skills. In his view, this knowledge is a practical knowledge rather 
being a know-what knowledge. On the enactive view, mere sensation, 
mere stimulation falls short of perceptual awareness. For perceptual 
experience, a necessary condition is to possess the sensorimotor 
knowledge and make use of it. “The basic claim of enactive approach 
is that the perceiver’s ability to perceive is constituted (in part) by 
sensorimotor knowledge (i.e. by the practical grasp of the way sensory 
stimulation varies as the perceiver moves” (Noe, 2004).
Here experiential content and perceptual content should be 
made clear. When you see an apple, as mentioned above, you 
experience the whole apple at once. The experiential content would 
be wholeness. The experience includes even the presence of the part 
absent to senses. This presence of the absence part is a construction. 
Alva Noe argues that to assume this construction as a process of 
inference, using a set of rules, will lead us nowhere. Because, there 
could be n number of different types of inferences and difference in 
inferential results, each of us should see and describe different apples. 
That is not the case. There is a perceptual constancy within me as 
well as between us.
Experiential content is a qualitative entity, whereas perceptual 
content is more definitive. To make this point clear, let us take the
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above example. When you see an apple the experiential content is 
the wholeness of the apple, along with its other properties, such as 
redness etc. These are in some sense the objects of perception. 
Whereas the knowledge content, or the perceptual content, is the 
shape of the apple - spherical, size of the apple, etc. These are more 
precise than the qualitative tag of experience.
A lva Noe considers the enactive approach as the more 
exaggerated version of visuomotor idea and claim that enactive 
approach does not endorse to the idea that perception is for acting or 
for guiding action. This may be an extreme position and it is necessary 
to see whether it can explain a significant number of perceptual 
phenomena. Let us consider a case documented by Jonathan Cole 
(1991), which was also mentioned by Alva Noe in his hook Action in 
Perception, a patient named Ian Waterman who had lost all sensation 
from the neck to down, except for the sensation of pain and 
temperature. He had lost, in particular, proprioception -  sense of 
position and kinesthesis or sense of movement. He possessed a 
normally functioning motor system. He, however, gained back his 
motor skills by learning to substitute vision for muscular sense. But 
if he was unable to view his body, he would jiist collapse. For him to 
make movements or to make sense of his muscles he had to use his 
vision. He had movements and his muscular sense was obtained 
through vision. His main body-representation that is proprioception, 
which is direct, is, not functioning. For him to stand or to make 
movements he has to make use of perceptual system to gain access 
to body representation. He being able to stand itself is an output 
action based on perceptual representation. For that he has to form a 
percept of his body independent of visuom otor knowledge or 
sensorimotor knowledge. It is not clear how Alva Noe’s position on 
actions explain the experience of this patient, but it is clear that 
perceptual and action systems interact with each other significantly 
for perceptual experience and behavior.
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As we have mentioned earlier that interaction between two 
interconnected systems (ventral-what system and dorsal-how system) 
allows for communication and cooperation between them (Goodale 
and Milner, 1992; Milner and Goodale, 1995). These interactions 
create interdependencies. The interdependency could be tracked back 
to evolution. Perception evolving to aid action. The interdependency 
might be of two-level as Hurley has proposed. It neither have to be 
actions arising out of (after) perception -  traditional view or 
perception is due to action component tagged to it -  Gibsonian view. 
These are as she says are one way dependency and instrumental 
dependency respectively (Hurley, 1998). It is the non-instrumental 
dependency of the perception system and action system that arouse 
consciousness. This non-instrumental dependency is a two-level 
interdependency. This non-instrumental dependency derives its idea 
from motor theory of perception and control systems theory of action 
as the control of perception. Further, if we concentrate more on action 
part of consciousness the internal model theory of motor control can 
explain how the generation of consciousness (for consciously 
detecting changes in visuomotor coupled actions) may occur (Frith 
et. al., 2000; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). This theory proposes that 
the signal for conscious detection occurs by integrating visual and 
motor information. “According to this theory, one predicts the sensory 
consequences of each motor command and compares the predicted 
and the actual consequences of the movement. An error signal 
generated from such a comparison might well underlie the conscious
detection of changes in visuomotor coupling..... ” (Knoblich et. al.,
2004). The signal is proportional to discrepancy between two systems 
and conscious detection in turn is proportional to error signal 
generated. However there is a threshold level above which if the 
signal crosses you are consciously aware of the changes. This explains 
why in Aglioti’s (Aglioti et. al., 1995) experiment people were not 
aware of their action being manipulated depending on the actual size 
of the object though they were only aware of the apparent size. The
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theory propose that the threshold for conscious detection is high than 
for the unconscious detection. In both cases it should be noted that 
we have still detected the changes i.e we have knowledge of the 
change. This was well tested in an experiment by Knoblich (Knoblich 
et al, 2004). In his experiment, participants performed a drawing 
task in which the relative velocity of actual movement and its visual 
consequence was varied. The unconscious compensatory movements 
and conscious detection rates were recorded and compared. There 
was an invariant relationship between the extent of the change and 
its detection (conscious). Thus he concluded that conscious detection 
of change (in visuomotor module) relies on a system that integrates 
visual and motor information. Another important finding was that 
figural discrepancies increased the detection rates suggesting that 
information in ‘what’ system is important for and facilitate conscious 
change detection.
Coming back to our question of how Consciousness arises 
from actions? We take the “Emergence theory” of consciousness. 
But the emergence is not just restricted, due to the interactions within 
the b rain , w hich is general trad itional view o f em ergence 
consciousness. We see emergence of consciousness as embodied in 
body and world as well. Consciousness emergence as a result of 
adaptations in action (behaviour) to accommodate the changes in 
the external world. Here we have to make distinction between 
intentional novel actions and reflexive actions. For example, Sieb 
(2004) makes a suitable distinction and argues that only intentional 
novel actions give rise to Consciousness. His argument also goes 
along the evolutionary lines and is consistent with Goodale’s argument 
that action system came first and then the visual system developed to 
aid or to complement the former. Hence the ability to generate novel 
action first evolved in the motor system. However he has suggested 
that this adaptive behavior is essential for survival success and is 
restricted to only one point of view of the system i.e self system. 
Sieb has proposed that this restriction forms our subjective view
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(experience) which cannot be viewed or experienced by others. 
Perception provides the animal with a way of looicing at information 
from the world and directly will produce reflexive actions which we 
see it as analogous to Goodale’s direct pathways -  visuomotor 
pathways or reflexive pathways. However, he has argued, to produce 
novel actions these representations are to be reorganized and 
rearranged. These rearrangement and reorganization are nonlinear 
and obeys complex system rules since brain is a system of interacting 
elements, producing complex behaviour internally. These complex 
reorganizations are in turn utilized to produce novel and complex 
action pattern for adaptation (Sieb, 2004). However the reorganization 
within the system is not explicit and is not available to consciousness. 
This explains the distinction made between implicit learning and 
explicit learning as well. Only when you are producing a novel action 
you are given conscious experience along with it.
Further this reorganization and rearrangement is not just limited 
to the brain. As in the case of epistemic actions and complementary 
actions, the reorganization is aimed at the world and occurs in the 
world. These reorganizations in turn produce adaptive behaviour. 
The novel action pattern as well the external reorganizing action 
pattern makes the self-system embodied in the external world. Thus, 
this indicates of mind and self being extended out in the world (Clark, 
1998). Consciousness becomes a natural property of this embodiment 
by extending itself out in the world as well due to nonlinear 
interactions between elements within brain. Thus, further scientific 
research on Consciousness should concentrate on mechanisms in 
beings that are responsible for novel action behavior (Sieb, 2004) 
and also the way world involves in reorganization of the mental 
process as well reorganization of the world by beings. Approaches 
based on dynamical systems theory should help in studying the 
relationship between action, cognition and consciousness.
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The Puzzle of Experiential 
Primacy and Consciousness
SANGEETHA MENON
Nationallnstitute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
The major epistemological worry faced by the empirical 
analyst, the philosopher and the psychologist is based on the central 
feature of ‘consciousness’ -  ‘experience’. This worry is commonly 
described as how to have a theoretical explanation for the mutual 
influence of neural events and subjective experiences and which one 
(neural events/subjective experience) is the defining characteristic 
o f consciousness. In terestingly , any attem pt to understand 
‘experience’, such as simple physical pain or much complex 
psychological pain, will have to cross the epistemological barriers 
of hierarchies and causal relationships, demanding a non-linear path. 
The classical description of consciousness as ‘unitary’ has even 
evolved, to accommodate the questions emerging in interdisciplinary 
dialogues, to present the term ‘self’ which was once considered 
metaphysical, but very much available for scientific discussion today. 
The epistemological transition, however implicit it is, is from a third- 
person perspective to a first-person perspective.
A distinctive trend in ‘consciousness’ discussions started with 
the theory of ‘easy problems and hard problem’ by David Chalmers 
(1995, Chalmers) which for the first time in the Western world made 
a semantic distinction between ‘being conscious’ and ‘what is 
responsible for consciousness’. Both experimental and cognitive 
science took into cognition the strong presence of an ‘explanatory 
gap’ (1987, Jackendoff). Though the approaches still remained/
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remains reductionistic or atleast dualistic in explanations the 
com plex ity  o f ‘co n sc io u sn ess’ and its un ique na tu re  in 
contradistinction with any other phenomenon in the lab was largely 
accepted. This acceptance inspired theories favouring complex 
cognitive and social functions, neural and subneural structures, 
system-environment interaction etc. inorder to fill the ‘explanatory 
gap’ and place ‘consciousness’ in its seat.
The views that are currently discussed and debated no more 
fall into a strict division of reductionistic and non-reductionistic 
approaches. This could be because of the recognition, in these 
approaches, of a distinct characteristic of ‘consciousness’, namely 
that it is not strictly linear, and also because of the need for bridging 
first-person and third-person worlds. One of the prominent view is 
that there is a distinction between subjective conscious experience 
and the biological mechanisms responsible for these, and their mutual 
non-reducibility. This view is based on the position that first-person 
data cannot be fully understood in terms of third-person data (2000, 
Chalmers) Biological explanations have also factored a hierarchy of 
functions inorder to explain consciousness. One such view holds 
that consciousness is a highly complex motor response occupying 
‘the uppermost echelon of a hierarchy having the primitive reflex at 
its base’ and that which ‘arises from the systems’ interactions with 
the environment’(2001,Cotterill).
Approaches to explain consciousness as epiphenomenal, but 
not in the classical sense of emerging from a physical composite, 
also take into account that the primary problem for explanation is 
more than a theoretical divide between the empirical and the 
subjective aspects of consciousness. Therefore, some of these 
approaches hold that consciousness ‘is formed in the dynamic 
in terre la tio n  o f se lf  and other, and therefo re  is inherently  
intersubjective’ (2001,Thompson) or that it is a system of interactions 
between the animal and its environment and that it is not located in
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the brain (1991,Varela et.al.). Explanations that address the 
psychological and social dimensions of consciousness hold that 
consciousness is ‘some pattern of activity in neurons’ (1997, 
Churchland) or that it is best understood in terms of varying degrees 
of ‘intentionality’ (1991, Dennett), and in terms of ‘memes’ which 
are the units of cultural evolution (1976, Dawkins; 1999, Blackmore).
Yet another school of thought that strongly upholds the need 
for finding neural correlates for the subjective components of 
consciousness is interested in the scientific exploration of meditation 
techniques. This school acknowledges the contribution of Eastern 
philosophy and wisdom traditions for a very specific role, which is, 
towards understanding and practicing meditational techniques for 
transcendental and extra-ordinary states of consciousness and 
experiences (1999, Shear).
It is interesting to see that much of these discussions consider 
consciousness as a phenomenon to be understood and that it is much 
within the scope for investigation and dialogue like any other 
phenomenon. There is a degree of equal balance between two basic 
explanations/approaches for consciousness such as (i) neural/ 
physical/social correlates (ii) extra-ordinary and meditational 
(transcendental) experiences mostly validated by neural or other third- 
person data.
The Puzzle of Experience
The questions we ask about consciousness have their bases on 
differuiit kinds of experience, whether it is dream, states of mind, 
memory, pain (physical and mental) etc. But the analysis for these 
questions is based on segregated information about behaviour or brain 
events and processes. Therefore, the answers to these questions are 
given in terms of neural correlates and neural information processing 
and models thereof. This method takes of the essential aspect of ‘being 
conscious’ or ‘consciousness’ which is the ‘person’. Questions asked 
as a result of first-person experience are given answers that are
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founded on third-person information. Essentially, there is a gap 
between the problematic of conscious experience and the attempts 
to address it, which I call as the ‘harder problem’ (Menon, 2001). 
The standards and criteria that we follow for objective understanding 
are most often the criteria for third-person information. This method 
helps us to build technologies and to understand abnormalities 
transcending individual existences. The first-person qualitative 
methods give us opportunities to be sensitive to the individual nature, 
psychology, expressions and uniqueness.
If both methods are important, how could the ‘harder problem’ 
be addressed? I do not have a ready answer for this question. But we 
could attem pt a m ethod that will not be m utually converting 
(inform ation to experience and experience to inform ation), 
reduction istic  or so lipsistic . M eaning, we should avoid the 
presumption of the larger picture of consciousness emerging out of 
solely third-person or first-person methods. The ‘harder problem’ is 
not a question, I think, to be answered completely, or a complete 
theory about consciousness. Rather, it is the ontological essence of 
‘consciousness’ that should always be addressed to whichever method 
we adopt, that will help us to see something more than the third- 
person information and the first-person experience.
The availability of ‘consciousness’ for our most intimate 
experiences and yet our inability to understand it completely in terms 
of third-person information makes us to think that ‘consciousness’ 
is a complex phenomenon, and that its complexity need to be 
addressed. We understand ‘complexity’ as an intrinsic characteristic 
of the ‘other’, the object of investigation, which we attempt to study. 
This notion of ours about ‘complexity’ is to be examined.
When we reduce different expressions and features of a 
phenomenon to one or two or to some quantity, we have to remember 
that it certainly is the only possible way of understanding something 
so multifaceted and simultaneous, and therefore could be called as a
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simple method. But such a method need not be the final and complete 
method, and not the complete third-person representation of the first- 
person phenomenon. Complexity could be the characteristic feature 
needed for the design for providing third-person representation. May 
be, what we distinguish as ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are not the intrinsic 
characteristics of the object of investigation, but the categories of 
thinking and understanding we have formed according to the third- 
person information supplied to us by the tools we have designed. 
Hence, the question ‘should design and tool be complex’ becomes 
important.
Also, therefore, the standard scientific criteria of replicability 
cannot be applied since the third-person representation cannot be a 
replica o f the com plete first-person phenom enon but only a 
representation of it from a particular framework that follows certain 
epistemological and empirical/theoretical parameters.
Experiential Primacy
According to Chalmersian theory of ‘easy problems and hard 
problem’ first-person data cannot be subjected to the standard method 
of reductive explanation. This theory also questions the basic fact of 
consciousness, that is, why is the performance of neural functions 
accompanied by subjective experience?
The ‘why’ question here is pertinent to understand the bases 
on which we find our primary, secondary and tertiary questions and 
methods for understanding ‘consciousness’. Why ‘why’? The ‘why’ 
question ( ‘why neural functions are accompanied by subjective 
experience’) assumes:
(i) consciousness as a separate ‘something’ borne or 
unusual/non-natural,




(iii) subjective experience as not tiie intrinsic nature of 
consciousness.
These assumptions tiiat are indirectly upheld by the camp of 
anti-reductionism stem from the basic conflict between ‘experience’ 
and ‘cognition’. The normative criteria for establishing ‘truth’ start 
from the objective reduction of whatever is posited. Here subjective 
experience falls out of normative standards for agreeing upon 
something as valid. So, the why-question as well as the assumptions 
arises from the conflict we encounter between epistemological 
necessity and experiential primacy. Both seem to be unavoidable 
and co-existent in human discourse.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to resolve a conflict if both 
the components of it are equally important. But, the recognition, of 
this unavoidable conflict itself, in our theories and models, will help 
us to widen the scope of investigation and prevent de-humanisation 
of the goals we seek for fulfilment. After all, through both third- 
person information and first-person experience what we ultimately 
seek are personal growth and health, co-existence and sharing, and a 
continuous exploration into the unknown and the unpredictable.
A prologue before we set forth the theorisation and definition 
of the problem will be helpful for a student of ‘consciousness’. This 
prologue will elucidate the primary division of a set of agenda based 
on direct first-person experience and the consensus we share on 
perceived facts. The primary division will be of the meaning and 
scope of ‘awareness of something’ and ‘awareness by itself’.
What exactly is ‘self awareness’? It is awareness of something. 
It is either the awareness of: (i) the world outside, such as other 
states of mind, objects, etc. (ii) the world inside, such as ‘my 
emotions’, ‘my perceptions’, ‘my body’, ‘my identity’etc. The ‘world 
inside’ cannot be understood without the intervention of self-reflection 
and self-participation. What is ‘awareness itself’? Awareness itself
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can be seen as (i) uniting discrete thoughts, and the two worlds (inside 
and outside), (ii) as meta-awareness of the two (inside and outside 
world) awareness-es, (iii) as pure I-ness.
Unless a clear distinction is made between these different 
categories of existence, for our thinking and analysis, we will end up 
searching the needle in the same haystack for centuries without 
realising that the problem is not just the subtleness of the subject of 
our inquiry but our own inability to design a comprehensive search. 
The design of the comprehensive search is important because the 
way we search for it is going to alter the presence of it in the invincible 
heap.
Indian Routes for Dialogues
‘Consciousness’ has become the umbrella term for debating many 
issues crossing disciplines yet connecting disciplines. This is 
interesting. Because, given the variety and differences in the themes 
and ideas for human discourse, to have a common factor in our 
dialogues seems to be difficult. The route and the possible result of 
this dialogue is to connect and joint various streams of thought 
whether, empirical or intuitive, experimental or theoretic, inorder to 
map and place consciousness. On a scale of meta-analysis, this is a 
linear and horizontal approach, essentially because our dialogues 
start from third-person working definitions we assume (however 
different they are) of ‘consciousness’. Nevertheless, contributions 
m ade by d ia logues that cou ld  be c lubbed  under the term  
‘consciousness’ is eventful, since they are an attempt to harmonise 
and integrate otherwise divergent human thinking.
The Eastern wisdom traditions, beginning from the Vedic 
system of thought, perceived of entities (physical/metaphysical) 
whose existence are different by being connected with the outside 
world of objects and the inside world of experiences. There are several 
verses in the Brahmanas that imply the quest for the source of
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knowledge and experience. Beginning from the origins to the classical 
schools and saints of Indian philosophy and wisdom traditions the 
focus is not to begin from the outside variety and unite the units by 
an emergent phenomenon, even if we take the most realist schools.
Epistemological analysis, in Indian thought, is subservient to 
experiential paradigms. Indian schools of thought, in general, have 
one common thread -  that is to relate to a larger, deeper and holistic 
concept/entity called ‘self’. Whether it is for affirmation or denial, 
Indian thought engages in rich analytic thinking to form a philosophy 
about ‘self’. Both analysis (structured and ‘leading-to-next’ kind of 
hierarchical thinking) and experience are used as epistemological 
tools in an integral m anner to form distinct but inter-related 
ontologies. Metaphors and imageries are used as epistemological 
tools for creating transcendence in thinking and thereby experiencing. 
The aim is not to arrive at structured and classified/listed knowledge 
of another object/phenomenon but understanding in relation to an 
abiding entity whether it be the self/no-self/matter.
Another interesting feature of Indian philosophical thinking 
is the importance given to the way of living or lifestyle subscribed 
to by the schools, no m atter how realistic or idealistic their 
metaphysical position is. The understanding of a particular school 
of thought will not be fulfilled by ‘understanding’ its epistemology 
or even world-view but by following a lifestyle which is prescribed. 
Experience is the core of understanding. This would primarily require 
the student’s mind to follow certain rules and discipline of forming 
integral and inter-related connections than individual and isolated 
relationships. This is a major difference when we compare with the 
dialogues in the West on ‘consciousness’.
The therapeutic value of analysis and self-oriented integration 
of understanding is given more importance than its cognitive value, 
in their philosophical thinking. The reference for the starting premises 
and concluding thoughts is the ‘person’ and his/her experience and
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the situation iie/she is in. Tine route taken is from the situation of the 
person (as ‘given’) to the reorientation and re-organisation of his/ 
her response based on transpersonal experiences. The most part of 
imagination and striving is for what is possible from what is given 
(Menon, 2003). Hence the style of discourse adopted in their 
presentations is more metaphorical and non-linear than hierarchical 
and localised.
The classical approach to spiritual experiences is to disengage 
from ‘ordinary’ experiences and engage in for ‘transcendental 
experiences’. The implication in such an approach is that there is a 
d iv ision  betw een , and a travel from , the ‘o rd in ary ’ to the 
‘transcendental’ experience. The major thesis which is missed is that 
spiritual experience is not another kind of experience in another world 
and relating to another set of objects forsaking and condemning the 
given ‘ordinary’ experienced world to be of a hierarchically lower 
order. Spiritual experience, according to Advaita, is reorienting and 
there by reconstructing any experience from the Self’s point of view. 
The ontological thesis, of Sankaracharya, upholds I-consciousness 
as ‘som ething-w hich-is-already-there’. Spiritual experience is 
reconstructing any experience from this ontology. ‘It is there across, 
above, below, full, existence, knowledge, bliss, non-dual, infinite, 
eternal and one’ (Atmabodha).
The difference between an ‘ordinary’ experience and a 
‘spiritual’ experience is that in the former case the experience is 
given meaning from the point of view of self and in the latter case it 
is from the point of view of Self. In both experiences there is an 
identity that relates to and generates meanings. In the first case the 
identity is caused and defined by the situation. In the latter case the 
identity defines the situation by responding to it from an integral 
point of view.
This thesis could be subjected to skepticism and criticized as 
ad hoc rationalization for not being soteriological. It is also one of
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the reasons why consciousness described by Acarya is often mistook 
as niskriya (inactive) in its literal sense. The notion of maya too has 
invited many misconceptions about it, the major one implying a 
passive homogeneity to pure consciousness. The main argument 
behind such misconceptions can be traced back to a monistic labelling 
of Advaita.
Current discussions on ‘consciousness’ mostly focus on either 
of the two problems: how simple physiological functions co-ordinate 
and work together as one single system; how and why a subjective 
orientation ensues. Will the focus on the ontology of Self and human 
experience will give a different picture about consciousness? In the 
first case the attempt is to build into ‘consciousness’ and in the second 
case the attempt is to build from ‘Self’. Categories of thinking needed 
for the two cases are different. One is for the allocation of new 
knowledge within a system, and the other is for transformation of 
knowledge a-systemically. Experience is the common concern and 
mystery for both the discussions, though it is not the beginning point 
for the first school of discussion. But can we give up the experiential 
primacy of consciousness totally or give secondary importance? 
Seems not to be so easy, and more importantly, less meaningful.
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Consciousness, Self and Metaphor
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Consciousness has been treated, for long, as an elusive 
phenomenon mainly because of its subjectivity making it less 
amenable to objective and empirical studies. Recently, it has become 
a major focus in the field of cognitive studies with the efforts from 
different fields such as neuro science and psychology to understand 
and explain the phenomenon of consciousness.
Even though a strict definition of consciousness is hard to 
make, it is generally considered to be an umbrella term covering 
subjectivity, awareness and sentience. A distinction is often made 
between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness.' The 
former refers to the experiential aspect considered independent of 
its effect on behaviour and the latter refers to that phenomenon by 
which information is made available for verbal report, inferential 
process and so on. The phenomenal consciousness is considered to 
be giving rise to the ‘what it is like’ aspect of consciousness and is 
called qualia. Explaining phenomenal consciousness is treated to be 
the hard problem of consciousness studies as the experiential aspect 
seems to be lying beyond the ken all objective descriptions. This 
goes to the extent of saying that “it is humanly impossible ever to 
understand how technicolor phenomenology can arise from grey 
soggy matter.” ̂
But there have been attempts to explain consciousness, 
including the phenomenal aspects, as a natural phenomenon. The
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Strategy involves treating consciousness as the result of evolution 
with definite functional advantages. Daniel C.Dennett’s Multiple 
Drafts Model(MDM) of consciousness is a comprehensive approach 
in this regard.
Multiple Drafts Model
With regard to consciousness, it is common to think of it as being 
located somew'here in the brain. Dennett calls this view Cartesian 
Materialism (CM) or Cartesian Theater.^ It holds that there is some 
place in the brain where arrival of information is equivalent to 
becoming conscious of it. There is an implication of a stage and an 
audience for whom the actions are performed. It is referred to as 
Cartesian because it is the result of clinging to the legacy of Descartes 
after discarding dualism and it is a form of dissimulated dualism. 
An example of the such a view is the statement of Crick and Koch 
that one of the functions of consciousness is to present the result of 
various underlying computations.''
The problem of Cartesian Materialism becomes apparent 
when we look at the ways in which our experience occur. It is well 
known that light travels faster than sound and, therefore, information 
about light should reach the brain much before that of sound comes. 
Yet, we can have a unitary experience of fireworks. What it implies 
is that our consciousness is not direct and immediate and the very 
questions of ‘where’ and ‘when’ of consciousness do not get exact 
answers. It is to be noted that this problem appears at microscopic 
intervals such as milliseconds at which brain processes take place.
Cartesian Materialism has got a logical problem as well. If 
there is a point in brain that can be regarded as the locus of 
consciousness, then what is it that makes that point conscious of? 
This leads to the problem of infinite regress. The better way to tackle 
this problem is to treat consciousness as a matter of degree and not 
as an all-or- nothing thing.
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MDM attempts to do away with the imagery of a locus of 
consciousness by treating the whole mental realm as a parallel track 
of processes. Let us have a look at the central claims of this models 
and why Dennett claims it to be the best way to explain several 
anomalies observed in relation with the phenomena of consciousness.^
The fundamental tenet of MDM is that all varieties of thought 
or mental activity are accomplished in the brain by parallel processes 
of both interpretation and elaboration of the information given by 
the sensory organs and these editorial processes occur over tiny 
fractions of a second. This much is, by and large, universally accepted. 
What makes MDM a radical thesis about consciousness is that it 
contends that all these feature detections or discriminations take 
places only once and there is no special place in brain where 
discriminated content again goes for a re- discrimination and appears 
in the stream of consciousness. Thus what gets discriminated in any 
part of the brain need not be necessarily a part of consciousness. The 
different content-discriminations yield different narratives and what 
appears in consciousness, according to Dennett, is the result of 
probing of those narratives. This denial of consciousness having a 
locus in brain is what makes MDM radical and intuitively less 
appealing as it also implies that there is no ‘when’ and ‘where’ 
regarding consciousness. But what lacks intuitive appeal may be 
scientifically valid. This is what the difference between ‘manifest 
image’ and ‘scientific image’, as drawn by Sellars, shows.^
In order to make clear what MDM amounts to, it is necessary 
to look into some case studies that Dennett discusses. All such cases 
involve rapid temporal sequences and show the limits of the powers 
of the brain and, presumably, shed light on the dark areas of the 
brain such as consciousness. The most interesting thing is that, these 
are the very same cases, based on which Karl Popper and John Eccless 
have argued for a dualist position.’
Consciousness, Self and Metaphor
231
Consider the case of phi phenomenon where apparent motion 
is created with the rapid succession of still pictures. Experiments 
show that if the two spots are of different colours, say, green and red, 
then the first spot will be seen as moving and then changes its colour 
from green to red in the middle of its illusory passage.* Here, the 
problem is how this gap is filled in, that is, how can there be a 
precognition of the red colour before that spot is perceived? For 
Popper and Eccless, this implies something supra physical, but for 
Dennett, these sorts of problems are due to our fundamental 
m isunderstanding of what constitutes consciousness and the 
subsequent conceptual errors.
In fact, there are several such cases with anomalies in the 
tem poral properties of consciousness. Apart from the dualist 
interpretation a la Popper and Eccless, there are other attempts to 
explain them. Goodman speaks of them as cases of “projection 
backwards in time” implying some twisting of normal cause-effect 
relationship.
But the explanation that D ennett gives is to look at 
consciousness through the MDM model and then all these paradoxes 
disappear.’ One important point to be kept in mind, while dealing 
with all such paradoxes, is that brain is at constant pressure to act 
and,therefore, time becomes a big constraint. When a lot of things 
happen, there has to be some simplification to be done so as to cope 
with the constraints of time and efficiency and this may be done at 
the expense of accuracy. What happens in the case of phi phenomenon 
is that the processing that there is a red spot and the processing that 
there is a movement are done at the same time and this amounts to 
the report that the spot has changed its colour from green to red. 
Hence it seems that there is an anomaly but this all due to the 
microscopic intervals of time involved and the enormous amount of 
data that the brain has to handle. There is no filling in the information, 
as has been suggested by many to explain the anomaly, as there is no 
re discrimination for consciousness to take place. It is the bedevelling
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notion that there is something inside that sees everything, that gives 
rise to the view that there has to be some sort of filling in the gaps. 
Once that is done away with, then it can be accepted that there are so 
many gaps in our consciousness with the presence of phenomena 
like change blindness. As Marvin Minsky puts it, “our sense of 
continuity comes from out marvelous insensitivity to most kinds of 
changes rather than from any genuine perceptiveness.”'®
Dennett contends that the brain makes use of an ingenious 
mechanism distinguishing features of representings from feature of 
represented. Such a distinction is implicit in the common distinction 
made between content and vehicle. This means the temporal 
properties of the vehicle need not be isomorphic to that of the content. 
This is usually made in the case of spatial properties. For instance, 
the top sentence in the description of a man need not be about his 
head. This is be applicable to temporal properties as well.
Given this, the brain can work with the information that A 
happened before B irrespective of whether information about A has 
reached first or not. The temporal properties of consciousness need 
not be as that of the objective sequence of happenings. In other words, 
brain can represent time by using a medium other than time itself. So 
the subjective order of temporal experience need not match the 
objective order of discrimination. This can be fully appreciated only 
if the additional point that the discrimination of any information does 
not imply its presence in consciousness is also taken note of.
What appears as conscious, according to Dennett, is the result 
of probing for subsequent report. As probing does not take place at 
all time, it is not continuous. This is indeed difficult to swallow as 
continuity is considered to be the hall mark of consciousness. But 
this can be appreciated that once we realize that in the scheme of 
MDM, there is not only no locus of consciousness but the very 
difference between the conscious and the unconscious is one of 
degree.
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The feeling of the unified stream of consciousness depends 
upon the time scale at which we view it. When we go to the 
microscopic time levels at which brain processes occur, there are 
several parallel streams of content-fixing events, each of which is 
done by a specialised subsystem in the brain. These different events 
can be taken to be forming different narratives out of which one 
cannot be considered as the canonical narrative. But when there is a 
‘probing’ of what is going on then there appears a stream of 
consciousness and which one will form part of it depends upon the 
nature and timing of the probe. In fact, we do this probing most of 
the time in the form of talking to oneself and we are not even aware 
that we do it. This results in the notion that there is a stream of ever 
present consciousness, but this is far from the case.
This constant self probing is inculcated in us mainly through 
language and culture. In fact, without language this would not have 
been possible at all. This makes clear that emergence of language 
and consciousness go in tandem. Cultural knowledge is transmitted 
through memes" and this transmission is done mainly through 
language. In fact, Dennett reaches the conclusion that human 
consciousness is to a very great degree a product not just of natural 
selection, but of cultural evolution as well and the human mind is 
itself an artifact created by memes.
This leads Dennett to formulate the following position, 
“Human Consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes(or more 
exactly, meme-effects in brains)that can best be understood as the 
operation of a ‘von Neumannesque’ virtual machine implemented in 
the parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed for any such 
activities.” *̂
The importance of language, according to Dennett, lies in 
helping in communication among different parts of the brain and as 
a vehicle of memetic transmission. Language constitutes the paradigm 
case of serial processing in brain, which is fundamentally a parallel
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machine. It is obvious that the capacity to do serial processing makes 
human brain to do things such as logic and mathematics which other 
species cannot. All this would not have been possible had it not been 
for the presence of language.
Thus language, consciousness and culture all are inextricably 
linked together in the Dennett’s scheme and there is a fundamental 
difference in the nature of consciousness from the rest of the brain 
processes. Anomalies are attributed to the properties of consciousness 
because the nature of consciousness is misunderstood and is treated 
as other brain processes.
The MDM account of consciousness cannot be treated to be 
comprehensive without dealing with the problem of qualia. ‘Qualia’ 
refers to qualities or feelings such as redness, bitterness considered 
independently of their effects on behavior. There has been a lot of 
debate concerning its ineffability arguing that the very presence of 
qualia gives rise to the feeling of ‘what it is like to be’ which cannot 
be explained through any third person stand point.
The strategy that Dennett adopts is to do away with the very 
notion of qualia treating it as simply the result of our muddled way 
of conceptualizing. So in true Wittgensteinian spirit, he tries to 
eliminate the confusion that bewitches us. Let us have a look at some 
of his thought experiments to drive home the point that there is nothing 
left to consciousness other than the reports or the very basis of the 
distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is dubious.
He enum erates four characteristics, considered to be , 
constitutive of qualia. They are: ineffable, intrinsic or non-relational 
private and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness. 
All these properties amount to making qualia something beyond the 
ken of any intentional or functional explanatory paradigm. The main 
argument is that you cannot know of it unless you have it. It is this 
first person authority that Dennett wants to demolish and he proceeds
Consciousness. Self and Metaphor
235
by arguing that all these qualities enumerated above are really not 
there.
His attack is based on several thought experiments or intuition 
pumps called the “neurological prank experiment”. Suppose the qualia 
of some one is inverted by a neurosurgen, that is, for him, grass 
appears blue and sky appears green. He will be unable to tell whether 
there is any change in the immediately apprehensible qualia as it is 
possible that either his qualia itself is inverter or his connection to 
past memories of qualia is inverted. But if qualia has got the properties 
of non-relationality, he should be able to tell what is actually the 
case.
The same point is made more clear in this case. Suppose X 
and Y used to like a particular brand of coffee. But one day both of 
them start disliking it. X defends the change by saying that the very 
taste of that brand has changed but Y says that the taste continues to 
be the same but he no longer likes it. Now there is no way one can 
say who is right as there is no fact of the matter in this case.
It is only in the scheme of Cartesian Theatre that qualia rules 
as there is some one for whom the intrinsic properties appear to. 
Once that is demolished, the rest follows suit. What it is like to drink 
a coffee is just a matter of how one reacts to the coffee and not the 
putative quale.
Thus qualia is nothing but the disposition to behave in certain 
ways. It has nothing private or ineffable in it.
Also there can be qualia only if there is a precise answer to 
the question concerning the where and when of consciousness. Thus, 
at most, these properties are disposition and they can be explained in 
functional terms. Thus he explains all that is there to phenomenal 
consciousness in terms of access consciousness.
Thus, to conclude, it may be stated that consciousness, within 
the framework of MDM, is only a train of thought and a sophisticated
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sensitivity towards the world coupled with the sense of a self. There 
is nothing ineffable, all-or-nothing property in it.
The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity
Having said this much about consciousness, the question concerning 
the nature of the self cannot be left unanswered.'^ In fact, our view 
of self and that of consciousness go in tandem. So in Cartesiam 
Materialism, the self can be treated as the real agent as it is accepted 
that there is a center where all mental processes go together. But 
M DM  dem olishes this saying that all that there is a huge 
pandemonium of parallel processes giving rise to different narratives, 
out of which some get attended to, thereby resulting in the feeling of 
consciousness.
Fixing the boundary between itself and the rest of the world is 
necessary for any organism lest the very survival should be at stake. 
This is the biological self. But at the level of human thought there is 
the notion of the self which considers itself to be the thinker and the 
doer of actions. The reality that can be attributed to this entity will 
depend upon one’s attitude towards the whole of folk psychological 
categories. Dennett is an instrumentalist in this regard and his views 
on self follows a similar line.
According to Dennett, self can be called the centre of narrative 
gravity. Centre of gravity of an object, in Newtonian physics, is the 
point to which all gravitational forces are calculated and it is basically 
fictional. But it plays a s ign ifican t role in pred ictions and 
explanations. For instance, when we tip a physical object, say a chair, 
we can predict more less accurately the moment at which it will start 
falling down. This is based on taking into account the center of 
gravity of that object. Similarly, the narratives that are formed with 
the activities of the brain require a center to organise interpretation 
and the notion of self is that center. Fictional characters are 
indeterminate and this indeterminacy goes in tandem with the
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instrumental approach that Dennett adopts towards the reality of folk 
psychological categories. He declares that to ask where is the self in 
the brain is to commit the category mistake. It is basically a narrative 
entity and, therefore, no independent, free floating status can ever be 
attributed to it and it is not in command of the resources of the mind.
Thus MDM gives a comprehensive account of consciousness. 
The fundamental principle is that there is no where and when to 
consciousness and then the rest of the things concerning qualia and 
the self follows suit. It champions a reconciliation between the two 
conflicting paradigms of behaviorism and cognitivism.
The Self as a Metaphor
The message that comes from MDM model of consciousness is that 
it is epiphenomenal. Most of the mental activity goes on at the 
unconscious level. George Lakoff, one of the pioneers of cognitive 
semantics, takes cue from the recent developments in cognitive 
science and aims at reformulating the whole edifice of Western 
Thought based on its findings. According to him, the three central 
claims of cognitive science, having overall philosophical imputations 
are: (1) Mind is inherently embodied, (2) Most mental activity is 
unconscious and (3) Abstract concepts are all metaphorical.
The notion of metaphor plays a major role in the analysis of 
language undertaken in the tradition of cognitive semantics whereas 
it is treated to be an aberration in formal semantics.''* The embodied 
nature of mind shows that capacities such as reason and language 
use are not independent of other processes like perception. Thus 
bodily metaphors come to play a large role in the formation of abstract 
concepts. Lakoff contends that most of our ordinary conceptual 
system is metaphorical in nature. For example, affection is understood 
through the metaphor of warmth because in childhood these two 
experiences often co-occur. The metaphorical nature of the conceptual 
system is often overlooked as most of the processes at the conceptual
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level are unconscious and phenomenological analysis can hardly 
reveal them.
The essence of a metaphor is to understand one thing in terms 
of another. This can have negative effects as it may cloud the real 
nature of the phenomenon concerned. For example, the metaphors 
often used for mind in the statements such as ‘thought is language’ 
or ‘mind is a machine’ overlook the embodied nature of the mind.
The study of self deals with the structure of our inner lives 
consisting of different sorts of experiences and,accordingly, several 
metaphors are used to capture the notion of the self. The most common 
division made is between the Subject and different selves. The former 
is often conceptualized as the locus of reason, consciousness and 
will. It is considered as disembodied and metaphorised in terms of a 
person. The latter concerns the body and different social roles and 
they are metaphorised accordingly either as a person or as an object 
or as a location. The distinction between the Subject and different 
selves is made clear in the statements like “I am at war with m yself’.
The fallacies associated with the notion of the Subject are 
obvious. First of all, as the MDM shows, there is nothing that is the 
ultimate controller and the very notion is logically untenable as it 
gives rise to an infinite regress. Moreover, it gives rise to the 
impression of being unique overlooking the commonality that exists, 
being the members of the same species. Lakoff even suggests that 
the influence of religion and spirituality on humans may be due to 
treating the Subject as something disembodied as this easily leads to 
believing that something transcendent lies above this body and world.
Conclusion: Towards a Remedial Amnesia
It may be objected that without the Kantian autonomous person, with 
absolute freedom and transcendent reason, morality will suffer and 
devastating consequences follow. But this criticism seems to be 
unwarranted. It may even be the case it is the illusory self that
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underlies most of our problems. As J.Krishnamurti puts it, “ the 
inability to face what we actually are and living with all sorts of 
misconceptions about the ‘m e’ lie behind the endless division, 
conflicts and destruction that we witness.” '̂
An empirical understanding of consciousness and self may 
pave the way for a holistic outlook towards oneself and the world 
and consequently, a better way of life. Perhaps, this is the only way 
to go beyond the centuries of conflict without falling back into the 
pattern of further divisions and destructions.
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Art and Archaeometallurgy of Nataraja: 
Exploring Visual Metaphors for 
Consciousness
SHARADASRINIVASAN
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Nataraja and Visual Approaches to Consciousness
The 10th century Chola metal image of Nataraja from Tamil 
Nadu in southern India, which is often described as the ‘Cosmic 
Dance of Siva’ represents one of the most artistically acclaimed and 
widely known symbols of Indian culture, art and religion, which has 
invited the attention of artists, dancers, scientists and philosophers 
in India and the world over. Famous sculptor Rodin extolled the 
N ata ra ja  in an essay ‘La D anse de S iv a ’ w hile A nanda 
Coomaraswamy in his exposition the The Dance of Siva (1924) 
described the image ‘as poetry but none the less science’. This paper 
attempts to show that the Nataraja religious icon provides a unique 
historical case study in exploring perspectives from art and philosophy 
in attempting to not only arrive at an understanding of notions related 
to the consciousness and the cosmos, but also to thereby provide 
something of a visual metaphor for apprehending abstractions. Of 
course not all these metaphors were necessarily part of its original 
conception but it is interesting to note that there has been this process 
of accretion of symbolic meanings over time: in fact continuing right 
into modem times as clearly seen in the writings of physicists such 
as Capra (1974) finding parallels with modem cosmology in this 
medieval icon while Sagan (1980) saw in it ‘a premonition of modem 
astronomical ideas’.
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This paper also significantly points out that the symbolism 
associated with the Nataraja in some ways attempts to reconcile the 
duality of the inner space of the consciousness with the exterior space 
of the world or cosmos out there: which according to this author is in 
a way a concern that can particularly be traced back to the aesthetic 
sensibilities of the remarkable corpus of classic Tamil Sangam poetry 
(c. 3rd century BC-AD). A modem painting, ‘Cosmic dance’ by the 
well know n B eige pa in ter and In do log ist Jean L etschert- 
Ascharyacharya who trained with the famed Beige Surrealist Rene 
Magritte indirectly captures these notions. The face of the Siva 
Nataraja in this painting is depicted in a way that is almost reminiscent 
of the transcendental calm of the Avalokitesvara painting in the 
Buddhist caves of Ajanta: depicting the inner space of the supreme 
consciousness outwardly radiating and manifesting itself in through 
dancing, swirling, patterns of cosmic blues and cosmic phenomena. 
A comment by Jean Letschert from his abstract submitted for this 
conference provides a useful contextual framework for this paper. 
He makes the point that we can derive two epistemological approaches 
to the understanding of consciousness, one that is essentially verbal 
and rational and the other that is basically visual, analogical and 
evocative, which is the realm into which Indian religious iconography 
essentially falls. In his essay ‘A joumey through vision’ Jean-Letschert 
suggests that the symbolic dimension of works of art (which in his 
case are partly influenced by religious iconography and partly by 
Surrealism), come to life through an inner dimension of dynamic 
interactions between dream and reality, symbol and substance. The 
Nataraja, with its symbolic aspects is a very good example of such 
an evocative, intuitive approach to consciousness.
However, as far as this paper is concerned, what is addressed 
is more of a historical problem rather than the implications for 
consciousness research per se. Ananda Coomaraswamy (1924), 
drawing from 13th century Saiva Siddhantic texts had described the 
Nataraja icon as representing the anandatandava which he interpreted
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as the dance of bliss within the consciousness. Although it has been 
generally believed that such mystical connotations of the Nataraja 
icon came into prominence around the 13th century, when the worship 
of the Nataraja at Chidambaram came under more overtly Sanskritic 
influences {chit: consciousness and ambaram: cosmos), this paper 
instead argues that such notions were already in vogue by the 8"’ 
century Pallava period, particularly from the hymns of Tamil saints, 
such as Manikkavachakkar, and from astro-archaeological evidence 
while briefly reflecting on the role of Saiva Siddhanta rituals. In 
particular the influences going back to indigenous dualist concepts 
of Tamil Sangam poetics (c. 5th c. BCE-5th c. CE) exploring the 
interior space in relation to exterior space are explored, since 
consciousness is ultimately an awareness of the interior mindscape 
as being distinct from the world ‘out there’.
Symbology of Nataraja’s Anandatandava
Based on 13th century Tamil Shaiva Siddhantic texts such as 
Unm aivilakam  composed at Chidambaram where the dancing 
Nataraja image is worshipped, Coomaraswamy interpreted the icon 
as Shiva’s anandatandava; (ananda: bliss; tandava: Shiva’s awesome 
dance), depicting the five acts or panchakritya, creation symbolised 
by the drum, destruction by the fire, protection by the front right 
arm, solace by the crossed left arm, dispelling of ignorance by 
trampling of the demon, with the ring of fire representing perpetual 
cosmic cycles of creation and destruction. Ananda Coomaraswamy 
(1924: 87) in his essay ‘Dance of Siva’ says: ‘The dance in fact, 
represents His five activities (Pancakritya) viz: Shristi (preservation, 
support), Samhara (destruction, evolution), Tirobhava (veiling, 
embodiement, illusion and also giving rest), anugraha (release 
salvation, grace).. .Unmai Vilakam, verse 36, tells us: ‘Creation arises 
from the drum: protection proceeds from the hand of hope; from fire 
proceeds d estru c tio n ; the foot held a lo ft gives re lease ’ . 
Coomaraswamy’s notes go on as follows: ‘The Supreme Intelligence
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dances in the soul...for the purpose of removing our sins. By these 
means, our Father scatters the darkness of illusion (maya), bums the 
thread of causality (karma), stamps down evil (mala, anava, avidya), 
showers Grace, and lovingly plunges the soul in the ocean of bliss 
(ananda). They never see rebirths who behold this mystic dance.’
Fritjof Capra in his Tao of Physics (1975) brought Nataraja 
into the global limelight and has brought into vogue another 
contemporary post-modernist symbolic dimension to this age-old 
image which has in its own way acquired a life of its own. Fritjof 
Capra wrote daringly that; “For modem physicists, then, Shiva’s dance 
is the dance of subatomic matter.. A photograph in this book shows 
a shower of hundred particles produced in a cosmic ray shower which 
found its way into a bubble chamber by accident which left behind a 
dense series of downward parabolic tracks emerging from something 
like a single source. This visual is rather interesting in the way it is 
reminiscent the rear view of the flying matted locks of the dancing 
Siva issuing out of the head of Siva, as if they were both visual 
metaphors for the web of the ‘cosmic consiousness’ or ‘supreme 
intelligence’ extending or manifesting itself outwards from a single 
source into numerous directions.
Questions of Dates and Original Significance of Nataraja
From the historical perspective the question is relevant as to 
what the origins and original significance of the Nataraja metal icon 
were and the extent to which its formulation was really informed of 
a ‘cosmic’ or scientific comprehension. Coomaraswamy’s ‘cosmic’ 
interpretations are not without problems as they derive from 13th 
century texts whereas the Nataraja icon is best known from the Chola 
period (lO th-llth  century). There have been other readings of the 
significance of the Nataraja as a political statement of the martial 
prowess of the Cholas (Kaimal 1999). The Tevaram hymns of Tamil 
saints to Nataraja (c. 6th-9th century) sometimes portray Siva as 
something of a social outcaste, even a madman wandering around
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cremation grounds; which can be interpreted as attempted subversion 
of the caste system and Brahmanical order which laid grounds for 
the Bhakti movement of salvation through intense devotion to a 
personal god rather than ritualistic worship.
There are also problems with the dating of the Nataraja icon 
itself. Since south Indian Hindu metal icons are rarely inscribed, 
there have been problems in stylistic dating which is done with respect 
to stone. For clarification, the Nataraja icon refers to the dance of 
Siva with the leg lifted across the hip in the specific dance pose 
known as bhujangatrasita karana.
The author’s paper in World Archaeology journal (Srinivasan 
2004) for the first time put forth comprehensive insights from 
archaeometallurgical, astro-archaeological and literary studies to 
suggest that the origins of the Nataraja metal icon goes back to the 
Pallava period (c. 800 AD) predating the Chola period (c.lO th-llth 
century) that it is usually attributed to. The paper also briefly suggested 
that its formulation by this time was indeed nascendy understood in 
terms of a ‘cosmic’ or metaphysical dimension by pointing to the 
significance of some examples of early Tamil poetry of the Saivite 
saints, c. 6th-9th century such as Manickavachakar (c. 9th century) 
and Appar (7th century).
Technology in the Study of Nataraja: Pallava Origins
Under the lO th-llth  centuries Chola rulers, technology came 
to the aid of religion with the prolific casting of Hindu metal icons. 
Metal icons of Hindu deities were made in early medieval Tamil 
Nadu in southern India for being carried out in processional worship 
amongst devotees after being elaborately decorated. The worship of 
Siva, was propagated by Tamil Saivite saints of the 6th-9th century, 
while Siva Nataraja was the family deity or kuladvata of the Cholas. 
Several thousands of fine solid bronze images were cast by the lost 
wax process by skilled stiiapathis or traditional icon makers, as still
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seen in Swamimalai. The stages of lost wax casting stage include the 
making of a wax model which is covered in clay to make mould and 
the mould is then heated and dewaxed and molten metal is poured in 
the mould to make the image. A great patron of Choi a bronzes and 
temples was the Chola queen Sembiyan Mahedevi (c. 940 AD) under 
whom the first rounded stone Nataraja sculptures were made.
A technical finger-printing and authentication exercise on 
Chola and South Indian bronzes was undertaken by the author on 
around 130 images as reported in her doctoral thesis (Srinivasan 1996) 
which was the first such comprehensive study in the world. The 
sampling procedure used was of micro-drilling using a drill bit of no 
more than 1mm thick in inconspicuous parts of the icon to retrieve 
about 20-50 mg of sample and going to a depth of 1 cm into the main 
body of the icon, for instance, the armpit. The advantage that this 
technique had over the previous techniques is that it aided the analysis 
of bulk or interior composition while ensuring that sampling was 
undertaken with minimum damage to the artefact and the procedure 
was undertaken successfully even on very delicate artefacts in reputed 
collections including Victoria and Albert Museum (50), Government 
Museum, Chennai (70) and British Museum (10). Thereafter bulk 
compositional analysis was done using ICP-OES, i.e. inductively 
coupled plasma atomic emission spectroscopy with drillings being 
made into solutions for analysis. Major, minor and trace elements 
were analysed for 18 elements of Cu, Zn, Pb, Sn, Fe, Ni, As, Sb, Bi, 
Co, P, S, Cr, Mn, V, Cd, Ag. Another technique applied was lead 
isotope ratio analysis which is useful because the lead isotope ratios 
of leaded artefacts vary discretely according to the source of lead, 
providing for clusters of artefacts which have been sim ilarly 
processed. Lead isotope ratio analysis was undertaken for sixty of 
the selected images (Srinivasan 1999). It was found that discrete 
metallurgical profiles could be indentified based on the trace element 
composition and the lead isotope ratios for different stylistic groups 
such as Pallava (7th-mid 9th century). Imperial Chola (late 9th-mid
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12th century), Late Chola (mid 12th-13th century), Vijayanagara (mid 
14tii-16tii century), Nayaka and Maratha (16th-19th century.
This technique validated the existence of Pallava bronzes as 
distinct from Chola which had been debated by historians. It was 
also found that Chola bronzes have a discrete metallurgical profile 
from Vijayanagar bronzes and from Late Chola bronzes. An example 
of a Pallava image whose dating was ratified by technical analysis is 
the
Kuram Natesa, Chennai Museum which was authenticated to 
the Pallava period (c. 7th century). A Pallava copper plate was found 
at Kuram lending weight to this. Interestingly, this study indicating 
that two Nataraja images which were previously regarded as 10th 
century Chola were in fact more likely Pallava based on the lead 
isotope ratio finger-prints. One of these is the Kunniyur Nataraja in 
the Government Museum, Chennai. Although this was thought to be 
10th century Chola, technical finger-printing supports a Pallava 
attribution, ie. late Pallava, c. 800-850, in the most mature phase of 
Pallava metal casting.
Nataraja and the ‘Cosmic Consciousness’
Archaeometallurgical and lead isotope studies by the speaker 
suggested a Pallava attribution (c. 8th century) for a Nataraja bronze 
from British Museum making it the earliest known Nataraja icon. 
The star chart for Orion was mapped onto this bronze in collaboration 
with astrophysicist Nirupama Raghavan which gave an excellent fit. 
This suggested that the Nataraja iconography was mapped around 
star positions like a wire frame (Srinivasan 2003) and suggested an 
intriguing ‘stellar’ inspiration for this bronze. The star, Ardra or 
Beteiguese, in the constellation Orion is linked to the mythology of 
Nataraja with a chariot processional festival at the Nataraja temple 
at Chidambaram. The Nataraja temple at coastal Chidambaram in 
Tamil Nadu is the only site where a bronze Nataraja is worshipped in 
the sanctum, next to which is worshipped a curtained space
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representing Shiva as ‘akasa lingam’ or space. The idea of Nataraja’s 
dance representing cosmic creation and destruction is well captured 







this heaven and earth 
And all else...
-  Manikkavachakar, Tamil, 9th century
Apart from the worship of Siva as akasa lingam, one of the 
meanings of the site name Chidambaram itself may be related to the 
idea of Siva as the cosmic consciousness (chit: consciousness; 
ambaram: cosmos) (Srinivasan 2001). Although it is generally 
thought it was through later 12th-13th century Sanskritic influences 
that the more beatific associations of the worship of Nataraja at 
Chidam baram  came into vogue, linking the cosm os and the 
consciousness (Kaimal 1999, Younger 1995), according to the author 
there is evidence that such ideas were already a part of the Tamil 
tradition by the Pallava period predating later Sanskritic attributions, 
as seen in Manikkavachakar’s 9th century verse (Yocum 1983: 20) 
w hich re fers  to the Tam il w ord unarve  im ply ing  the one 
comprehension rather than the Sanskrit word chit. The terse and 
moving verse below conveys the idea of a supreme consciousness 
which is beyond the realm of ordinary words and comprehension as 
we understand it. It points to the way even words can fail to describe 
the indescribable which seems a real problem in the realm  of 
consciousness studies, given that consciousness lies more in the realm 
of the felt, experienced, or even visually articulated, rather than that 
which can be described through language:
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O unique consciousness (or unarve),
which is realised (unarvatu) as standing firm,
transcending words and (ordinary) consciousness (unarvu),
0  let me know a way to tell of You.
-  Manikkavachakkar, 9th century, Tamil (22:3) 
Saivite Agamic Rituals as Activation of the Consciousness
Temple practice in early medieval Tamil Nadu followed the 
Saiva Siddhantic canon of worship following the agamas. Indeed, 
the complex rituals prescribed in agamic worship related to the Siva 
and Nataraja can be seen as attempts and ways to negotiate the 
transition from a state of inertness (jada) to an animated state {chit) 
and the activation of the consciousness by imbibing Siva’s nature 
which is itself consciousness. This is compared to the primeval act 
of striking fire from stones in this evocative translation of a passage 
from the Saiva Siddhantic text of Kamikagama (Davis 2000: 146): 
‘One should know that the divine glance distinguishes between what 
is inert (jada) and what is animate (chit) through Siva’s own power 
of vision. Sprinkling upward renders an object suitable (for offering 
to Siva) by separating it from jada. Striking brings about the 
manifestation of cit in that object, as the striking of stones (manifest 
sparks) and sprinkling downward nurtures these sparks still more’. 
Davis (2000: 146) goes on to add: ‘The transformation of normal 
food into naivedya, then, requires that the worshipper remove it from 
its normal status as inert matter and infuse into it the animating energy 
of consciousness. This process instills ‘Siva-ness’ into the substance 
since Siva’s own nature is consciousness, and thereby makes it 
suitable for intimate contact with Siva’.
Sangam Literature Insights: Cosmos-Consciousness as 
Inner-Outer Space
This author would like to suggest that it is also relevant to 
keep in mind the early dualist Tamil poetic ethos to understand aspects
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of nature mysticism linked to worship of Nataraja and the linkage 
between the cosmos and the consciousness discussed above. Tamil 
Sangam poetry (loosely dated from about the 5th century BC-5th 
century AD) makes a separation between the akam genre (i.e. the 
intimate inner space of love and intimacy) and the puram genre (i.e. 
the outer space of the heroic and bardic). This recalls to dual aspects 
of Siva worship in Tamil Nadu, of the aniconic, unitary lingam (ie. 
cosmic pillar with phallic associations) in the intimate sanctum and 
of processional images outside, and of the invocation of Nataraja at 
Chidambaram as consciousness (inner space) and cosmos (outer 
space).
A.K. Ramanujan’s translation of Tamil Sangam poetry as the 
example below from ‘The Interior Landscape’ (1967; 108-9) well 
illustrates this sense of traversing effortlessly from the interior 
mindscape of love to the exterior landscape of cosmic vistas, from 
the expansive macrocosm outside to the microcosm suggested by 
the world of the bees.
Bigger than earth, certainly,
higher than the sky,
more unfathomable than the waters
is this love for this man”of the mountain slopes
where bees make rich honey
from the flowers of the kurinci
that has such black stalks.
In a similar vein, some of Manikkavachakar’s 9th century 
verses written several centuries later also traverse the space from the 
exterior to the interior as for example the verse by Yocum (1984: 30) 
cited below which not only confirms the link between the worship of 
Nataraja and concepts related to akam or the inner space of the 
consciousness from Tamil Sangam poetics but also explains how this 
Indian tradition holds dance to be the most sublim e way of 
experiencing and realizing this link and connection between inner 
and outer space.
krt and Ardiaeometallurgy ofNataraja: Exploring Visual Metaphors fo r  Consciousness
251
He...revealed His foot which is like a tender flower,
caused me to dance
entered my innermost part (akam)
became my Lord.
Conclusion
The above analysis indicates that in many aspects the art, rituals 
and iconography of the Nataraja manages at subliminal levels to link 
the inner space of the consciousness with the exterior realm of the 
phenomenal world, providing extraordinary and highly contemporary 
visual metaphors for abstract and intangible concepts. In a historical 
sense this is a unique achievement of the religious artistic expression 
of medieval Tamil Nadu to the corpus of worldwide articulations on 
consciousness. It is found that Sangam concepts of interior mindscape 
and exterior landscape are a useful tool to explore the unique ways 
in which the ancient Tamil traditions, including Nataraja worship, 
emerged as a way of attempting to reconcile the dualities of the mind 
or consciousness inside and the cosmos or world outside.
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A Panel Discussion on ‘̂ Consciousness, 
Experience and Ways of Knowing”
Panelists:
NARAYANAN SRINIVASAN, RAMKRISHNA RAO,
SANGEETHA MENON, B. V . SREEKANTAN, C, S. UNNIKRISHNAN
B.V. Sreekantan; I am not a philosopher, but an experimental 
physicist and why I got into thinking about consciousness is perhaps 
relevant. When I was reading the mahavakyas, the four famous 
sayings from the Upanishads, one of them says prajnanam brahma, 
i.e. consciousness is Brahman. What really set me thinking is, “Why 
is consciousness called Brahman?” and “What is the equivalence 
between consciousness and Brahman?” This led me to think of the 
parallelism in physics, about what is it that is common to everything 
that we see around us. As you go to deeper and deeper levels of 
investigations as a physicist, you end up with more questions. Newton 
himself did not know how the gravitational force goes from one end 
to the other. He knew how the intensity decreases but he did not 
know how the force is transmitted. It took almost three hundred years 
to bring in the ideas of quantum  physics, quantum  vacuum, 
fluctuations, virtual particles, creation, annihilation etc, to bring about 
some understanding. We started from explaining matter. Finally, we 
explain ultimate reality as some kind of substratum that is identified 
with quantum mechanical vacuum. Today we have to understand 
everything in terms of just one entity. This concept is not very different 
from the concept of Brahman and universal consciousness.
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Ramakrishna Rao: I am glad that I am able to be here and 
participate in this conference. Considering the kind of feedback I 
received, the number of people who wanted to talk to me after the 
presentation was over, during the last two days, does suggest to me 
that there are a number of things that we all seem to share. We may 
not agree on the solutions and the answers but I think we all agree 
that we have discussed here some very fundam ental issues, 
fundamental questions. The nature of consciousness itself is an issue 
that is too profound to be solved in a conference or in a set of 
conferences. In fact, consciousness, to my mind, is the most puzzling 
of all puzzles. I think it was William James who said, “The concept 
of self is the most puzzling of puzzles”. But to me, even more primitive 
than the concept of self is the concept of consciousness and therefore 
it, to my mind, is the most puzzling of all the puzzles. As I sat and 
listened to the various speakers, somehow I was still thinking, what 
is consciousness, how can I describe it? I have attempted to study 
consciousness for a number of years, attempted to describe it, 
attempted to investigate it in a number of ways but always I was 
haunted by the apprehension that what I am talking about or what I 
am doing is probably not consciousness but something else. What is 
this thing called consciousness? How broadly can I look at this 
concept of consciousness? You can’t look at it any broader than the 
notion of the Brahman, which is very encompassing, as Dr. Sreekantan 
has just pointed out.
To me, it looks as though the universe is an information system. 
All that exists, the reality, is nothing but an information system. So 
out of that information system you extract information. In the process 
of extracting that information, you bifurcate the system into two. 
And one is consciousness. It is the quintessence, it is the ground 
condition that makes it possible for us to retrieve information about 
things that exist. In so doing, you necessarily make a dichotomy, 
make a distinction between information and the thing to which this 
information relates. And this process of retrieving information takes
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place at different points in time at difference centers in tiie universe 
itse lf  and consequen tly , we have the notion of individual 
consciousness or the person attempting to retrieve this information 
from a particular spot and this is the individual consciousness, but 
the whole thing is nothing but an information system. We are 
extracting that information. In order to do that, we have to have this 
basic, overall governing principle, which is the ground condition of 
all knowledge. That to me is consciousness.
But on the other hand, if you limit consciousness to any kind 
of a manifestation consequent to certain biological permutations and 
combinations, biological interactions of cortical processes, I think, 
we are missing the whole boat. We have to consider it in its larger 
perspective and that being it is the center, it is the essence, it is the 
basic ground for all awareness and that awareness can manifest as I 
said, in other ways, in a number of forms. I was able to think of four 
or five different forms but others can possibly classify them into 
more forms. All that becomes necessary inasmuch as the processing 
of information is itself a part of information and this is the tricky 
issue and this is probably the knot that we have to untie. Until we do 
that we shall continue to have the same conundrum, the same puzzle 
continuing to haunt us.
N arayanan Srinivasan: I am going to take an opposite route. 
The only thing we can be confident of is that we are conscious. So, I 
will start with humans. You don’t have to define consciousness. It is 
very simple. If I show a circle on the screen and I ask you, ‘What do 
you see?’ then if you say it is a circle then I will say you experience 
a circle. It is not at all complicated.
You are unconscious of certain processing or information, 
whatever you want to call it or you become conscious of it. In my 
starting with the simpler approach, you are either unconscious or 
conscious of something. There are certain things you will not be
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conscious of at all. For example, some processing that is occurring 
in your retina, there is no chance that you probably will be conscious 
of it. It will be what we call an intermediate processing stage or 
intermediate representation. Just because a stimulus is there doesn’t 
mean you will be aware of it. The simple issue is: You are unconscious 
of something. You can become conscious of it. The easiest way to 
think about it is to think of it as some sort of a threshold. If some 
concept or some information goes above the threshold, you are 
conscious of it.
Now, the question is: what’s happening undemeath? And that’s 
one of the ways to study it. There are two other issues here. One is 
experience. When people ask me, ‘Do you study experience?’ I say, 
‘No.’ I don’t think you can study experience. What we study are 
relationships between experiences.
Another easy way to think about it is: think of the world. There 
are various things in the world. Put everything in a circle. There are 
lots of points. Think of your mind as another circle here. Everything, 
let us assume for simplicity has a corresponding thing inside the 
mind. You can link a red apple in the world as a representation in 
your mind. Now a red apple is related to the green apple in a certain 
way. The representation of the red apple and the representation of 
the green apple -  how are they related to each other? In fact, when 
we do a psychological experiment in psychophysics, this is the 
question we ask. Our question is about the relationships between 
representations or relationships between experiences. When you 
understand all these relationships, you understand pretty much 
everything. We do experience. But all experiencing is always in 
relation to something else. Even when you say something is red, it is 
a relationship statement. For example, the same thing you will not 
perceive as red on some other day. It is always with respect to 
something. In this sense we have been studying consciousness for 
more than a hundred years.
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The other point of view is that the only way we acquire 
knowledge is through interaction with the world. A lot of times it is 
not emphasized. We acquire knowledge only by interacting with the 
world. Our representations are created, destroyed, interchanged, 
transformed through interacting with the world. If you don’t interact 
with the world, you will not acquire any knowledge. How we interact 
with the world will tell you about what sort of knowledge we acquire. 
It is a process.
C. S. Unnikrishnan: As a researcher, when you look at the 
physical world, it is not just studying the properties of the physical 
world. I certainly look at the physical world as a rasika. Who is a 
rasikal Even as a physics researcher you can be a rasika who looks 
at the world, its properties and so on. It is to look at how the world 
affects you not just intellectually but also emotionally. Part of my 
research has been quite involved with how the physical laws 
themselves are formed by the properties of the universe as a whole 
and how all natural laws are somehow fixed by various properties of 
the physical universe. When you involve very deeply into the 
properties of the universe, one realizes that what you get from that 
kind of a research tells you how inseparably you are linked to 
everything else in the universe. It is a physical link. But this is also a 
spiritual experience, as you can imagine. I don’t want to go into the 
details of those kinds of research, but what one gets out finally from 
that kind of pure physics research is the outer harmonizing feeling.
Dealing with the physical world outside requires training, some 
aptitude for mathematics, physics and subjects like that and a sense 
for observation, respect for the physical world. You don’t need so 
much courage though it certainly needs courage when you want to 
ask new questions. For example, people have asked me, coming from 
a small middle-class background from a small town in Kerala, how 
do I dare ask certain questions which I ask. I said, “No problem. In 
our culture a small child could go all the way to the God of Death
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and ask about the meaning of life after death. And with such profound 
questions being asked and recorded what’s my problem? I don’t need 
much more courage and motivation to ask these small questions”. 
But to look inwards into consciousness requires a lot of courage 
because you don’t know what to expect. In fact, you might change 
so much that you may not even be able to come back with your 
normal sense.
B. V. Sreekantan: Many think that consciousness is something 
like a software. But, what about the hardware? It is equally important. 
Unless you make hardware and software one and the same -  what 
you are saying and what you are experiencing, there is no way science 
can finally answer for. Even the question of objective world and 
subjective world, distinctions we have made. You cannot call 
something objective per se, because you have only one experience, 
that is the experience within yourself. Even when you do an 
experiment it is what is happening in your own brain that is important. 
What is objective is of no use. I take a photograph of something, 
unless I  interpret it, it is of no use. You can make it somewhat free of 
subjective biases. That is a different question. But ultimately, in terms 
of interpretation the difference between subjective and objective is 
purely one that is drawn for argument’s sake and nothing else.
S angee tha  M enon: Unnikrishnan said that he has not 
experimented with inner experiences. When he qualified himself as 
a rasika, and he being a physicist, I was wondering what sort of 
experience would that be? Can a researcher see how the world 
influences him, not only by the physical laws but also emotionally? 
Narayanan Srinivasan said that defining consciousness might be a 
problem but it will be easier and clearer if we try to see what our 
basic sensory experiences are. Because, mostly we study relationships 
between experiences and not experience perse. We always experience 
in relation to something else. Ramakrishna Rao noted that we may 
not have all the answers but we have for sure discussed certain
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fundamental basic questions and to him it is important to take 
consciousness in a larger perspective. B. V. Sreekantan considers 
that the idea of universal consciousness, vi^hich is so dominant in 
Indian traditions is also an idea which is today very much reflecting 
in the developments of science.
We can see that these are four different perspectives, but four 
interesting and im portant perspectives. The idea behind this 
conference was not to give the final answer for the question ‘what is 
consciousness’, to judge ‘what is real experience’ and to say which 
way of knowing is the best way of knowing. This conference is meant 
to highlight the ideas that we think are important in areas such as 
science, philosophy, spiritual traditions and arts, and to extend our 
questions and imagination when we ponder over basic questions.
Can we extend our questions? Can we redefine our questions? 
Those attempts by themselves will be a major step in our progress 
towards understanding something very complex like consciousness 




Science, Reality and Consciousness
B. V. Sreekantan
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
A scientist as part of his daily and scientific activities has to 
get used to different kinds and different levels of reality. If he is 
given a flower, say a rose flower, what he recognises first are the 
beauty of the flower, the pleasing colour the fragrance or aroma of 
the flower and the softness of the petals -  characterises which are 
real, but which he cannot quantify. When he takes it to the laboratory 
and looks under a microscope, he gets an entirely different picture of 
the flower. The particulate structure say of the petals, which through 
his knowledge of chemistry and physics he will trace successively to 
particular elements, and their molecules and atoms and the colour to 
the radiations from atomic transitions and so on. If he goes to a still 
deeper level of investigation he will be faced with yet another level 
of reality -  the structure of atoms -  the nuclei -  the fundamental 
particles -  the quarks and leptons He soon realises that according to 
current ideas of science everything around him and himself too are 
nothing but bundles of these fundamental particles. If he dares to go 
still deeper he will realise that these particles are just manifestations 
of quantum vacuum. All this knowledge -  the fragrance, the softness 
on the one hand and the particles and the fluctuations of the quantum 
vacuum on the other cannot mean anything unless there is a 
consciousness to register, analyse, and interpret. What a neuroscientist
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can register with all his intricate equipment are only bundles of 
electrical signals and releases of neurochemicals in specific areas of 
the brain. How to relate these to the realities of the outer world or to 
the realities of the inner feelings? That is precisely what consciousness 
does. The n eu ro sc ien tis t has no exp lanation  yet how this 
consciousness arises and how it operates. The views of some of the 
leading scientists on this question of reality will also be presented.
Abstracts o f Lectures
Consciousness and Cognitive Anomalies 
K. Ramakrishna Rao
Institute for Human Science and Service, Visal<hapatnam.
C onsciousness refers to a com plex set of apparently 
heterogeneous phenomena. These superficially diverse phenomena 
fall b roadly  into four ca tegories - (1) prim ary aw areness, 
(2) paradoxical aw areness, (3) pathological aw areness, and 
(4) paranormal awareness. They manifest in two forms- (1) the explicit 
and (2) the implicit. They appear to be governed by two fundamental 
processes - (1) the normal and (2) the paranormal, which do not 
constitute an incongruous dyad. It is suggested that they may be seen 
as mutually complementary processes.
The normal processes of awareness are those in which 
awareness is mediated by sensory processes, the nervous system and 
the brain. They admit naturalistic explanations within the framework 
of a physical system. The paranormal processes, however, resist such 
explanations calling for fundamentally different assumptions. In 
paranormal awareness there is no sensory mediation. The awareness 
is direct. The subject and the object have an identity relationship. 
The subject realizes the object in his/her own being by a process that 
may be appropriately termed awareness by being, distinguished from 
awareness by knowing. Awareness by being involves accessing pure
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consciousness. It leads to a state of awareness-as-such, a contentless 
and nonrepresentational state. Spontaneously on rare occasions and 
often by disciplined practice (if we may trust the yogic claims) a 
pure conscious event may manifest in a cognitively processed form. 
The mind as an interfacing instrumentality is involved in both the 
normal and paranormal processes. It is also the source of interplay 
between the two processes.
There are good reasons to believe in the reality of cognitive 
anomalies, collectively designated as “psi.” Carefully conducted 
experiments and frequently reported spontaneous experiences provide 
persuasive evidence in support of ESP and PK, two forms in which 
psi seems to manifest. The known characteristics of psi suggest that 
psi involves a two-stage process. One of the stages is conceived to 
be something that may not be realized by a physical system. The 
other is normal cognitive processing. Inasmuch as psi thus involves 
normal and paranormal processes, it may be usefully thought of as a 
gateway between the two.
If ESP is real and can be investigated by deploying scientific 
methods, psi research may have profound conceptual, methodological 
and theoretical implications for consciousness studies and vice-versa. 
The fundamental distinction between awareness by being and 
awareness by knowing can play a crucial role in adding a new 
dimension to consciousness studies. It is important that researchers 
recognize that psi is one kind of awareness and that there is 
congruence and homogeneity among what at first appear to be a 
heterogeneous “hodgepodge” of disparate items of consciousness. 
Once there is such recognition, the researchers would begin to 
appreciate the important aspects in which they may benefit by learning 
how consciousness manifests at implicit and explicit levels and how 
the normal and the paranormal processes interact. An understanding 
of the interaction between the two would help to explain the 
subjective, “what it is like,” experience and other aspects of
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consciousness that seem to defy physical explanations. As researchers 
learn more about the physical and psychological variables related to 
the occurrence of psi experiences, hopefully useful common ground 
between psi and other forms of awareness would be found.
Also, recognition of the reality of psi would take the wind out 
of the sail of state-central materialism and neural identity theories. 
Whether this necessarily leads us to favor radical dualism is, however, 
doubtful. A double aspect theory of the mind, which does not commit 
to either materialism or spiritualism, could account for all types of 
awareness including psi without the additional problems that radical 
dualism entails. Thus process dualism appears to be less problematic 
than entity dualism. Many classical Indian theories of mind consider 
the mind as matter in its subtlest form with normal and paranormal 
attributes. This line of thought deserves to be explored further with a 
naturalistic bias.
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The Conscious versus the Subconscious: a View 
through the Neurobiology o f Memory
Sumantra Chattarji
National Centre for Biological Sciences, Bangalore.
Some experiences are memorable, others forgettable. Most of 
us have to make a conscious and continuing effort to remember daily 
facts of life -  phone numbers, names, dates, etc. While conscious or 
explicit memories of facts and events tend to fade away with time, 
memories of emotional events are often very powerful and persistent. 
For example, war veterans or victims of severe stress continue to 
have vivid flashbacks of traumatic events from their past, while their 
cognitive abilities diminish. Despite their best efforts, they are often 
unable to suppress traumatic Memories from their past. In other 
words, these people become victims of their subconscious emotions, 
which they are unable to control with their conscious, rational
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thoughts. Recent experimental studies in neuroscience may provide 
us with new insights into these complex mental processes. How does 
a particular experience leave its mark as a memory in the brain? For 
more than a century, the search for a biological basis of memory 
formation has centered on the synapse, the junction where information 
is passed from one brain cell to another. The remarkable ability of 
synapses to change in response to experience, a property described 
as “synaptic plasticity”, is believed to mediate long-term storage of 
information in the brain. Memories of facts and events depend on 
synaptic plasticity in a brain structure called the hippocampus. On 
the other hand, emotional memories are processed by another 
structure called the amygdala. My laboratory is interested in 
understanding why memories of emotional events are often more 
potent compared to factual memories. To this end we study synapses, 
cells and microcircuits in the hippocampus and amygdala, by using 
a combination of behavioral, neuroanatomical, computational, genetic 
engineering and electrophysiological techniques. Using this strategy, 
we have identified several novel mechanisms which shed new light 
on the neural basis of the contrasting nature of conscious versus 
subconscious memories.
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The Theory and Experience of Rasa
Satavadhani R. Ganesh
International Academy for Creative Teaching, Bangalore.
Though the word ‘Rasa’ has many layers of meaning in 
Sanskrit, in the field of aesthetics, poetics and dramaturgy, it is 
invariably used as a term to designate the ultimate art experience.
Since Sage Bharata’s Ndtydsastra, the word ‘Rasa’ has become 
the keystone in all facets of Indian art. According to Bharata, ‘Rasa’ 
is the product of the synthesis of vibhava (stimulus), anubhava 
(responses) and vyabhicaribhavas (transitory emotions). But, the
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riddle of ‘Rasa’ is not so simple. Hence, we have many theories to 
explain the same and these are inspired by several major schools of 
Indian philosophy, both realistic and idealistic. Among these, the 
theory of Abhinavagupta is the most acclaimed one and it is later 
further shaped and sharpened by the luminaries in Sanskrit poetics 
like V isw anatha, Jagannatha, K arnapura and 
M adhusiidhanasaraswathi. Even the earlier theories of Lollata, 
Samkuka and Bhattanayaka are known to us only because of the 
writings of Abhinavagupta. Of course, we have a host of other theories 
on ‘Rasa’ propounded by scholars like Bhojaraja, Ramacandra and 
Gudnacandra, B6padeva, Hemadri, et al. However, it is the school 
of Abhinavagupta which has stood the test of time and has won the 
acceptance of numerous scholars.
The present paper tries to explain the realization of ‘Rasa’, 
referring to the exposition of Abhinavagupta, Jagannatha and 
Madhusiidhana and also dwells upon the other theories briefly. While 
doing so, art experience as a whole, encompassing the areas of 
different basic arts will also be considered. Even the insights of great 
poets who existed before the said theories on ‘Rasa’ will be cited 
and discussed.
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Living At The Edge O f Experience: 
The Way O f The Sanyasi
Ravi Kapur
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
The title derives from the claim made by the Sanyasis that 
their aim is to reach ultimate reality, which is beyond sense experience 
and the sadhana they are continuously engaged in, is the route to this 
existence.
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For the last twenty years the author has been spending one 
month every year in the Himalayas, trying to interview Sanyasis who 
have left home in search of this ultimate reality. He has been looking 
at the life trajectory of the Sanyasis, the reasons for taking Sanyas, 
their relationship with God, Guru and the society they have left 
behind. A major focus in the interviews is on their Sadhana and their 
mental experiences when engaged in it. This paper will, while 
describing the whole study in some detail, focus especially on the 
sadhana techniques and the sadhana experience. The presentation 
will include a slide show of the places author has visited and the 
Sadhus he has interviewed.
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M andala Awareness in Indian Spirituality 
Jean Letschert
Artist, Writer and Philosopher, Bangalore.
Being an extremely vast subject covering different levels of 
enquiry ranging from  the m aterial to the m etaphysical, the 
investigations in the nature of consciousness quite often rely on initial 
insights which are then developed into a comprehensive systemic 
fashion. When we speak of insight it implies that one has to see 
something first before understanding it; and more specifically in a 
spiritual perspective one should see it with the eyes of the mind rather 
than with the physical organs of sight.
From  this poin t o f view , we can derive  tw o m ajor 
epistemological approaches to the understanding of consciousness: 
one that is essentially verbal and rational, the other that is basically 
visual, analogical and evocative. An all-comprehensive approach to 
the study of consciousness has therefore to take into account the 
complementarity of these two linguistic perspectives, treating them 
dialectically, with the purpose to enrich the mass of documentation 
available in view of a more holistic comprehension of the nature of 
consciousness.
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To deepen our understanding of consciousness, it is a fact 
that we cannot do away with the various propositions and experiences 
the great spiritual traditions of mankind have made available to human 
knowledge, consciousness itself being the instrumcnl par excellence 
of the presence of spirit in all aspects of life.
When tapping into the visual imagery developed by the great 
spiritual traditions of the world, we acknowledge that there is a 
recurring shape that is mysteriously common to most of them when 
they venture to depict the complexity of consciousness and which 
invariably tends to express one or the other form of symbiosis between 
unity and multiplicity, between spirit and matter, or any antinomy 
created in the rational and dualistic mind. This shape is that of a 
circle which contains a series of concentric circles vanishing 
successively towards an immovable center. These circles follow an 
evolutive and involutive process as they proceed towards the 
periphery or towards the center. The conventional name that has been 
given to this circular matrix and has entered into the spiritual 
vocabulary of the last decades is Mandala, a Sanskrit word which 
generically means a circular enclosure, and more specifically a circle 
drawn around a particular state of mind. Besides its obvious womb­
like visual im pact on the mind, further investigation raises 
fundamental questions regarding its origin. The foremost question 
in the context of consciousness studies may be stated thus: are 
Mandalas arbitrary confections related to cultural idioms or are they 
collective representations of a pre-existing archetype deeply cast 
within the structure of consciousness itself ? In other words, supposing 
we allow consciousness to express itself -  to make a “self-portrait” 
of itself -  wouldn’t the Mandala be the first spontaneous form it will 
endeavor to formulate? Is there an inhering condition which could 
be termed “Mandalic awareness'" which corresponds to the all- 
encom passing nature of consciousness and which could be 
instrumental, both in the scientific realm and the spiritual realm, to 
broaden our research and substantiate our aspirations for a holistic 
understanding of the subject.
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Based on a series of visual documentation, this lecture will 
explore some of the relevant examples in Indian spirituality which 
are conducive to the understanding that there is a specific area in 
consciousness which generates an awareness of its all-inclusiveness.
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The “Conscious” Bacterium  
S. Mahadevan
Molecular Reproduction and Development Genetics,
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore.
Microorganisms are commonly perceived primarily as the 
causative agents o f most contagious diseases that plague the 
humankind. This view gradually changed during the first half of the 
twentieth century, whereby, they began to be recognized as model 
organisms to study fundamental aspects of life processes. This gave 
birth to a new scientific discipline that we now call molecular 
biology. Recent studies have shown that bacteria are extraordinarily 
perceptive to their surroundings and can respond to changes in the 
most amazing ways. They can communicate with others and can 
collaborate as a group to mount elaborate behavioural responses to 
environmental challenges. The talk aims to examine some of these 
recent findings in the context of cognition studies on “higher” 
organism.
Brain and Being  
Sangeetha Menon
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
It is evident that neuroscience is a discipline that will influence 
our understanding of other minds and our own in a substantial manner 
in the years to come. The contributions from brain studies have today 
changed the way we address many a problem that required complex
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and challenging answers a decade or two back. Consciousness has 
inarguably become the most charming contender to walk the ramp 
for not just one but many allied disciplines that border neuroscience, 
cognitive psychology, neuropsychiatry, neurophilosophy and even 
biogenetics. Some say that the one area that will emerge in the coming 
years as the most im portant in the history of hum ankind is 
‘neuronomics’, the nexus between neuroscience and genetics.
The meanings of human identity are certainly going to be 
debated in a manner that occurred never before. The evading character 
of consciousness makes it more appealing to almost all disciplines 
including the good old philosophy. But the fact of the matter is that 
even to have some minimalistic idea of what consciousness is, a 
whole set of parameters have to be factored in. This explains the 
rush of multidisciplinarity into the field of consciousness. What 
William James tried to capture, a 100 years back, in his epochal 
expression ‘the stream of consciousness’, has today given rise to 
many tributaries, and hence many bridges too. However, it seems 
that the two problems that will stay with us in the distant future are 
(i) the impersonal brain, and, (ii) the personal experience. Not to 
explain further, such a dual presents an apparent impasse. How can 
we even juxtapose the impersonal brain, a theory of which can explain 
all of human identity and why we do what we do; and the personal 
experience, without which all that we talk about consciousness 
become of no meaning?
Brain and Being seem to be the two inevitable dimensions of 
consciousness that mutually reinforce and challenge. This dual is 
not to be mistaken with a simple Cartesian dual or not even its avatar 
in Chalmersian theory. It is not even the easy and hard problem. 
What we are talking about is the fundamental nature of human 
experience. With a tiny snap in my brain I might see you in a manner 
that is most different. At the same time, with a reinforced sense of 
spiritual wellbeing, I can completely change the way I respond to the 
situation I am in.
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It is extremely difficult to give away those human aspirations 
that constantly look for transformation, progress and wellbeing, 
however much neural become the explanations for these. Our being 
on one side is very much decided by those nanomaterials of our 
identity called neurons. But on the other side, we know that by positive 
approaches, by the route of the spirit and grace, by an insatiable urge 
to look for the beyond, we could make differences in our behavior, 
attitudes, relations and identities.
Brain is the key question for consciousness. But that question 
is meaningless without that which makes us a remarkable species: 
experience. Experience is directly related to the existence of agency. 
Today, the question  o f agency is con sid ered  vital for 
neu ropsycho log ical research , cogn itive science as well as 
philosophical understanding. Another area where the issue of agency 
is central, but not discussed enough, is that of spiritual experiences.
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Art and Archaeometallurgy o f Nataraja bronzes: 
Explorations into Visual Metaphors and Consciousness
Sharada Srinivasan
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
The 10th century Chola metal image of Nataraja from Tamil 
Nadu in southern India, which is often described as the ‘Cosmic 
Dance of Siva’ represents one of the most artistically acclaimed and 
widely known symbols of Indian culture, art and religion, which has 
invited the attention of artists, dancers, scientists and philosophers 
in India and the world over. The Nataraja religious icon provides a 
unique historical case study in exploring perspectives from art and 
philosophy in attempting to not only arrive at an understanding of 
notions related to the mind and consciousness, but also at thereby 
providing som ething of a visual m etaphor for apprehending 
abstractions. In the 8th-10th centuries when the worship of the
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dancing Siva gained currency in the Tamil region, technology came 
to the aid of religion with religious fervour being spread through the 
building of temples and the casting of metal icons which were taken 
out in public re lig io u s processions. A rchaeom eta llu rg ical 
investigations were made by the author on over a 130 south Indian 
metal icons sampled from major museums such as Victoria and Albert 
Museum, London and Government Museum, Chennai using lead 
isotope finger-printing, which suggested that the Nataraja bronze, 
depicting Siva dancing with the leg extended in the bhujangatrasita 
karana, was a Pallava innovation (7th to mid 9th century), rather 
than 10th century Chola as widely believed. Ananda Coomaraswamy, 
drawing from his interpretations of 13th century Saiva Siddhantic 
tex ts had d escribed  the N ataraja  icon as rep resen ting  the 
anandatandava which he interpreted as the dance of bliss within the 
consciousness. Although it has been generally believed that such 
mystical connotations of the Nataraja icon came into prominence 
around the 13th century, when the worship of the Nataraja at 
Chidambaram came under more overtly Sanskritic influences (chit: 
consciousness and ambaram: cosmos), this paper instead argues that 
such notions were already in vogue by the 8th century Pallava period, 
p a rticu la rly  from  the hym ns of Tamil sain ts , such as 
Manickavachakkar, and from astro-archaeological evidence while 
briefly reflecting on the role of Saiva Siddhanta doctrines, the 
influence of the philosopher Sankara and indigenous dualist concepts 
of Tamil Sangam poetics (c. 5 th c. BCE-5th c. CE).
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M editation, Brain and Cognition 
Narayanan Srinivasan and Shruti Baijal
Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University ofAliat)abad
A  major technique to produce an altered state of consciousness 
is meditation. The practice of meditation has a long history especially
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in India, China, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries. Meditation 
traditionally has been associated with Hindu and Buddhist religious 
practices. In the last fifty years or so, efforts have been made to study 
meditation as well as other altered states of consciousness using 
behavioural and physiological approaches. Questions have been 
raised whether meditative experience can be explained in terms of 
neural or cognitive processes. The current paper discusses empirical 
studies from cognitive science and neuroscience that have been 
perfo rm ed  on m ed ita tion . T hese stud ies show changes in 
neurocognitive processes and bodily states. The current EEG and 
brain imaging studies demonstrate significant changes in the brain 
due to meditation. Interdisciplinary approaches covering psychology, 
neuroscience, computer science and philosophy are further needed 
to understand m editation and its effects on brain and mind.
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Scientific Investigation O f Psychoenergetic 
Phenomena: “Intention Imprinted Electrical Device” 
(IIED) Experiments O f W illiam Tiller - 
A Brief Introduction
M. Srinivasan
Formerty with BARC, Mumbai.
During the last eight years Physicist & Materials Scientist, 
Dr. William Tiller, (Professor Emeritus of Stanford University), and 
his co llaborators have carried out a series of path-breaking 
“psychoenergetic” experiments which seem to demonstrate that a 
group of accomplished meditators (typically four Siddha yoga 
practitioners) are able to consciously implant a “specific intention” 
into a special electronic device (actually an EEPROM connected to 
an oscillator circuit). A typical intention they use for example is for 
the electrical device to acquire the ability  to “increase” (or 
alternatively “decrease”) the pH of a bottle of ultra pure water kept a 
few inches from it. After the meditative implantation, which takes
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about 45 minutes, the “Intention Implanted Electrical Device” (IIED) 
is couriered by FedEx to a destination laboratory thousands of miles 
away where on placing it a few inches from a test flask containing 
pure water, its pH is found to steadily increase (or decrease as the 
case may be) by one full pH unit, over a one week period.
D uring such experim ental cam paigns, a phenom enon 
characterized by Prof. Tiller as “conditioning” of the laboratory, was 
accidentally  discovered. They have since identified specific 
experimental signatures of such a “conditioned” space; Prof. Tiller 
is presently awaiting the grant of US patents for the experimental 
procedures which he claims can firstly produce and subsequently 
measure the “degree of conditioning” of any locale. Prof. Tiller’s 
2005 book (co-authored with Walter Dibble and J.GFandel) titled 
“Some Science Adventures with Real Magic” summarizes in great 
detail the rationale behind as also the results of his “robust” 
experim ents. His earlier book “Conscious Acts of Creation - 
Em ergence of a New Physics” (published in 2001) which has 
forewords by INSA fellows ECG Sudarshan and Rustum Roy, gives 
details of his initial experiments covering the period 1997-2000. Their 
five part paper published in the “Journal of A lternative and 
Complimentary Medicine” covering all these is available in their 
w ebsite w w w .tiller.org. These fascinating experim ents have 
emboldened Tiller to extend Einstein’s postulate of the equivalence 
of mass and energy to a third component namely consciousness. Tiller 
has also propounded a quantitative theoretical model which appears 
to explain not only his experimental findings but all Subtle Energy 
phenomena.
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Denying Experience in the Physical World: 
Consciousness Misled
C. S. Unnikrishnan
Gravitation Group, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai.
I explore how collective objective scientific knowledge of our 
times could be grossly off the mark because of the denial of experience 
and of the results of experiments (experience in situations specifically 
designed to gain experience) in particular. Such situations arise in 
the physical sciences due to efficient biasing of scientist’s collective 
consciousness, generally thought to be immune to such bias, by 
specificities of theoretical descriptions, as well as due to factors of 
sociology, politics and even religion.
Human consciousness has no innate mechanism to sense truth, 
but gross misleading is countered by its capabilities in logical analysis. 
But it seems that this operates at a layer that could be veiled by more 
subjective considerations.
I explore these aspects in a case study related to the knowledge 
on motion and relativity. The situation in about 1905 regarding the 
analysis of motion and its physical effects had the options of retaining 
the notion of an absolute preferred frame or of its denial, leading to 
a theory of relativity without a preferred frame. The choice was made 
and retained by considerations that are not fully justified within the 
methodology of physical science. In any case, recent studies show 
that a large body of empirical experience regarding motion is treated 
without adequate logical analysis due to a collective hesitation to 
change the existing paradigm despite strong experiential evidence 
that point to the need to change the paradigm. The denial seems to 
go to the extent of denying even those aspects of the physical world 
that are directly sensible routinely where subjective experience does 
not conflict with objective collective experience.
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The talk aims to demonstrate an instance where the collective 
scientific consciousness of the rigorous physical sciences displays 
surprisingly conservative and retrograde existence. This might serve 
as a good example how the powerful knowledge-seeking collective 
consciousness lags behind in its nonlinear path, whereas the limited 
individual surpasses such hesitation and goes beyond, as often 
happens in sciences.
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Death and the Foundations of Science 
Nataraja Sarma
Formerly with BARC, Mumbai.
When human intelligence rose above that of animals, they 
began to fear the irreversible phenomenon of death. Primitive humans 
regarded it as temporary illness but later realized that it was a journey 
into the unknown. When their dead had to be buried to foil scavenging 
carnivores, intense feelings of claustrophobia were induced. Priests 
who were also counselors sought the fears of their flock by introducing 
religion with its philosophy. The abject fear of death however 
persisted and led men to seek the elixir of life through alchemy and 
their experim ents to seek this amruta  as well as to find the 
philosopher’s stone to make gold laid the foundations of science. 
The exploration of nature was then reinforced by curiosity, a trait 
inherent in all animals.
The philosophies of the East, those of H induism  and 
Buddhism, on the other hand, accepted death as a natural and 
temporary process wherein the soul returns to earth after a course of 
reprogramming. Based on the principle of ahimsa, not to cause 
suffering, ayurveda merely alleviated pain and never sought methods 
to cause immortality. As there was no incentive to avoid death, they 
neglected science and the search for eternal life. Instead they placed 
their trust in their divinities. The Moslem invasion and the advent of
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the colonists with their European belief in the power of logic brought 
about a revolution in scientific research and development in India 
and China.
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Consciousness, Self and M etaphor 
V. Harinarayanan
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur.
Two thinkers who take an instrumentalist view towards folk 
psychological categories are Daniel Dennett and Goeorge Lakoff. 
Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness is an attempt 
aimed at attacking the ubiquitous ‘Cartesian Theatre’. This results in 
viewing consciousness as the result of probing of one among the 
several narratives available to the cognitive processes. This has 
implication for the concept of self. For Dennett, the self is nothing 
but ‘the centre of narrative gravity’. Lakoff attempts to build up a 
theory of mind based on the findings of cognitive science and argues 
that psychological categories are anchored on bodily metaphors. In 
the proposed presentation, I shall argue that the positions of Dennet 
and Lakoff can be developed in such a way as to bridge the gap 
between our scientific understanding of ourselves and the folk 
psychological theory of self. This can be a fruitful development of 
the project of third culture and helps in directing us towards, what 
J.Krishnamurti and David Bohm call, a remedial amnesia.
Attention, Awareness, and Knowledge: Implications of 
Change Blindness
Farah Naaz & Narayanan Srinivasan
Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allahabad.
Strong claims have been made that attention is necessary for 
perception and we are only aware of the information we are attending.
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Attention and awareness are almost always associated with each other. 
The studies of scene perception indicated that the representation of 
visual stimulus is quite accurate and we have the capacity to remember 
large number of scenes viewed just once. Studies of Iconic memory 
show that detailed representation of scene may be available though 
it disintegrates very fast. Evidences from Change Blindness (CB) 
studies contradict these findings and give insight of what might be 
the nature of representations of visual stimuli. CB studies indicate 
that attention is necessary for awareness and people are blind to 
changes to unattended objects when the transient due to the change 
is removed. Only those objects that are attended are preserved across 
saccades and there may be no such thing as a visually integrative 
buffer. Explanations of CB help in understanding the nature of visual 
short-term memory. It has been claimed that CB may occur because 
the information of previous stimuli is overwritten by new information. 
Experimental evidence also suggests that even though we are unaware 
of some information, we can use this knowledge to perform some 
tasks. Implicit learning and memory paradigms also support the 
availability of knowledge that a subject may not be aware of but can 
be shown to influence performance in certain tasks. For example, in 
CB experiments though explicit change detection rates are very poor, 
when presented with forced choice task observers performance was 
above chance level even when they reported being unaware of change. 
Sometimes they could recall information even though they had 
reported that they could not detect any change. Results from blindsight 
experiments also argue for the availability of knowledge without 
accom panying awareness. Further research is needed to fully 
understand the relationship between attention and consciousness as 
well as the type and extent of knowledge that one has about the world.
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Cognitive Neuroscience o f Altered States of 
Consciousness
Shruti Baijai and Narayanan Srinivasan
Cen/re for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allahabad, Allahabad.
Consciousness is an important aspect of mind and various 
attempts have been made to explain consciousness and the phenomena 
associated with consciousness. One way of attacking this problem is 
to study certain “changed” or “different” states of consciousness 
called as the altered states of consciousness (ASCs) that would itself 
reveal something about normal states of consciousness. ASCs range 
from typical human experiences like dreaming to atypical experiences 
like hypnosis. ASCs can result from  intense personal effort 
(meditation, tantra, ecstatic dancing, and sensory deprivation) or 
through external agents (drugs, hypnosis). ASCs are also produced 
under disease conditions including various psychotic disorders like 
Schizophrenia as well as coma and vegetative states. O ther 
controversial ASCs include out-of-body and near death experiences. 
Given the large variety of ASCs, it is important to investigate the 
similarities and differences between these states. Recently cognitive 
scientists and neuroscientists have started exploring these ASCs by 
using behavioural and neural approaches. Specifically cognitive 
electrophysiology (EEG/ERP) and neuroimaging has been used to 
investigate some of the neural correlates of ASCs. These techniques 
have demonstrated changes in brain activity due to changes in the 
states of consciousness that differ from  the norm al state of 
consciousness. Thus, it provides a way of measuring changes in 
cognitive functions due to changes in these states and correlating it 
with the normal states of consciousness. It has been proposed that 
these ASCs are the result of dynamical and constantly interacting 
neural activities between cortical and sub-cortical regions. Further 
research and modeling of brain function may help determine the 
concomitants of ASCs. Thus, interdisciplinary approaches covering
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psychology, neuroscience, computing and philosophy are further 
required to explore and approach towards solutions to the problem 
of consciousness.
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Epistemic action: A Link between Consciousness and 
Extended Mind?
Dilip Athreya, Narayanan Srinivasan and Sanjay Chandrasekharan
Center for Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, University ofAiialiabad, Allahabad.
In this paper, we introduce and discuss the general idea of 
epistemic action, introduced by Kirsh & Maglio (1994). Epistemic 
actions are actions an agent performs primarily to gain knowledge 
— it is an action that contributes to computation. An example would 
be rearranging rummy cards so that the set possibilities can be “read- 
o ff’ the hand, and not computed repeatedly. Epistemic actions are 
contrasted with pragmatic actions, which are actions executed 
primarily to alter the physical task environment. Epistemic actions 
make mental computations easier, faster and more reliable.
Various phenom ena have been investigated using the 
framework of epistemic actions. Mental rotation is one example where 
performing an actual rotation in the world is shown to be sometimes 
more advantageous than performing a mental rotation, especially in 
dynamic games like Tetris. At the very least, epistemic actions show 
the importance of actions in perception, awareness and knowledge 
acquisition.
Epistemic actions question the view that the mind resides 
entirely within the body, and raises the case for an ‘extended mind’, 
as argued for by Clark and Chalmers (1995). According to this view, 
any component of the world that plays the same role as that of any 
brain/body component in the cognitive process would count as 
“mind”. Thus cognition is viewed as outcomes of complex cognitive
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systems with social/institutional/artifactual components. Individual 
cognition is viewed as one component of such a system.
But, what of consciousness? Many identify cognitive with the 
conscious, and it seems far from plausible that consciousness extends 
outside the head. Are the first-person aspects of mind then to be 
exempted from the extended-mind theory? One of the replies is that 
the inner phenomenological awareness cannot be lost within the 
environmental embedding. We therefore see epistemic action as a 
link between perception (awareness) and knowledge acquisition.
References
1. Kirsh, D. & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic
action. C o g n i t i v e  S c ie n c e ,  1 8 , 513-549.
2. Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind, A n a ly s is ,  5 8 , p.7-19.
Abstracts o f Lectures
Hold your nerve 
Sharat Shastri
Central Institute of English and foreign Languages (CIEFL), Hyderabad.
Narratives restore harmony in the noise of life. In fact, one of 
the major themes of human life where this noise is quite glaringly 
visible is when humans batde with mental deficits. Medicine explains 
such deficits through the neurological anatomy covering the nervous 
system including the brain. And, the study of these two internal 
structures leads to neurology, which is extending well into a broader 
discipline called neuroscience. In both these dazzling fields, there 
have been several specialists who surpass their clinical constraints 
to produce scintillating narratives. I wish to study the works of two 
engaging neurologists of the 20th century.
The preeminent neuropsychologist Alexander Luria, and 
largely inspired by him, the renowned neuroanthropologist, Oliver 
Sacks -  Both of them have transformed their patient’s neurological
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diagnoses into wondrous narratives. Energized by real-life situations, 
these narratives nourish a novel way to document neurological 
complaints. Luria and Sacks aspire through these narratives to 
preserve the identity and dignity of the human self.
By moving beyond mere chronicling of the case histories, these 
neurological narratives trounce the prevalent gross reductionism of 
the brain and help enrich the existential sanity of humanity.
Specifics: I would select few neurological deficits (some result 
in advantages too) and briefly describe how they impinge on 
consciousness and impact the current literature about the subject. 
Useful illustrations and cartoons may invade the text.
Abstracts o f Lectures
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Dr. K. Kasturirangan
National Institute of Advanced Studies 





Dr. Krishnaswamy Kasturirangan is presently the Director of 
the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) at Bangalore and 
the Hon’ble Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha). Dr. Kasturirangan 
has steered the Indian Space programme gloriously for over 9 years 
as Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation, of Space 
Commission and Secretary to the Government of India in the 
Department of Space, before laying down his office on August 27, 
2003. He was earlier the Director of ISRO Satellite Centre, where he 
oversaw the activities related to the development of new generation 
spacecraft, Indian National Satellite (INSAT-2) and Indian Remote 
Sensing Satellites (IRS-IA & IB) as well as scientific satellites. He 
was also the Project Director for India’s first two experimental earth 
observation satellites, BHASKARA-I & II and subsequently was 
responsible for overall direction of the first operational Indian Remote 
Sensing Satellite, IRS-IA. Dr. Kasturirangan took his Bachelor of 
Science with Honours and Master of Science degrees in Physics from 
Bom bay U niversity  and received  his D octorate  D egree in 
Experimental High Energy Astronomy in 1971 working at the Physical 
Research Laboratory, Ahmedabad. Under his leadership, as Chairman, 
ISRO, the space programme has witnessed several major milestones 
including the successful launching and operationalisation of the 
India’s prestigious launch vehicle, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
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(PSLV) and more recently, the successful conclusion of flight testing 
leading to operationalisation of the all important Geosynchronous 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). Further, he has also overseen the 
design, development and launching of the world’s best civilian 
satellites, IRS-IC and ID, realization of the second generation and 
initiation of third generation INSAT satellites, besides launching 
ocean observation satellites IRS-P3/P4. These efforts have put India 
as a pre-eminent space-faring nation among the handful of six 
countries that have major space programmes. As an Astrophysicist, 
Dr. Kasturirangan’s interest includes research in high energy X-ray 
and gamma ray astronomy as well as optical astronomy. He has made 
extensive and significant contributions to studies of Cosmic x-ray 
sources, celestial gamma-ray and effect of cosmic x-rays in the lower 
atmosphere. Dr. Kasturirangan is a member of several important 
scientific academies, both within India and abroad. He is presently. 
President of Indian National Academy of Engineering, Chairman of 
the Council of the Indian Institute of Science and Raman Research 
Institute at Bangalore and of the Governing Council of Aryabhatta 
Research Institute of Observational Sciences at Nainital.
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Prof. B. V. Sreekantan
National Institute of Advanced Studies 
Indian Institute of Science 
Bangalore 560 012
Ph: 080-2360 4351 
Fax: 080-2360 6634 
Email: bvs@nias.iisc.ernet.in
B. V. Sreekantan is currently Visiting Professor at NIAS; 
Chairman, Gandhi Cetre of Science and Human Values of the Bhavan, 
Bangalore; and Editorial Fellow of the Project of History of Indian 
Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC). He was the Director of 
the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research during 1975-87 and the 
Indian National Science Academy Srinivasa Ramanujan Professor 
during 1987-92. he has specialized in cosmic rays, High energy 
physics and higher energy astronomies and has published over 200 
research papers. His current interests are in Philosophy of Science 
and Scientific and Philosophical studies on Consciousness. He is 
Fellow of the Indian Academy of Science, the Indian National 
Academy and the National Academy of Scences. He has received a 
number of professional awards including the R.D. Birla Award of 
the Indian Physics Association. He has held a number of Visiting 
positions including the US and Japan. He is a recipient of the Padma 
Bhushan Award.
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Prof. K. Ramakrishna Rao
President
Institute for Human Science and Service 




K. Ramakrishna Rao, PhD, DLit., is currently President of the 
Institute for Human Science & Service, Visakhapatnam, India. His 
previous academic appointments include Professor of Psychology 
and Vice-Chancellor at Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, and the 
Executive Director of the Foundation for Research on the Nature of 
Man, Durham, NC, USA. He studied at Andhra University and 
received Ph. D. and D. Lit. degrees in philosophy and psychology 
respectively. He attended the University of Chicago as the Smith - 
Mundt Fulbright Scholar and a Fellow of the Rockfeller Foundation 
and later carried out research at Duke University. Rao also served as 
Advisor on Higher Education and Vice-Chairman of the State 
P lanning B oard in the governm ent of A ndhra Pradesh. An 
acknow ledged international authority on Indian psychology, 
consciousness studies and psychical research, Rao was elected twice 
as the president of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology and 
served three times as the president of the US-based Parapsychological 
Association. He edited the Journal o f Indian Psychology and the 
Journal o f  Parapsychology. His publications include about 200 
research  papers and 12 books. His m ost recent books are 
Consciousness Studies: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (McFarland, 
2002) and Towards a Spiritual Psychology (New Delhi: Samvad India 
2005).
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Prof. Sumantra Chatterjee
Neurobiology of Leaning and Memory 
National Centre for Biological Sciences 
(Tata Institute of Fundamental Research)
UAS-GKVK Campus, Bellary Road 
Bangalore 560 065
Tel: 080-2363 6420-432 
Fax: 080-23636662/2363 6862 
Email: shona@ncbs.res.in
Chattarji, originally from Santiniketan, received his M aster’s 
Degree in Physics from IIT-Kanpur. He then went on to do a PhD in 
neuroscience, under the supervision of the well-known computational 
neuroscientist Terry Sejnowski, at the Johns Hopkins University and 
Salk Institute. After post-doctoral research at Yale University and 
MIT, he started his own lab at the National Centre for Biological 
Sciences, TIFR in Bangalore in 1999. He also holds a visiting 
appointment at MIT where he collaborates with the Nobel laureate 
Susumu Tonegawa. In addition, he is an affiliate at the Center for the 
Neuroscience of Fear and Anxiety at Rockefeller University in New 
York City. He was awarded the prestigious International Senior 
Research Fellowship by the Wellcome Trust, U.K. in 2003 and was 
recently featured in Outlook magazine as one of the top 10 young 
scientists of India.
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Shatavadhani Dr. R. Ganesh
(Dean, Department of Values at the 
International Academy for Creative Teaching)
1250 (30), 4th Main, E Block 
2nd Stage, Rajaji Nagar 
Bangalore 560 010
Tel: 080-2342 0628
Shatavadhani R. G anesh did his m aste r’s degrees in 
Mechanical Engineering and Sanskrit and pursued research in 
Materials Science and Metallurgy and also got D. Litt degree in 
Kannada literature for his thesis on the art and science of Avadhanam, 
and unique liteary feat in voling concentration, memory, spontaneous 
versification in classical diction and astounding wit aided with a 
refined sense of humour. He as an only Satavadhani in India to 
perform this art in several languages embellished with fine arts has 
given over 550 performances both in India and abroad. Ganesh has 
taught in several Engineering colleges regularly and was/is a visiting 
faculty inseveral univesities and academic institutions. He also 
workied as the director of Sanskrit studies at the Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan and was the research officer at the IGNCA, SRC, Bangalore. 
Presently he is the Dean for the Department of Values at the 
International Academy for Creative Teaching.
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Prof. R. L. Kapur
Professor Emeritus 
National Institute of Advanced Studies 





R. L. Kapur is an Emeritus Professor at the National Institute 
Of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. He w/as awarded the M.B.B.S., 
from  M edical College A m ritsar in 1960 and the D iplom a in 
Psychological Medicine (D.P.M.) from All India Institute of Mental 
Health (currently, the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro- 
Sciences or NIMHANS), Bangalore in 1965. Prof Kapur has been 
associated with the National Institute of Advanced Studies right from 
its beginning in 1988, first as a Full Professor, then as the Deputy 
Director, later as the J.R.D. Tata Visiting Professor and now as the 
Emeritus Professor. Here he has been pursuing his attempts to bring 
together experts in different fields of knowledge. His research 
interests include the community mental health research cross- cultural 
studies and the relevance of Indian philosophical and Spiritual 
traditions. He has also taken up for examination, some important 
themes in the area of Social Psychology. His major contributions in 
this field have been the study of Militancy in India and psychological 
correlates of creativity in Indian Science. His current passion is the 
study of the Indian Sanyasa traditions and to understand these, he 
has been examining the life trajectories of the Sanyasis and Sadhus 
who live high up in Himalayas, trying to understand their motivation 
to leave the society the impact of their Sadhana on their psychological 
states. Among the awards he has won the most prominent awards are 
the Commonwealth fellowship, Medical Council of India Hari Om 
Ashram award and the Fulbright fellowship of the USA.
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Dr. Jean Letschert
No. 2 4 ,16th Cross, 13th main
Malleswaram
Bangalore 560 055
Tel: 080-2344 7386 
Email: jletschart@yahoo.com
Jean Letschert Ashcharyacharya is bom in Brussels, Belgium, 
in 1939. After graduation in architecture and monumental painting 
from the Royal Academy of Fine-Arts of Brussels in 1958 he 
undertakes a carrier as a painter, decorator and illustrator. At the age 
of 22 he discovers the teachings of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and 
Vivekananda, and develops a deep interest for Eastern Spirituality, 
meets Jiddu Krishnamurti in Switzerland and becomes deeply 
involved in his teachings. Dr. Jean Letschert Ashcharyacharya has 
resided in South India for more than 30 years. Since December 1999, 
he is residing in Bangalore, Karnataka, where he has become a 
significant personality in the realm of culture. He has authored three 
books in French on Indian spirituality among which a translation 
with commentaries of the main Upanishads. He has written several 
articles on similar subjects for European revues. For the past 5 years 
he is currently working on what he considers should be his master- 
opus ; a book with a visual rendering of the 100 shlokas of 
Shankaracharya’s SAUNDARYALAHARI, with his own translations 
and commentaries. Due to his eclectic personality and his wide range 
of interests, his activities cover a variety of fields: Symbolist artist, 
environmental designer, art therapy & meditation consultant, writer, 
lecturer, philosopher, Indologist and Sanskrit translator. As an 
exponent of the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, his teachings are 
oriented towards the actualization of the Whole Person, involving 
psychology, ethics and practical aesthetics in all aspects of life. He 
considers himself as a genuine ambassador of the perennial spiritual 
culture of India.
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Prof. S. Mahedevan
Molecular Reproduction and Developmental Genetics 
Indian Institute of Science 
Bangalore 560 012
Tel: 080-2293 2607 
Email: mahi@mrdg.iisc.ennet.in
S. Mahadevan, Ph.D. FASc. is Professor, at Developmental 
B iology and G enetics Laboratory D epartm ent of M olecular 
Reproduction, Development and Genetics, Indian Institute of Science. 
He is a Ph.D. in Molecular Biology and Microbiology from Tufts 
University Medical School, Boston, USA. He did his Post-doctoral 
studies at the Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA. His Research 
Interests include Regulation of gene-expression in bacteria, microbial 
physiology and evolution. He is Secretary, Science Education Panel, 
Indian Academy of Sciences, and Chief Editor, Resonance, Journal 
of Science Education.
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Dr. Sangeetha Menon
Fellow
National Institute of Advanced Studies 





Sangeetha Menon is a philosopher with a doctorate awarded 
for the thesis entided “the concept of consciousness in the Bhagavad 
Gita" a major text of Indian philosophy. After graduating in zoology 
she took her postgraduate degree in philosophy and Ph.D from 
University of Kerala. A gold-medallist and first-rank holder for 
postgraduate studies, she received University Grants Commission 
fellowship for her doctoral studies for five years. She is working as
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Fellow at the National Institute of Advanced Studies since 1996. 
Dr. Menon has been working in the area of consciousness studies for 
over fifteen years. She has given numerous lectures and presentations 
at various national and international forum on consciousness, spiritual 
and aesthetic experiences, and science-spirituality interface issues. 
The Journal o f Transpersonal Psychology published an article on 
her research work and significant contributions (2002). Dr. Menon 
has co-edited three books on “Science and Beyond: Cosmology, 
consciousness and technology in Indie traditions” (2004, NIAS), 
“Consciousness and Genetics” (2002, NIAS) and “Scientific and 
Philosophical Studies on Consciousness” (1999, NIAS). Her book 
“Dialogues: Philosopher meets the Seer” (2003, Srshti Publishers) is 
a set of nine dialogues with her Guru on socio-cultural issues of 
contemporary importance. She has several publications in peer- 
reviewed journals, and contributed chapters on a variety of issues 
relating to self, mind and consciousness. She has also authored few 
monographs on consciousness in the context of Indian thought. She 
has been awarded two national awards and one international award 
for her achievements in the field of consciousness and Indian 
philosophy and psychology. In 1988 she was awarded the “Swami 
Pranavananda Philosophy Trust of India Award”. In 2003 she was 
awarded the “Young Philosopher Award” for her research work from 
Indian Council of Philosophical Research. This is the topmost national 
award given to a philosopher belonging to her age group. Recendy 
(2005) she won the international award entitled “Global Perspectives 
on Science and Spirituality Award” (www.uip.edu/gpss) and is 
currently writing a book on relating ‘consciousness, agency and 
spiritual experience’. She is an avid photographer, artist and web- 
designer.
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D r. Sharada Srinivasan
Fellow
National Institute of Advanced Studies 




Sharada Srinivasan has made significant contributions in the 
field of archaeometallurgy, i.e the study of metallurgy in relation to 
history, conservation science and scientific applications in art history, 
archaeology and museum studies. For the past four years, she has 
been based at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore 
(2001-4) and has previously held a Homi Bhabha Fellowship at the 
Department of Metallurgy, Indian Institute of Science (1996-8). 
Dr. Sharada Srinivasan has 10 years research experience since the 
award of Phd. (from Institute of Archaeology, University College 
London, Department of Conservation and Material Science) as an 
internationally and nationally reputed scholar with well cited 
published works including a book and 23 research papers and has 
also done a research associateship at the Department of Conservation 
and Scientific Research at the Freer and Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian 
Institution, USA. She is a recipient of prestigious awards such as the 
Malti B. Nagar Ethnoarchaeology Award (2005), the M aterials 
Research Society of India Medal (2006), India Foundation for Arts, 
Arts Documentation Award (2003), the Flinders Petrie Medal 1989 
from University of London, the Materials Research Society Graduate 
Student Award 1996 and the DST-SERC Young Scientist Fellowship. 
Her doctoral thesis research at Institute of Archaeology, University 
College, London on archaeometallurgical investigations on south 
Indian metal icons in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London and 
Government Museum, Chennai was the first to have extensively made 
use of lead isotope analysis in the study of south Asian archaeology 
and art history. She has important original archaeometallurgical
Ust o f Speakers and Brief Biography
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findings pointing to the accom plishm ents of ancient Indian 
metallurgists including production sites of high-grade wootz steel, 
evidence for the use of skilled alloys such as high-tin bronzes to 
make vessels and mirrors, and the extractive metallurgy of copper 
and bronze. Her investigations have demonstrated the usefulness of 
a range of analytical and metallurgical techniques in archaeology 
such as lead isotope analysis, spectrochemical and ICP analysis, SEM, 
EPMA-EDAX etc. A B.Tech from Indian Institute of Technology in 
Engineering Physics, Dr. Srinivasan also has significant inter­
disciplinary expertise with a background in art history (with an MA 
in Art and Archaeology from School of Oriental and African Studies, 
London). Dr. Srinivasan has lectured widely at international and 
national venues and teaching institutions (eg. UK, USA, Sweden, 
Japan, Sri Lanka, China) and has been guiding international doctoral 
candidates.
List o f Speakers and Brief Biography
Dr. Mrinalini Sarabhai
Darpana Academy of Performing Arts
Usmanpura
Ahmedabad 380 013
Tel: 079-2755 1389; 079-27550702
Fax; 079-2755 0566
Email: mrinaiini@darpana.com
Mrinalini Sarabhai, the celebrated dancer and choreographer, 
has achieved an international reputation that is unmatched by any 
contemporary Indian classical dancer. The syntax of her creativity 
mediates between a moral commitment to traditional form and the 
desire to claim one’s own experiments as unique, unrepeatable. This 
interface of technical mastery and creative expressionism achieves a 
profoundly versatile language of the body - simple, eloquent, visually 
inspiring. The creative anarchy of her essentially modern style is 
convincingly disciplined by the taut orthodoxy of her classical
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technique, leamt from her guru Sri Meenakshi Sundaram Pillai. The 
result is an exalted visual statement combining almost fanatical purity 
of vision with modish formal experiments. She is the founder-director 
of the Darpana Academy of Performing Arts, Ahmedabad, which 
came into being in 1949. She has travelled extensively all over the 
world and has received many distinguished national and international 
awards and citations for her contribution to the preservation of Indian 
classical dance. Called “the High Priestess of Indian dance” by dance 
critics, she is a pioneer in creative work and has given “new concepts 
to traditional dance forms with fresh perspectives and new mysteries.” 
She has many publications to her credit. She is the first Indian to 
receive the medal and Diploma of the French Archives Internationales 
de la danse. She was awarded the title of Natya Kala Sikhamani in 
Madras in 1960 in recognition of her artistic eminence and her 
unequalled performances of Bharatanatyam. In 1965, she was 
awarded the Padma Shri by the Government of India.
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Prof. Narayanan Srinivasan
Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences 
University of Allahabad 
Allahabad 211002
Tel: 0532-2460 738 
Email: ammuns@yahoo.com
Narayanan Srinivasan is mainly interested in studying visual 
perception and attention, consciousness and computational modelling 
of cognitive processes. He did his Masters degree in Electrical 
Engineering from Indian Institute of Science and the Master’s project 
was on EEG signal processing. During his doctoral work at University 
of Georgia with Dr. James Brown, he has looked into the interaction 
between attention and spatial frequency processing. He did his 
postdoctoral work at University of Louisville with Dr. Edward A 
Essock on diagnostic algorithms for Glaucoma. At CBCS, he is
295
pursuing various research projects on visual attention, consciousness 
and computational modelling. We are currently looking at processes 
associated with object-based attention, attentional processes in normal 
children and children with ADHD, change detection, and processing 
with hierarchical visual stimuli. We are also working on computational 
models of cognitive processes. At present, we are focusing on a graph 
theory based model for identifying phonological jokes, hindustani 
music analysis looking at raga recognition, and modelling visual 
attention. We are also conducting an EEG study to explore brain 
activity during meditation.
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D r. M. Srinivasan






M ahadeva Srinivasan served as an experimental Nuclear 
Physicist in the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai for 40 
years (1957 to 1997). His main interest was in the general area of 
Nuclear Science and Technology, specialising in the “Physics of 
Fission Chain Reactions and Fusioning Plasmas”. At the time of his 
retirement he was Head, Neutron Physics Division of BARC and 
also Associate Director of its Physics Group. His main contributions 
were in the design, construction and experimentation with the Pumima 
series of experimental nuclear reactors. (He also played a key role in 
the 1974 Pokhran Nuclear explosion experiment.) During the last 
seven years of his research career at BARC he was deeply involved 
in the study of the controversial new field of “Cold Fusion”. This 
experience played a key role in his realization that even scientists 
are subject to the common human trait of closed mindedness, short
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sightedness and being biased and conditioned by prior “knowledge”. 
Dr. Srinivasan has since come to appreciate that “Official” Science 
has its limitations and there are many facets of “Reality” that 
Conventional Scientific wisdom has not been able to fathom. Since 
his retirement, Dr.Srinivasan has been closely following the world 
wide progress of the field of Cold Fusion which has since been 
rechristened as “Condensed Matter Nuclear Science”. He has also 
been studying various anomalous and unexplained phenomena often 
consigned to the realms of “Fringe Science”. He has been following 
many experimental Investigations presently being carried out by 
several open minded and bold scientists to understand the plethora 
of phenomena falling in the overall category of “Parapsychology” 
which seeks to understand the basis of what is often dubbed as 
“Paranormal” phenomena.
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Dr. C. S. Unnikrishnan
Gravitation Group/FI-Lab
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Mumbai - 400 005
Email; unni@tifr.res.in 
URL: www.tifr.res.in/~filab
C. S. Unnikrishnan is presently Professor of Physics at the 
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) in Mumbai. At present, 
he also holds visiting faculty positions at the Centre for Philosophy 
and Foundations of Science, New Delhi, Bhaktivedanta Institute, 
Mumbai, Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, and University of Paris. 
Unnikrishnan was bom in Kalady in Kerala. After schooling and 
undergraduate education in Kerala, he completed M.Sc (Physics) from 
the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, and joined TIFR as a 
research student in 1984. He has been a faculty member of TIFR 
since 1993. His main research interest has been experimental and 
theoretical studies of foundational aspects of gravity, quantum
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mechanics, and the quantum vacuum. He is also deeply interested in 
the study of unobservables in physical theories. Apart from conducting 
precision measurements using torsion balances to test gravitation 
theories and to study the Casimir effect, he has also contributed to 
experim ents on laser cooling  o f atom s and B ose-E instein  
condensation of Helium. There are also several results pertaining to 
phenomenology of the gravitational interaction. He has contributed 
several articles on philosophical and metaphysical aspects of physical 
theories, methodology, spiritual experience in scientific endeavour, 
and foundations of physics. His major original scientific contributions 
in theoretical studies are clarifications on the issue on quantum 
nonlocality and a new consistent theory of relativity called Cosmic 
Relativity. Unnikrishnan has a serious interest in film-making and 
music. He has also been a regular columnist and satirist writing in 
Malayalam for the newspaper, ‘Kalakaumudi’, from Bombay. Details 
of publications and research can be found at the website of the Tata 
Institute, www.tifr.res.in, in the department of high energy physics.
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D r. Nataraja Sarma
Formerly with BARC 
302, Janki, Sector 17a 
Navi Mumbai 400 705
Tel: 022-27890364 
Email: vinarasa@vsnl.com
Nataraja Sarma was educated at Madras Christian College, 
Unviersity of Madras; Emmanuel College, Cambridge UK an the 
Imperial college, London. At the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
Dr. Sarma did basic research in nuclear and high energy physics and 
on the enhancement of precious stones. He has published 136 research 
papers in physics, two on ancient astronomy in Endeavour, and many 




Department of Humanities and Social Sciences 




H arinarayanan.V  is a research scholar in the Dept, of 
Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Kanpur. He currently works on 
the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. His other areas 
of interst are philosophy of language, philosophy of science and theory 
of evolution. He has a post-graduate degree in philosophy from 
Calicut University.
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Ms. Farah Naaz
MSc Cognitive Science
Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences 
University of Allahabad, Allahabd 211 002
Email; fnansaril@yahoo.com 
fnansari@gmail.com
Farah Naaz is currently doing my M.Sc. in Cognitive Science 
at the Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, Allahabad 
University. She has completed her B.Sc with Botany and Zoology 
from Allahabad University. She is generally interested in the topic of 
Perception, Attention and Awareness. She is working on the topic of 
Change Detection as her Master’s Thesis. This project aims at studying 
various factors that affect our ability to detect change.
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Ms. Shruti Baijal
First Floor, Psychology Building
Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences
University of Allahabad, Allahabad 211 002
Email: shrutLbaijal@rediffmail.com
Shruti Baijal is presently a Master’s student at the Centre for 
Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences at the University of Allahabad. 
Before joining the Master’s programme She did her undergraduate 
degree in Zoology (with Honors) at the University of Delhi. She hhas 
always been interested in Neuroscience and Cognition which led her 
to take up a research project on the neural bases of altered states of 
consciousness (meditation). Besides this, she is interested in studying 
Attention and Cognitive Neuroscience.
List o f Speakers and Brief Biography
Sri Dilip Athreya
Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences 
University of Allahabad 
Allahabad 211 002
Email: athreyadilip@yahoo.com
Dilip Athreya was bom and brought up in Bangalore. He has 
done Bachelors of Science (Mathematics, Electronics and Computer 
Science) from Bangalore University. Currently he is in 2nd Semester 
of Masters Degree in Cognitive Science from Center for Behavioral 
and Cognitive Science, University of Allahabad. His interest has a 
wide spectrum from dramatics to science of mind to philosophy. In 
the realm of Cognitive Science he is interested in visual perception, 
particularly Imagery. He would like to work with nonlinear dynamical 
approach to cognition in future. Imagination and Illusion are the two 
mysteries that he would like to dig upon and demystify. He is also 
interested in Indian philosophical approach to cognition and 
perception, especially Sankara’s Advaita philosophy.
300
Sri Sharat Shastri




Sharat Shastri’s graduate and postgraduate education in science 
swung him between certainty and ambiguity until he chanced upon 
literature and philosophy, which reinstalled much-needed curiosity 
for knowledge. And, he got a lifetime task: to become what he is 
potentially capable of. As a first step, he joined for a postgraduate 
course in English at CIEFL, Hyderabad. Fortunately, he had the 
privilege to be tutored by some brilliant professors who touched him 
with their compassion and ingenuity. Synthesis of disciplines by trying 
to weave a rainbow out of diversities has moved him through various 
subjects. In this pursuit, he have had the impressive company of some 
bright minds to prepare for research to blend one of the most 
enlivening disciplines: literature & philosophy with an equally 
enthralling subject: medicine (especially neurology, neuroscience.). 
He is gradually learning and he wishes that through this august 
conference, he can explore and discover new pathways to knowledge.
List o f Speakers and Brief Biography
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Conference Programme
M onday, 6 February 2006
9.30 AM Welcome and Opening Remarks
K. Kasturirangan
Director,
National Institute of Advanced Studies
Introduction
Sangeetha Menon
National Institute of Advanced Studies
Registration: 9-9.30am
Session 1: C h a ir-C . S. Unnikrishnan
9 .4 5 -1 0 .1 5 B. V. Sreekantan on Science,
Reality and Consciousness
10 .15-10 .30 DISCUSSION
10.30-11 .00 TEA/COFFEE
Session 2; Chair -  Nataraja Sarma
11.00 -  11.30 K. Ramakrishna Rao: Consciousness
and Cognitive Anomalies 
11 .30- 11.40 DISCUSSION
11.40 -  12.00 M. Srinivasan: Intention Imprinted
Electrical Device: Experiments o f  
William Tdler
12.00 -  12.10 DISCUSSION
302
Programme
Session 3: Chair -  Narayanan Srinivasan
12 .10 -12 .30  
12.30. -  12.40 PM
S. M ahadevan: on
The “Conscious” Bacterium 
DISCUSSION
1 2 .40 -1 .0 0
1 .0 0 -1 .1 0
S um an tra  C h atta rji on The Conscious 
versus the Subconscious: A View 
through the Neurobiology o f  Memory 
DISCUSSION
1 .1 0 -2 .0 0 LUNCH
Session 4: Chair -  K. Ramakrishna Rao
2.00 -  2.20 
2.20 -  2.30
Jean  L etschert on Mandala 
Awareness in Indian Spirituality 
DISCUSSION
2.30 -  2.50 
2.50 -  3.00
S hatavadhani R. G anesh on
The Theory and Experience o f  Rasa 
DISCUSSION
Session 5: Chair -  B. V. Sreekantan
3.00 -  3.20 
3 .2 0 -3 .3 0
C. S. U nnikrishnan  on Denying 
Experience in the Physical World: 
Consciousness Misled 
DISCUSSION
3 .3 0 -3 .5 0  
3.50 -  4.00
N ata ra ja  S arm a on Death and the 
Foundations o f  Science 
DISCUSSION
4.00 -  4.30 TEA/COFFEE
303
4.30 -  6.00 Session 6:
Poster Presentations:
Shru ti Baijal on Cognitive 
Neuroscience o f  Altered States o f  
Consciousness
F arah  Naaz on Attention, Awareness, 
and Knowledge: Implications o f  
Change Blindness
S ara t C handra on Hold Your Nerve
T\iesday, 7 February 2006
Session 7: Chair -  K. Ramakrishna Rao
9.45 -  10.15 AM R. L. K ap u r on Living at The Edge o f  
Experience: The W ayofTheSanyasi 
10 .15-10 .30  DISCUSSION
Programme
10 .30-11 .00 TEA/COFFHE
Session 8: Chair -  R. L. Kapur
11 .00-11 .20 N arayanan Srinivasan on
Meditation, Brain and Cognition
11 .20-11 .30 DISCUSSION
11.30-11 .50 Sangeetha M enon on Brain and Being
11.50-12 .00 DISCUSSION
12.00 -1.00 PM Session 9: Poster Presentations 
V. H arinarayanan  on
Consciousness, Self and Metaphor 
Dilip A threya on Epistemic Action:




1 .0 0 -2 .0 0 LUNCH
Session 10: Chair -  Sangeetha Menon
2.00 -2 .4 5 Special Lecture (and abhinaya) by 
M rinalini Sarabhai on The Concept o f  
Beauty in Indian Aesthetics
2.45 -  3.00 DISCUSSION
3 .0 0 -3 .3 0 TEA/COFFhE
Session 11: Chair -  Sangeetha Menon
3 .3 0 -3 .5 0 S harada Srinivasan on Art and
Archaeometallurgy ofNataraja  
Bronzes: Explorations into Visual 
Metaphors and Consciousness
3 .2 0 -3 .3 0 DISCUSSION
3 .3 0 -4 .3 0 Session 12: PAN EL  DISCUSSION on 
“ Consciousness, Experience and 
Ways of Knowing: Perspectives from 
Science, Philosophy and the A rts”
Chairperson ; Sangeetha Menon
Panelists : B. V. Sreekantan
K. Ramakrishna Rao 
Narayanan Srinivasan 
C. S. Unnikrishnan
4 .3 0 -5 .1 5 OPEN DISCUSSION
5 .1 5 -5 .3 0 CONCLUSION
3 0 5
Today often the issue that gathers focus inspite ol'its evasive nature, in 
discussions on consciousness, cognition, or even advancements in 
nanotechnology and biotechnology, is about E x p e r ie n c e  with a capital 
'E'. The last few decades have seen tremendous achievements in creating 
new technologies and theories to understand life, nature and universe. 
This has brought back the human factor into discussions. In this book, 
authors address the persistent puzzles in consciousness studies, 
developments in cognitive sciences, and the distinct ways of knowing 
and experiencing in science, philosophy and the arts in the context of the 
Indian discourse. It is hoped that this discussion will help to examine the 
emerging trends in these areas and also explore the place of'experience' 
in knowledge and bclicfsystems.
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started by the late Sri .1. R. D. Tata. Sri Tata was desirous of starling 
an Institute which would not only conduct high quality research in 
interdisciplinary areas but al.so serve as a medium which would 
bring together administrators in the government and private sector 
with members of the academic community, lie believed that such an 
interaction could be of great help to executives in their decision 
making capabilities. N IAS is situated in the picturesque Indian 
Institute of Science Campus in Bangalore. Its faculty is drawn from 
different fields representing various disciplines in the natural and 
social sciences. The Institute carries out interdisciplinary research 
and is unique in its integrated approach to the study of the interfaces 
between science and technology and societal issues. Dr. M. S. 
Swaminathan is the Chairman of the Council of Management ofthc 
Institute. Dr. Raja Ramanna was the Director since its inception till 
his retirement on July 3 1,1997. Prof R. Narasimha was the Director 
from 1997 to March 2004. Dr. K. Kasturirangan. (Hon'ble Member 
of Parliament, Rajya Sabha), former Chairman, ISRO. is currently 
the Dircctorofthe Institute.
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